

**AL-JAMĀ'AH
AL-ISLĀMIYYAH**

Kennimrod Sariburaja

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FOREWORD

The Bali bombings perpetrated by al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI) that killed 202 civilians in 2002 were amongst the deadliest terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia. The series of suicide bombings in Indonesia that followed i.e. the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in 2003, the bombing of the Australian Embassy in 2004, the Bali bombings in 2005 and the Jakarta bombings in 2009 alerted the authorities in the region for the need of swift and extensive action and cooperation in the fight against JI.

This was indeed a herculean task simply because the cooperation required by the authorities was not only in the enforcement field, but also included areas such as deradicalisation and disengagement. Therefore, to counter JI from expanding, it is important to understand the aims of JI and how they hope to achieve them.

Throughout the years, Malaysian security forces have successfully thwarted attempted attacks and have arrested numerous JI members who were operating in the country. However, the threat of JI, albeit disrupted due to successful counter-terrorism efforts in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, remains dangerous. The result of such successes has unfortunately led to the emergence of new networks, sleeper cells and other splinter groups around Southeast Asia. These newly emerged groups are relatively small in size and this had made the effort to apprehend them all the more difficult. Therefore, in the attempt to counter the spreading and masked threat in this globalised era, the burden and responsibilities in ensuring peace and security should not only emphasise the employment of hard power but also the application of soft power.

Realising this, the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) through its Research and Publications Division conducted an in-depth study to understand the history, ideology, organisational structure, recruitment process, financial resources and operational methods of JI. In conducting the research, the author has managed to obtain first-hand information from former terrorists, experts and security personnel in the field. In this regard, I am certain

that with the publication of this monograph, readers will have a better understanding of the dynamics of JI.

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KENNIMROD SARIBURAJA

INTRODUCTION

The 2002 Bali suicide bombings that killed 202 people was a wakeup call for the authorities in Southeast Asia on the potential threat posed by al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI).¹ JI is a militant-oriented group with the ultimate goal of forming an Islamic state (*dawlah Islāmiyyah*) in the region, and subsequently, reviving the glory and greatness of the Islamic caliphate (*khilāfah Islāmiyyah*²) through armed struggle (*jihād muṣallah*). As the targeted states in the region are Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines and Singapore, the JI is an imminent threat to Malaysia.

As a militant group in the region, JI is not only active in planning terrorist attacks such as suicide and car bombings, but it is also actively recruiting members, and training and indoctrinating them, as well as collecting funds in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Australia.

The threat posed by JI is focused not only in the Southeast Asia region but it has also been globally demonstrated through their links with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Taliban and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Therefore, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 25 October 2002, JI was included in the United Nations 1267 Committee's list of terrorist organisations linked to the al-Qaeda or the Taliban.³ JI was responsible for numerous attacks over the past decade, showing its tenacity in its efforts to realise its vision. From 2000 to 2009, JI carried out 22 bombing attacks, killing 296 civilians.

¹ C. Clarence, Augustus Martin and Gus Martin, *The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011).

² *Khilāfah Islāmiyyah* / خلافة refers to the Islamic caliphate that existed during the time of the *ṣaḥabah* (companions of the Prophet) and the generation *tabi'* (followers) and *tabi' al-tābi'in* (followers of the followers). This generation is known as the *salaf al-sālih* generation, i.e. the generation that existed during the 300 years following the demise of the Prophet. Contemporary jihadist groups such as al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI), Dārul Islām (DI) and al-Qaeda envisioned having the caliphate system revived and practiced in the modern world. Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 2013.

³ "Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QE.J.92.02. JEMAAH ISLAMİYAH by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," *The United Nations*, last modified March 28, 2011, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE09202E.shtml>.

List of al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah Attacks⁴

Date of Bombing	Targets
1 August 2000	Philippines Embassy in Jakarta
27 August 2000	Malaysian Embassy complex in Jakarta
13 September 2000	Jakarta Stock Exchange
24 December 2000	Christmas Eve bombings in Jakarta, West Java (Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung), East Java (Mojokerto), Nusa Tenggara Barat (Mataram), Sumatra (Medan, Pematang Siantar), Batam, Riau (Pekanbaru)
23 September 2001	Atrium Plaza, Senen, Jakarta
12 October 2001	KFC restaurant, Makassar
6 November 2001	Australian International School, Pejaten, Jakarta
1 January 2002	New Year’s bomb attack outside a restaurant in Jakarta
12 October 2002	Kuta and the American Consulate in Denpasar, Bali
5 December 2002	McDonalds in Makassar, South Sulawesi
3 February 2003	Police headquarters, Wisma Bhayangkan, Jakarta
27 April 2003	Terminal 2F, Soekarno-Hatta International Airport
5 August 2003	JW Marriot Hotel, Jakarta
10 January 2004	Cafe Bukit Sampoddo Indah, Palopo, South Sulawesi
26 July 2004	General Elections Commission, Jakarta
9 September 2004	Australian Embassy in Jakarta
12 December 2004	Church of Immanuel, Palu, Central Sulawesi
21 March 2005	Two bombings in Ambon, Eastern Indonesia
1 October 2005	Kuta and Jimbaran, Bali
31 December 2005	Marketplace in Palu, Central Sulawesi
11 November 2006	A&W restaurant, East Jakarta
17 July 2009	JW Marriot and Ritz-Carleton hotels, Jakarta
<i>A total of 22 terrorist bombings, 296 fatalities</i>	

⁴ Adam D. Tyson, “De-Radicalisation in Indonesia: Discourses and Strategies,” in *SEARCCT’s Selection of Articles Vol. 2/2011*, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2011).

The above statistics show that JI's target areas are concentrated in public places and are "soft targets" rather than focusing on military facilities and installations or "hard targets". Such an indiscriminate approach of targeting non-combatants or civilians shows the viciousness of JI in achieving their aims. Zamihan Mat Zain, in an interview, explained that JI is prepared to use violent methods such as suicide bombings and car bombings to realise their idea of a *dawlah Islāmiyyah*.⁵ These methods are used deliberately to maximize casualties and instil fear among the people. Meanwhile, Ken Conboy stated that, from the list of bombings, it is clearly shown that JI targets western nationals as seen in their modus operandi of attacking embassies, hotels and tourist spots⁶ which are frequented by these people.

Although the threat level of JI is relatively low in Malaysia, the group has attempted attacks on several vital installations in the country. The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) has successfully arrested 129 JI members in an attempt to eliminate their threat in Malaysia. Besides that, two most prominent Malaysian JI members who had masterminded and executed a series of suicide bombings in Indonesia, namely Dr. Azahari Husin and Noordin Mat Top were killed in Indonesia, in 2006 and 2009 respectively.

Following this, JI operations in Malaysia have weakened. However, the threat has not been fully eliminated as there is still a possibility that JI will try to revive the group through new recruits, splinter groups, or sleeper cells, as well as through cooperation with other terrorist groups such as the al-Qaeda and the ASG, either in Malaysia or elsewhere in the region. Rommel Banlaoi agreed that JI still poses a threat in the region through its continued links and cooperation with other terrorist groups, in particular with the ASG.⁷ Thus, the threat posed by JI in the region is complex and sophisticated, and one that is not easily tackled and diffused. Therefore, it is imperative for us to study and analyse the complexity of JI in order to identify the best possible approach to counter the threat posed by the group.

⁵ Zamihan Mat Zain, interview by Author, Bangi, Selangor, March 8, 2011.

⁶ Ken Conboy, interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 4, 2011.

⁷ Rommel Banlaoi, interview by Author, Bangkok, Thailand, June 21, 2011.

THE HISTORY

There are several “theories” explaining how the al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI) came into existence, evolved, and became the organisation it is today. However, most researchers agree that the origins of JI as an organisation (*tanzīm*) and ideological movement can be traced back to Dārul Islām (DI), a politically-oriented movement founded by S.K. Kartosuwirjo in 1947, in the midst of Indonesia’s war of independence against the Dutch in the late 1940s and 1950s.⁸

When Indonesia gained independence in 1945, President Sukarno declared that the nation would be established as a secular-state, based on the ideology of *Pancasila*. The five principles of the *Pancasila* are: Belief in the one and only God; Just and civilized humanity; Unity of Indonesia; Democracy guided by consensus; and Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia. Sukarno’s proclamation of *Pancasila* was diametrically opposed to the vision of several Islamic figures in Indonesia who envisioned creating an Islamic state (*dawlah Islāmiyyah*), a state based on Islamic law (*Shari‘ah*). For Kartosuwirjo, Sukarno’s ideology of *Pancasila* was un-Islamic, for Islam only recognises the supremacy of *Shari‘ah* as the law of the state. Failing to push his idea forward, Kartosuwirjo employed a militant approach and declared *jihād* against the state. In this so-called war, DI did not only fight against the Sukarno regime but also the Dutch, who were trying to regain their hold on Indonesia.

However, Kartosuwirjo’s struggle against the Sukarno regime ended prematurely with his arrest and execution in 1962.⁹ Despite his demise, Kartosuwirjo’s vision of establishing *dawlah Islāmiyyah* in the Malay Archipelago (*Nusantara*) was perpetuated secretly by his followers during Suharto’s era. Among these followers were two well known clerics of *hadhrāmi* descent,¹⁰ Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir, who were actively involved in political activism against Suharto’s regime for many years. In 1978, they were

⁸ See Peter Chalk, “Militant Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” in *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, ed. Paul J. Smith, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2005).

⁹ Amelia Fauzia, “Darul Islam Movement (DI): Struggling for an Islamic State of Indonesia,” in *Southeast Asia: a historical encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor*, ed. Keat Gin Ooi, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004).

¹⁰ The *hadhrāmi* / حضرمي are people inhabiting the Hadhramaut region in Yemen and their descendants around the world.

apprehended and detained for nine years by Indonesian authorities for their role in creating subversive elements to destabilise Indonesia.

Sungkar and Ba'āsyr met in Solo in 1963. Both shared the same vision about the future of Indonesia, which was to transform Indonesia from a secular state into an Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* - NII) that is built upon the *Shari'ah* law, and also to restore the *khilāfah Islāmiyyah*. It is believed that Sungkar and Ba'āsyr were recruited by one of DI leaders, Haji Ismail Pranoto as members of the DI movement, between 1974 and 1976.

From the 1970s until the 1980s, Suharto's regime launched a massive crackdown on the DI movement, apprehending many of its leaders, members and associates linked to its special operations group known as *Komando Jihad*.¹¹ As a result of this, as well as to avoid imprisonment by the Suharto regime, many DI leaders went into hiding or fled to Malaysia. Among the earliest DI figures to flee to Malaysia were Sungkar and Ba'āsyr. Their flight to Malaysia in 1985, which they regarded as their own *hijrah*,¹² paved the way for other DI members to relocate the movement and its operations to Malaysia.

In Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr became respected religious figures amongst the locals. They held regular religious group discussions (*usrah*) for their followers and other people who came from various parts of the country to listen to their lectures. Apart from *usrah* activities, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr also recruited new members, collected funds, and organised training for DI members so that they could fight alongside the *mujahiddīn*¹³ in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet war, from 1979 to 1989.

¹¹ *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) is an offshoot group of Dārul Islām (DI) founded by former DI members properly instigated by Ali Moertopo and *Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara* (The State Intelligence Coordination Body - BAKIN) in 1970s. Semilar to DI, *Komando Jihad* was also fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia and has been involved in the Garuda DC9 hijacking in 1981, the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984 and the Borobudur bombing in 1985. See Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin, *Second Edition: Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2004); See also Marcus Mietzer, *Military Politics, Islam and the State of Indonesia: from Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009).

¹² *Hijrah* / هجرة refer to the migration of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E to escape an assassination attempt from the Qurayš tribe chiefs in Mecca. See Şaff al-Raḥ mĀn Mubārakfūrī, *Ar-raheeq Al-makhtu*, (Saudi Arabia: Darulssalam, 2002).

¹³ *Mujāhiddīn* / مجاهدين is the term used by a group of individuals who fight their enemies for the sake of upholding the religion of Islam. Those who died in this battle will be regarded as *syahīd* / شهيد (martyr) or individual who will be granted heaven in the hereafter. This term is used by JI for its members who embark into *jihād* in the battlefield against its enemies. Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview.

It is clear then that the influence of DI and its ideology did not cease, but was continued by its followers and passed on from one generation to another. However, the relationship between Sungkar and Ba'āsyir and the DI leadership in Indonesia did not last long. After the execution of Kartosuwiryo in 1962, the organisation was headed by figures such as Daud Beureueh, Adah Djaelani and later by Ajengan Masduki.

In 1987, when Djaelani was arrested by the Suharto regime, Masduki was elected as the acting leader of DI.¹⁴ As Masduki was a Sundanese who could not speak fluent Arabic, his leadership was not well received by several influential Javanese leaders in DI, particularly Sungkar and Ba'āsyir.¹⁵ Apart from this, there are several explanations as to why this relationship deteriorated. First, it was said that Sungkar and Ba'āsyir advocated a more academic approach in developing *dawlah Islāmiyyah*. This was clearly manifested when they established *Pesantren al-Mukmin*,¹⁶ also known as *Pondok Ngruki*, in 1972, to recruit selected cadres into the movement. On the other hand, DI under the leadership of Masduki was still focusing on recruiting and winning the support of individuals from poorly-educated and the lower income groups. Second, it has also been suggested that while Sungkar and Ba'āsyir favoured *jihād* (*jihād* in their perspective refers to *al-qitāl*¹⁷), influenced by their association with the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; Masduki, as the new leader of DI rejected the notion of using violence to achieve DI's goal and preferred a more passive *jihād* through consultation and prayer.¹⁸ Third, the conflict between Masduki, Sungkar and Ba'āsyir was also due to the issues of financial management, particularly the issue of using funds to send DI

¹⁴ Justin V. Hastings, *No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia: The rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)*, (Canberra, Australia: Australia National University Press, 2008).

¹⁶ *Pesantren* is an Islamic boarding school in Indonesia. *Pesantren* teaches subjects related to Islam, including memorisation and interpretation of the Quran, *hadith* (traditions of the Prophet), and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). See Ron Lukens-Bull, "Pesantren," in *Modern Muslim Societies*, ed. Florian Pohl, (Malaysia: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2010); see also Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia*, (Wesport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009).

¹⁷ *al-qitāl* / القتال in the context of JI's struggle refers to the actual war in the battlefield involving the use of weapons to defeat the enemy and this includes the use of suicide bombing or "operation martyrdom" (*al-'amāl al-isyīshādīyyah* / الاعمال الاستشهادية). Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview.

¹⁸ Kenneth J. Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*, (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing, 2006).

members to Afghanistan. Masduki accused Sungkar and Ba'asyir of lack of transparency and alleged they benefitted personally from the collected funds. Meanwhile, Sungkar and Ba'asyir accused Masduki of practicing Shi'ism¹⁹ and Sufism²⁰ and asked the DI *mujāhiddīn* in Afghanistan to choose between them and Masduki.

This dispute led to the emergence of JI in Malaysia in 1993, under the leadership of Sungkar and Ba'asyir, and as an organisation distinct from DI. Bilveer Singh and Kamarulnizam Abdullah are both of the opinion that among the many versions of how JI was established, this version of JI's establishment is the most accurate as both believe JI was set up in Malaysia during the time Sungkar and Ba'asyir were in hiding.²¹

Meanwhile, some have suggested that the formation of JI was as a result of the "black operation" orchestrated by *Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara* (BAKIN) or the State Intelligence Coordination Body, led by Ali Moertopo.²² According to this account, the Suharto regime had planned to flush out former DI members who were inducted into the military before the 1977 elections. BAKIN fabricated stories that the fall of Saigon in 1975 would lead to the dispersion of communist ideology throughout Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Moertopo's men then persuaded key former DI members to contact their colleagues and reactivate their movement²³ through the formation of a DI offshoot group called *Komando Jihad*.²⁴ Suharto's plan was to flush out of hiding hundreds of DI

¹⁹ Shi'ism is the doctrines and practices of the Shi'a, the second largest denomination of Muslims, which believes that Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, as the first Imam and the rightful caliph / successor to the Prophet. See Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest*, (USA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

²⁰ Sufism or Islamic mysticism often refers to as the internalisation and intensification of Islamic faith and practices through rituals such as recitation of prayers, poems, selections from the *Quran*, and methodical repetitions of divine names (dhikr). See "Sufism," in *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, *Oxford Islamic Study Online*, accessed May 15, 2013. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2260>

²¹ Bilveer Singh, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, October 15, 2010; Kamarulnizam Abdullah, interview by Authors, Bangi, Selangor, January 31, 2011.

²² *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, "Asia Report N°92 Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing", February 22, 2005.

²³ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, (Singapore: University Press Pte Ltd, 2005).

²⁴ Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syariat Islam Dari Indonesia Hingga Nigeria*, (Jakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004).

members and then to arrest them for involvement in violent activities.²⁵ Thus, in 1977, 185 DI members were arrested for trying to form an Islamic state in Indonesia. It was during this turmoil that Sungkar and Ba'asyir gathered DI members close to them and making them swear an oath of obedience and thus creating a new underground religious network that is known today as JI.²⁶

Another theory was that JI was created by Indonesians who were inspired by *jihād* in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s. At the time, the United States (US) was involved in a proxy war against the Soviet Union supporting Osama bin Laden and his *jihādi* activities in Afghanistan. The US even condoned the mobilisation of *mujāhiddīn* from all over the world, including Southeast Asia, and provided the foreign *mujāhiddīn* in Afghanistan with logistics and financial aid through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²⁷ During this time, the *mujāhiddīn* from the Southeast Asia region met and formed a new *mujāhiddīn*-oriented organisation that came to be known as al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah or JI.

Finally, it has also been suggested that the JI was founded by Sungkar and Ba'asyir in the early 1970s. Prior to that, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were actively involved in the *Masyumi*-affiliated Indonesian Muslim youth known as *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia*, a movement under the influence of *Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations). In 1960, *Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* was banned by President Sukarno for supporting the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI) or the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, a rebel movement led by army officers of the Indonesian army. Sungkar and Ba'asyir met in 1963 when both were actively campaigning for the implementation of *Shari'ah* law in Indonesia. In 1969, they founded *Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta* (Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta), a pirate radio station that broadcasted the call for *jihād* in Solo, Central Java.²⁸ In 1971, both of them founded the *Pesantren al-Mukmin* or *Pondok Ngruki*. According to this account, JI was founded shortly after both Sungkar and Ba'asyir established *Pondok Ngruki* and merged it with DI in 1976 to strengthen Islamic propagation as one congregation (*jamā'ah*). Due to the

²⁵ Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 2003).

²⁶ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*.

²⁷ Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

similarity of its vision and mission, which was to form a *dawlah Islāmiyyah* in Indonesia, the JI was not intended to succeed DI. Thus it became part of the DI movement led jointly by Masduki and Sungkar.²⁹

Despite the many theories about the emergence of JI, what can be clearly seen is that the formation of JI is closely linked to the DI movement, as JI leaders and members were either former members of DI or had family ties with them. Furthermore, both movements shared the same vision, which was to create an Islamic state known as *dawlah Islāmiyyah* based on *Syarī'ah* law. It is also important to note that Sungkar and Ba'āsyir were highly charismatic leaders and believed in the use of *jihād* (*al-qitāl*: war and killing) as the means to achieve the objectives of their movement. This misconception of *jihād* eventually led to numerous terrorist acts in Southeast Asia, and especially in Indonesia.

²⁹ Kamarulnizam Abdullah, "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): The Links", in *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, Vol. 4, Issue 1, ed. Caroline Ziemke, Kongdan Oh Hassig, Colin Wastell and Rhonda Jenkins, (April 2009).

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT

Ideology is an important element in JI as it functions as the basis of the organisation's struggle and serves as a guide for its leaders and members. In order to comprehend the ideological construct of the organisation, it is imperative to discuss three key concepts, namely *salafī-jihādiyyah*; *jihād*; and *al-walā' wa al bara* and how these concepts are connected to terrorism.

Salafī-Jihādiyyah / سلفي جهادية

The term *salafī-jihadism* (*salafī-jihādiyyah*) is essentially a combination of two key terms *salafī* and *jihādiyyah*, reflecting the vision and mission of the group. In this context, the term *salafī* implies the intention and purpose of the group to return to the original teachings of the *salaf* generation (*tābi'* and *tābi' tabi'īn*) or the generation that existed 300 hundred years following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad. It is believed that the *salaf* generation practiced Islam in its most perfect and complete manner. Therefore, in JI's perspective it is important for modern Muslims to return to the understanding of this generation in order to rejuvenate the spirit and revive the glory of the Muslim community (*ummah*) in modern times. However, JI believes that there is only one way to achieve this objective and that is through the commission of *jihād*, where wars are waged on the so-called "enemies" of Islam. Such battles are regarded the utmost form of *jihād*³⁰ and to implement them, a structured organisation (*tanzīm*) and effective human capital are essential. This led to the formation of JI as a well-structured organisation based on a certain philosophy (or ideology), a leadership system and *modus operandi*. The JI's *salafī-jihādiyyah* thought is well documented in a manual known as *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah* (PUPJI)³¹ (General Guidelines for the Struggle of al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah). Azyumardi Azra in an interview said he is of the opinion that following the example of the *salaf* generation in practising Islam is necessary to defend the

³⁰ Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 2013.

³¹ Andrew T.H. Tan, *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, (Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007).

religion. However, it must not be done through extremism or the ‘ideology of hatred’ and armed *jihād* but via moderation and *da‘wah*.³²

Originally, *salafī* was a positive term for it reflected the intention of Muslims to cleanse their faith from all forms of impurities and distortion; it was not inclined to violence. However, the advocates of this idea became increasingly radical when they became influenced by radical writers and ideologues³³ who introduced the concept of *takfīriyyah*³⁴ and *jihād* in the form of *al-qitāl* and several other radical terminology. It became more complicated when they started calling others who did not share their beliefs as “enemies of the religion” or *tāghūt*.³⁵ The JI leadership was greatly inspired by this approach (*fikrah*). Yusuf Morales believes that terrorist groups had twisted the true meaning of *salafī* in order to justify their action in killing innocent people and to label other Muslims who did not share their opinions as enemies.³⁶

Scholars and experts in the field have long argued over the origins of JI’s radical thinking. One of the theories states that JI’s radical ideology was entrenched in the DI movement. Many JI members were former DI members who were associated with the *Tentera Islam Indonesia* (TII)³⁷ and *Komando Jihad*. These were people such as Farihin Ahmad, Abdul Jabar, Mohammed Islam,

³² Azyumardi Azra, interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 4, 2013.

³³ These include Syed Qutb, Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Hassan al-Banna, Abu al-‘Alā al Mawdūdī, and Shaykh Abdullah Azzam (even though he is against the idea of overthrowing Muslim ruling government). In the contemporary world, they include Osama bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Ḍawāhirī, Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Abū Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahmān and others. Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview.

³⁴ *Takfīriyyah* / تكفيرية is the practice of calling Muslims as apostate or heretic, therefore it is permissible to kill them and confiscate their properties. See Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, *Kitāb al Tawhīd* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: International Islamic Publishing House, 1991); see also Syed Qutb, *Ma‘ālim fi al Ṭariq* (Milestone) (Singapore: Muslim Youth Assembly, undated).

³⁵ Tito Karnavian, *Indonesia Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso*, (Jakarta, Indonesia: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008).

³⁶ Yusuf Morales, interview by Author, Manila, the Philippines, March 29, 2011.

³⁷ *Tentera Islam Indonesia* (TII) was an offshoot group from Dārul Islām (DI) led by individuals such as Kahar Muzakkar, Daud Beureueh and Amir Fatah that launched a rebellion against the government of Indonesia with the aimed of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. See Amelia Fauzia, “Darul Islam Movement (DI): Struggling for an Islamic State of Indonesia,” in *Southeast Asia: a historical encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor*.

Solahudin, and Achmad Kandai, who was a prominent member of DI and who later became a devoted follower of Sungkar and Ba'asyir.³⁸

Another theory suggested that the JI radical ideology was influenced by the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII) (Islamic Propagation of Indonesia), a movement founded by Mohammad Natsir³⁹ in 1967.⁴⁰ DDII was closely associated with *Rābiṭah al-‘Alam al-Islāmī* (Islamic World League) an organisation founded in 1962. The organisation provided financial assistance for DDII's educational programmes, *da'wah* activities and the construction of new mosques in Indonesia.⁴¹ In the 1970s, through the financial support of *Rābiṭah al-‘Alam al-Islāmī*, DDII managed to translate the books of Ḥassan al-Bannā, Yāsuf al-Qardhāwī and Sayyid Qutb into *Bahasa Indonesia*⁴² and distributed them among Indonesian Muslims. Their programmes and activities have played an important role in spreading the ideology of *salafī-jihādiyyah* in Indonesia.⁴³

Following the above reasoning, it was claimed that JI's connection with radical elements was more visible during the Afghan-Soviet war when the *Rābiṭah al-‘Alam al-Islāmī* provided funding to the followers of Sungkar and Ba'asyir who fought alongside the *mujahiddīn* against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ Throughout this period, *Rābiṭah al-‘Alam al-Islāmī* was managed by two of Osama bin Laden's close associates in Afghanistan, namely Abdullah Azzam and Abdul Rasūl Sayyaf. It is believed that through this contact, JI's radical ideology acquired further solidification.

³⁸ R. Coolsaet, *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2008).

³⁹ Natsir was the fifth Indonesian Prime Minister (1950-1951) and a former leader of *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS) (Islamic Party) and *Parti Islam Masyumi* (PIM) (Masyumi Islam Party). He was known for anti-secularism and was against the Indonesia's *Pancasila* especially Sukarno's nationalist-secular ideology. See Thohir Luth, *M. Natsir: Dakwah dan Pemikirannya*, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1999).

⁴⁰ Ida Indawati Khouw, "In search of Mohammad Natsir's spirit in Islamic Revivalism," *The Jakarta Post*, March 8, 2008, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/03/in-search-mohammad-natsir039s-spirit-islamic-revivalism.html>

⁴¹ M.C. Ricklefs, "Religious Elites and the State in Indonesia and Elsewhere: Why Takeovers are so Difficult and Usually Don't Work," in *Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia*, ed. Hui Yew-Foong (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013).

⁴² *Bahasa Indonesia* is the official language of Indonesia.

⁴³ Zulkifli Haji Mohd Yusoff & Fikri Mahmud, "Gerakan Teroris Dalam Masyarakat Islam: Analisis Terhadap Gerakan Jemaah Islamiah (JI)," *Malaysia Abstracting and Indexing System (MyAIS)*, accessed January 10, 2013, <http://myais.fsktm.um.edu.my/7341/1/JUS21-03.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, *Joining the Caravan?: The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, trans. Akh. Muzakki, (Bandung, Indonesia: Penerbit Mizan, 2007).

Meanwhile, some have also speculated that JI's radical ideology was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimīn - IM) in Egypt, primarily because JI often used books and references written by IM ideologues such as Hassan Al-Banna (*al Jihād and Majmū'at Rasā'il al Imām Hassan al Bannā*), Muhammad Abd al Salam Farj (*al Jihād al farīdhah al ghā'ibah*) and Sayyid Qutb (*Ma'ālim fi al Ṭarīq*) in their *usrah*.⁴⁵ Other than that, JI also made use of books written by Abdullah Azzam (*al Tarbiyyah al jihādiyyah wa al binā'*), Abu al 'Alā al Mawdūdī (*al Jihād fi sabīlillāh*) and Nasir al-Fahd (*al Dawlah al uthmāniyyah wa mawqif da'wah al Shaykh Muḥammad bin Abd al Wahhāb minhā*) to educate members of its "interpretation" of Islam. These writings were used as inspiration for the new generation of jihādists to encourage them to undertake *jihād* in order to realise the establishment of *dawlah Islāmiyyah* in this region. Noor Umug, a former member of the ASG asserted that terrorist organisations such as the ASG, the JI and the al-Qaeda have commonly used books written by Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam in their indoctrination of new recruits and also use it to inspire new members to become jihādists.⁴⁶

The origins of JI's radical thinking, either through its deep-rooted affiliation with DI or through the influence of radical and extreme personalities from the Middle East, reveal that their ideology is deeply influenced by the idea of *salafī-jihādiyyah* as documented in PUPJI and via their willingness to sacrifice innocent lives in the name of *jihād* in achieving their goal. Sidney Jones categorised JI as a salafī-jihādist group as its leaders were inspired by the same ideology as other salafī-jihādist groups such as al-Qaeda that allow the use of violence and armed *jihād* as a means of achieving its objectives.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Dewi Candraningrum, *The Challenge of Teaching English in Indonesia's Muhammadiyah Universities (1958-2005): Mainstreaming gender through postcolonial Muslim Women Writers*, (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008).

⁴⁶ Noor Umug, interview by Author, Manila, the Philippines, March 30, 2011.

⁴⁷ Sidney Jones, interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 6, 2011.

Jihād / جهاد

Jihād is a multidimensional concept in Islamic tradition. Etymologically, the word *jihād* originates from the Arabic root word j-h-d (جهد) meaning “to endeavour, to strive and to labour” in performing one’s daily activities. Thus, the word *jihād* simply means “struggle”. Muslim scholars have categorised *jihād* into major *jihād* (*jihād al akbar*) and minor *jihād* (*jihād al asghar*). Major *jihād* (*jihād al akbar*) encompasses the struggle against self desires and evil deeds while minor *jihād* (*jihād al asghar*) refers to struggle against the enemy during war time. However, JI did not accept this categorisation, and believed that *jihād* in the battlefield is the highest form of submission in Islam.⁴⁸

For JI, *jihād* refers to *al-qitāl* and *jihād muṣallaḥ*, which means armed struggle in the fight against their perceived enemies. They believe that this is the actual *jihād*, and that this was the method adopted by the *salaf al ṣālih*. Following the advice of Azzam, Mawdūdī, and Quṭb, they are also convinced that *jihād muṣallaḥ* is obligatory (*fardhu ‘ain* or *wājib*) for Muslims in order to establish the *dawlah Islāmiyyah* and subsequently to revive the *khilāfah Islāmiyyah*. JI also believes that *jihād* through armed struggle becomes more urgent when Muslims are being oppressed by foreign powers and authoritarian regimes around the world. Therefore, the fight to reinstate the *dawlah Islāmiyyah* and the *khilāfah Islāmiyyah* is not only against foreign invaders but also against non-Muslim authorities, apostates, atheists (*zindīq*) and dissenting Muslims.

In PUPJI, JI’s leadership outlines seven functions of *jihād muṣallaḥ* comprising of the following elements:

1. To destroy *tāghūt*;
2. To uphold the truth and eradicate cruelty so that the destruction of the earth can be prevented; to safeguard religious existence and dignity and assist those who are weak;
3. To humiliate, and raise the alarm against enemies and prevent them from creating mischief;
4. To separate the infidels/hypocrites from the believers and to pave the way of the latter towards martyrdom;
5. To test one’s faith; and
6. To maintain power on earth through the implementation of *Sharī‘ah*.

⁴⁸ Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview.

Subsumed under JI's conception of *jihād* is the “martyrdom operation” (*al ‘amāl al ishtishādiyyah*) that permits individuals to carry out suicide attacks in order to attain martyrdom. This is supported by Yūsuf al-‘Uyayrī in his work *Hal intaḥarat hawā’ am istashhadat* which offers religious and tactical justifications on the use of suicide bombings. According to him, it is religiously and morally justified to use suicide bombings against enemies, particularly when they have caused collateral damage to non-combatants, such as in the case of Palestine. He believes that tactically, suicide bombings are the most effective way of confronting asymmetrical power. It causes more damage to the enemies with minimal loss on the part of the executor or the suicide bomber (*ishtishādiyyin*).⁴⁹ In the 9/11 events for instance, 19 al-Qaeda members caused approximately 2,975 deaths when they hijacked four commercial airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon and a western Pennsylvanian field. Similarly, in the case of the 2002 Bali bombings, 202 people were killed by three JI suicide bombers. For a small-sized organisation like JI, it was certainly a cost-efficient operation.

al Walā’ wa al Bara’ / الولاء والبراء

The concept of *al Walā’ wa al Bara’* is a combination of the terms *al Walā’* and *al Bara’*. *Al Walā’* literally means “loyalty” while *al Bara’* means “disloyalty”. The concept of *al Walā’* which refers to the loyalty to Allah, His prophet, religious injunctions and to the *ummah* is employed in theological discussions. On the other hand, *al Bara’* refers to the state of being free from submission to any entity other than Allah.

However, JI reformulates this concept to differentiate those deemed as “friends” from “enemies”, “Muslims” from “non-Muslims” and “those who are with us” from “against us.” For JI, the United States, the Jews and their allies, including governments supporting them are enemies for continuously oppressing, exploiting and killing Muslims. This is the basis for JI activism, militancy and operations in Southeast Asia and beyond. Muhammad Uthman El-Muhammady,

⁴⁹ See al Shaykh al Shahīd Yūsuf al ‘Uyayrī, *Hal intaḥarat hawā’ am istashhadat*, published online by Minbar al tawḥīd wa al jihād; Ahmad El-Muhammady, interview.

further explains that JI sees the world as either “black” or “white” with a clear differentiation between “JI members” and “non-JI members” or “friend” and “foe”.⁵⁰ In essence, JI employ’s the concept of *al Walā’ wa al Bara’*⁵¹ to identify friends and enemies, to strengthen loyalty towards JI’s struggle, to ensure the secrecy of the organisation and to maintain the discipline of its members.

⁵⁰ Muhammad Uthman El-Muhammady, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, February 8, 2011.

⁵¹ *al Bara’* in JI’s ideology means disavowal and with it comes obstruction, enmity and rejection. JI believes that a Muslim who does not conform to their own understanding or interpretation of Islam is a *kāfir* (non-believer) and that Muslims should not align themselves with Non-Muslims. See “Countering the Ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), last modified 2012, http://www.rrg.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73%3Acountering-the-ideology-of-jemaah-islamiyah&catid=5%3Alatest-posted-articles&Itemid=10&limitstart=8.

THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE STRUGGLE OF AL-JAMĀ'AH AL-ISLĀMIYYAH (PEDOMAN UMUM PERJUANGAN AL-JAMĀ'AH AL-ISLĀMIYYAH - PUPJI)⁵²

JI is a unique organisation compared to other *jihādi* groups in the region because it has published its own manual to act as a guide in the direction and operations of the organisation. This manual is known as the General Guidelines for the Struggle of al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah (*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah - PUPJI*),⁵³ it contains the philosophy, objectives, principles, organisational structure and modus operandi of the organisation. It is regarded as the key document in understanding the JI as a *jihādi* group.⁵⁴

As its name suggests, PUPJI serves as a guide for the JI leadership in carrying out their operations, as well as to organise and achieve their ultimate goal of establishing the *dawlah Islāmiyyah* (Islamic state) in the Southeast Asia region. This manual is meant primarily for JI's top leadership and thus it is not shared with the ordinary members of the group. It was drafted and issued by a special unit within the JI system known as *Majlis Qiyādah Markaziyyah* (Leadership Council).

In PUPJI, the philosophy of life for JI members is enshrined in three fundamental principles. These are:

1. Our life and duty is to worship Allah and Allah alone;
2. We are created to obey and carry out the will of Allah; and
3. Our lives are a test by Allah to judge our good and bad practices in this world.

In addition to the three fundamental principles, PUPJI also has four major themes that encompass various aspects of the organisation, such as the basic principles, organisational structure, financial matters, operations, recruitment and training. The four themes are as follows:

1. Methodological principles of the movement for the establishment of religion (*Uṣūl al manhaj al ḥarakī li iqāmat al dīn / المنهج الحركي لاقامت الدي (اصول*)

⁵² See *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah*, a document published by *Majlis Qiyādah Markaziyyah* (Leadership Council), 1996.

⁵³ Andrew T.H. Tan, *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

2. Methodology of the movement for the establishment of religion (*Al manhaj al ḥarakī li iqāmat al dīn* / المنهج الحركى لاقامت الدين)
3. Methodology for the management of the establishment of religion (*Al manhaj al ‘amalī li iqāmat al dīn* / المنهج العملى لاقامت الدين)
4. Basic statues or regulations (*Al niḡām al asāsī* / النظام الاساسى)

Methodological Principles of the Movement for the Establishment of Religion (*Usūl al manhaj al ḥarakī li iqāmat al dīn* / يـنـاصـول المنهج الحركى لاقامت الدي) ⁵⁵

PUPJI identifies ten principles to guide the organisation and its members in the quest for establishing Islam in this world. These methodological principles are:

1. Our aim is to seek Allah’s pleasure in the way prescribed by Him and His messenger;
2. Our belief (*aqīdah*) is based on the *aqīdah* of the Sunni (*ahli sunnah wal jamā’ah*) in the way of the *salaf al ṣālih* (the righteous predecessors);
3. Our understanding of Islam is comprehensive, based on the understanding of the *salaf al ṣālih*;
4. Our objective is to make man submit to Allah and this is achievable only by restoring the *khilāfah* on earth;
5. Our path is faith (*īmān*), migration (*hijrah*), and struggle in the cause of Allah (*jihād fi sabīlillah*);
6. Our resources are;
 - a. Knowledge and piety (*taqwa*);
 - b. Confidence and submitting to the will of Allah (*tawakkal*);
 - c. Thankfulness and perseverance;
 - d. Renunciation of worldly life and pleasures (*zuhud*) and giving priority to the hereafter;
 - e. The struggle in the cause of Allah (*jihād fi sabīlillah*); and
 - f. Martyrdom (*syahīd*).
7. Our love is for Allah, the messenger and the faithful;
8. Our enemies are Satan and evil men;
9. Our group (*jamā’ah*) is bound by unanimity of objective, belief (*aqīdah*) and understanding of Islam; and

⁵⁵ Ibid.

10. Our practise of Islam is pure and total, starting from the *jamā'ah* followed by the state (*dawlah*) and caliphate (*khilāfah*).

Based on the aforementioned principles, it is clear that JI has developed a systematic and strategic plan to realise its vision. It begins with the creation of a *jamā'ah* or small group committed to form the *dawlah Islamiyyah* through militant activism and finally ends in the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. These principles also serve as the core foundation to develop the methodology of the movement for the establishment of religion (*al manhaj al ḥarakī li iqāmat al dīn*).

Methodology of the Movement for the Establishment of Religion (*al manhaj al ḥarakī li iqāmat al dīn* / المنهج الحركى لاقامت الدين)⁵⁶

Based on the ten guiding principles mentioned above, PUPJI outlines another set of methodologies (*al manhaj*) that needs to be implemented by the movement (*al ḥarakī*) in order to realise the vision of establishing the religion (*dīn al Islām*). This set of methodology includes the following:

1. Formation of the group (*takwīn al jamā'ah* / تكون الجماعة):
 - a. The formation of *qiyādah al rāshidah* / قيادة الراشدة (leadership development);
 - b. The formation of *qā'idah ṣalābah* / قاعدة صلبة (solid base);
 - c. The implementation of *tanẓīm sirrī* / تنظيم سرى (clandestine groups and organisations); and
 - d. The implementation of *ḥisbah* / حسبة (rules and regulations).
2. Creation of strength (*takwīn al quwwah* / تكوين القوة):
 - a. *tarbiyyah* / تربية (education);
 - b. *da'wah* / دعوة (missionary work);
 - c. *jihād* / جهاد (armed struggle);
 - d. *tajnīd* / تجنيد (recruitment);
 - e. *qā'idah amīnah* / قاعدة امينة (building of safe areas / bases and sanctuaries);
 - f. *diklat* (combination of the word “dik” for [education] and “lat” for [training]);
 - g. *jasūs* / جاسوس (spying and intelligence gathering); and

⁵⁶ Ibid.

- h. *tansīq bainal jamā'ah* / تنسيق بين الجماعة (cooperation and networking with liked-minded groups).
3. Exercise of the various strengths gained (*istikhdām al quwwah* / استخدام القوة) through *da'wah* or armed *jihād*.
4. Formation of the state (*takwīn al dawlah* / تكوين الدولة) and the maintaining of the state:
 - a. *tanzīm* / تنظيم (law and regulations);
 - b. *tajnīd* / تجنيد (recruitment);
 - c. *jihād* / جهاد (armed struggle);
 - d. *tahkīm* / تحكيم (arbitration or judiciary);
 - e. *tamwīl* / تمويل (finance);
 - f. *ummah* / أمة (establishment of a Muslim community); and
 - g. *tansīq baina al duwal* / تنسيق بين الدول (collaboration with other countries).
5. JI believes that once all the aspects of *dawlah* have been achieved, the phase that follows would be the establishment of an Islamic caliphate (*khilāfah al islāmiyyah*).

Methodology for the Management of the Establishment of Religion (*al manhaj al 'amalī li iqāmat al dīn* / المنهج العملي لإقامة الدين)⁵⁷

The third theme is *al manhaj al 'amalī li iqāmat al dīn*. This covers the operational and administration aspects of JI. There are four types of operational aspects outlined in PUPJI. These consist of intelligence, development of strength, deployment of strength and combat. The administration aspects include personal development (information/recruitment, education and military training), *hisbah* (Islamic doctrine of keeping everything in order under the laws of Allah), and territorial and economic development (geographical, demographic and social conditions).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Basic Statues or Regulations (*al niẓām al asāsī* / النظام الاساسى)⁵⁸


The fourth theme is *al niẓām al asāsī*. It is regarded as the JI's constitution for it outlines the group's norms, chains of command, as well as the roles and functions of its leaders and members. The PUPJI also shows JI as a centralised and well-structured organisation, with a top-down chain of command, well-defined objectives and a plan of action. It also outlines a comprehensive framework of organisational and operational procedures that the JI leadership and its operatives must adhere to.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The organisational structure of JI is one of the key themes discussed and elaborated in great detail in the PUPJI. The document shows that the JI has developed a systematic structure and it is led by a leader who is known as *amīr* (emir). The *amīr* is assisted by four councils comprising of senior members of JI. The four councils are as follows:⁵⁹

1. Advisory Council (*Majlis Syūra* / مجلس شورى);
2. Leadership Council (*Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah* / مجلس قيادة مركزية);
3. Fatwa Council (*Majlis Fatwā* / مجلس فتوى); and
4. Disciplinary Council (*Majlis Ḥisbah* / مجلس حسبة).



The upper hierarchy of al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah

⁵⁹ Max L. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press (NDIC Press), 2007).

The *amīr* is nominated and appointed by the *Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah*. Given his position at the apex of the organisation, he has the authority to appoint all key positions in the organisation, collect funds, decide and approve JI operations and build networking with other militant organisations.

Historically, Abdullah Sungkar was appointed as the first *amīr* of JI when it was established in 1993 and he was assisted by Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir as his deputy. After the death of Sungkar in November 1999, JI was led by Ba‘āsyir for two years until he was detained by Indonesian authorities in 2002. The leadership of JI was then taken over by Abu Rusdan, who acted as the caretaker on behalf of the incarcerated *amīr*. In 2003, Abu Rusdan was arrested for his involvement in the Bali bombings along with Ali Ghufron, Mukhlas and Imam Samudera. As a result, Zakarsih was appointed as the *amīr* of JI, assisted by Abu Dujana, a senior JI operative. However, in 2007 both of them were arrested and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on charges related to terrorism. Since then, there has been no indication that any JI member has taken over the office of *amīr* from Zakarsih. However, two possible candidates have emerged as possible successor to Zakarsih. They are Para Wijayanto and Hadi Surya.⁶⁰

The *Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah*, the central committee of JI, is the most important council in JI’s organisational structure as it played the role of “advisor” to the office of *amīr*. The *Majlis* has the power to convey instructions from the *amīr* to members of lower ranks and to ensure enforcement of JI’s rules and regulations. It also functions as the central command in the event the *amīr* is unable to perform his duties. Among the well known members of the *Majlis* were Abu Rusdan, Zulkarnean, Mukhlas, Mustofa, Hambali, Achmand Roichan, Mustaqim and Afif.⁶¹ Key positions in the *Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah* include:

1. Deputy to *amīr*;
2. Treasurer / *khāzin*;
3. Secretary-General / *amīnul ‘ām*;
4. Official in charge of religious activities such as *usrah* and religious classes / *da‘wah wa al irshād*;

⁶⁰ “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” *The Australian National Security*, last modified November 18, 2010, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doi ng_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Jemahh_Islamiyah.

⁶¹ Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah*, (Jakarta, Indonesia: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005).

5. Official responsible for educational activities such as *madrasah*⁶² / *tarbiyyah rasmiyyah*,⁶³
6. Official responsible for military affairs / *diklat*;
7. Official responsible for training as well as sending JI members to conflict areas / *'askarī*;
8. Official responsible for building a supporting network among the public / *'Ilām wa al 'alaqāt*; and
9. Official responsible for political activities / *siyāsiyyah*.

The main responsibility of *Majlis Syūra* is policy-making. The *Majlis Syūra* consists of seven council members led by a *raīs* (chief). This council has the power to appoint a new *amīr* and to dismiss him if he is unable to perform his duties. The *Majlis Syūra* has the right to propose or change JI rules and regulations, as well as to evaluate the management of JI.⁶⁴

On the other hand, the *Majlis Fatwa* consists of a minimum of three council members, appointed by the *amīr*. Its functions are to support and enforce any decision made by the *amīr* to ensure unity amongst JI members.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the *Majlis Hisbah* is a council that comprises of a minimum of three members appointed by the *amīr*. Its main responsibility is to handle disciplinary issues involving JI members.⁶⁶

All the four councils have their own roles and responsibilities in ensuring that JI achieves its main objective of establishing a *dawlah Islāmiyyah*. However in times of crisis, only the *Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah* will take the lead role as the command centre for JI, while the other three councils would be dissolved.

⁶² *Madrasah* / مدرسة generally has two meanings: (1) the term can be refer to as a “schools”; and (2) it is an education institution teaching Islamic subjects such as the Quran, *hadīth* (traditions of the Prophet), *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and law. See Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” in *Focus of Islamic Issues*, ed. Cofie D. Malbouisson, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2007).

⁶³ *tarbiyyah rasmiyyah* is the JI education division that manages the group’s education matters. See Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist extremists*.

⁶⁴ Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Under the *Majlis Qiyādah Mazkaziyyah*, JI divided the area of control into four regional commands called *mantiqī* (zone or geographical area):⁶⁷

1. *Mantiqī Ūlā* / منطقی اولی (zone/region 1) comprises of Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore;
2. *Mantiqī Thānī* / منطقی ثانی (zone/region 2) covers Indonesia (excluding East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Ambon);
3. *Mantiqī Thālith* / منطقی ثالث (zone/region 3) comprises of Sabah (Malaysia), East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Ambon (Indonesia) and Mindanao (The Philippines); and
4. *Mantiqī Ukhrā* / منطقی اخرى (zone/region 4) covers Australia and other areas besides *Mantiqī Ūlā*, *Mantiqī Thānī*, and *Mantiqī Thālith*.

Below the *mantiqī*, there is a smaller divisional command known as *wakālah* (division), followed by *sarāyah* (battalion), *kātibah* (company), *kirdās* (platoon), *fī'ah* (squad), and *tāifah* (team).

Malaysia falls under the first regional command of JI (*Mantiqī Ūlā*), comprising of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. The first head of *Mantiqī Ūlā* was Riduan Isamuddin @ Hambali⁶⁸ who held that position from 1998 to 2001. Muklas became the second leader of *Mantiqī Ūlā* from 2001 to 2002. Under this regional command, there are five other *wakālah* comprising of *wakālah* Singapore, *wakālah* Negeri Sembilan, *wakālah* Selangor, *wakālah* Perak and *wakālah* Johor.

The heads of *wakālah* under *Mantiqī Ūlā* are listed below:

Head	<i>Wakālah</i>
Mohd Khaider Kadran	Negeri Sembilan
Dadang Surahman Abu Yusuf	Selangor
Abd. Murad Sudin	Perak
Wan Min Wan Mat	Johor
Ibrahim Maidin	Singapore

The function of the *Mantiqī Ūlā* is to serve as an area of financial support for the JI. This is due to the economic potential that Malaysia and Singapore offer

⁶⁷ Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau and Leanne Piggott, *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment*, (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: RAND Corporation, 2009).

⁶⁸ David Martin Jones, "Informal Networks in Southeast Asia: the Case of Jemaah Islamiyah and its Affiliates," in *Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal Networks*, ed. David Martin Jones, Anne Lane and Paul Schulte, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010).

in comparison to the other *mantiqī*. Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore are seen to provide good business opportunities and more job prospects for JI members. Thus, the leadership of JI decided that *Mantiqī Ūlā* would be the source of income and funding for the group's activities.

Mantiqī Thāni encompasses Sumatra, Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara in Indonesia. JI regards *Mantiqī Thāni* as an important conflict zone and believes that the territory has the potential to become the first *dawlah Islāmiyyah* for its strategic advantages such as easy access to new recruits, as the region has a large Muslim community. The first head of *Mantiqī Thāni* was Abu Fateh who was later replaced by Abu Irsyad @ Nuaim. *Mantiqī Thāni* has nine *wakālah*: *wakālah* Sumbagut, *wakālah* Pekan Baru, *wakālah* Lampung, *wakālah* Jabotabek, *wakālah* Jabar, *wakālah* Surakarta, *wakālah* Jateng, *wakālah* Jatim and *wakālah* Nusra.

Mantiqī Thālith is JI's regional command covering Sabah (Malaysia), East Kalimantan and Sulawesi (Indonesia), and Mindanao (The Philippines). Under this *Mantiqī*, there are five *wakālah*, known as *wakālah Badar* (Sabah and Labuan in Malaysia and Tarakan in Indonesia), *wakālah Hudaibiyah* (Mindanao in the Philippines), *wakālah Uhud* (North Sulawesi and Palu in Indonesia), *wakālah Khaibar* (Poso in Indonesia) and *wakālah Tabuk* (Central Sulawesi and South Sulawesi in Indonesia). Abu Tolud @ Mustofa, a senior JI member from Indonesia was the first head of the *Mantiqī Thālith*, a position he held from 1997 to 2001.⁶⁹ In 2001, he was replaced by Nasir Abas, a senior JI member from Malaysia.⁷⁰ Nasir Abas was the head of the *Mantiqī* until his arrest by the Indonesian police in 2003.

Mantiqī Thālith is the area in which JI members obtain their military training. According to Nasir Abas, he and another JI member named Qatādah opened the Hudaybiyyah training camp in Mindanao for JI with the support of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to train JI members and other local terrorist groups. JI looks at the conflict in Mindanao as the perfect training ground for its members as they are able to train together with the local militants battling against what they consider to be the infidel Philippines government. Furthermore, JI members are able to obtain supplies of weapons,

⁶⁹ *The Republika*, "Abu Tolud Sering Berbeda Pandangan dengan JAT," September 23, 2010, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/hukum/10/09/23/135931-abu-tolud-sering-berbeda-pandangan-dengan-jat>

⁷⁰ Tito Karnavian, *Indonesia Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso*.

ammunition and explosives from the local groups.⁷¹ Among the well known Malaysians who received armed training at the camp were Dr. Azahari Husin, Noordin Mat Top and Zulkifli bin Hir @ Marwan.


Mantiqī Ukhṛā is not an official *mantiqī*. However, among the JI leadership and members, it is recognised as an area that covers Australia and other territories that are not covered by other *mantiqī* (geographical areas not covered by the aforementioned *mantiqī* 1, 2 and 3). *Mantiqī Ukhṛā* is not part of the original *dawlah Islāmiyyah* but it constitutes the grand plan of *khilāfah Islāmiyyah*.⁷² It primarily functions as the centre for fundraising activities, and garnering support and sympathisers for the struggle of JI. In the early 1990s, some sources claimed that Sungkar and Ba'asyir went to Sydney, Australia to collect funds and to gain support for the struggle of JI. JI's leader in Australia at that time was Abdul Rahim Ayub, an Indonesian married to an Australian named Rabiah Hutchison.⁷³

As mentioned, besides the four *majlis* and *mantiqī*, JI's organisational structure also consists of smaller sub-divisions under each *mantiqī*. Each *mantiqī* comprises of four to five *wakālah* / وكالة (division). Below each *wakālah*, there is the *sarāyah* / سراية (battalion) consisting of three *kātibah* / كاتبة (company). Each *kātibah* consists of three *kirdās* / كرداس (platoon) which are made up of three *fi'ah* / فية (squad) consisting of six to ten people. Meanwhile, the smallest group is called *ṭāifah* / طائفة (team) which is formed on an *ad hoc* basis.

⁷¹ *Tempo.Co*, "Nasir Abbas: Poso Masuk Mantiqi III," January 26, 2007, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2007/01/26/05592038/Nasir-Abbas-Poso-Masuk-Mantiqi-III>

⁷² Nasir Abbas, interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 7, 2011.

⁷³ Tom Allard, "The mother, her sons and their terrorist dad," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, November 1, 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/the-mother-her-sons-and-their-terrorist-dad/2006/10/31/1162278141610.html>.



The lower hierarchy of al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah

Based on the organisational structure of JI shown above, it is clear that the JI follow a top-down approach leadership. The *amīr*, council members and the heads of *mantiqī* meet and decide on relevant matters. Upon approval from the *syūra*, decisions are implemented by the lower ranking members. All plans and activities must be approved and authorised by the upper ranking officials, especially the *syūra*. The progress report is then submitted to the *amīr* and senior leaders.

RECRUITMENT METHODS

Jl's recruitment method is simple but effective. Similar to most militant groups, the process begins with "talent spotting" to identify individuals possessing certain characteristics and skill sets. It is then followed by the process of establishing a relationship with that individual, through friendship or familial ties so as to give the prospective candidate a sense of belonging. Jl has identified four methods through which a relationship can be effectively established with the new recruit i.e. friendship, kinship, education institution (*madrasah* and *pesantren*) and religious activities in mosque.

Most candidates are "talent spotted" during their attendance and participation in the *madrasah* and activities in the mosques. Of the four methods, friendship and kinship are the most effective recruitment methods. Harry Setyo R. further adds that a potential new member will be introduced through older members or existing Jl members and invited to participate in a discussion group, first on common religious matters such as the five pillars of Islam (*shahada*, *salat*, *zakāt*, *sawm* and *hajj*)⁷⁴ and then lead towards issues related to *jihād* (*al-qitāl* and *jihād muṣallah*) by showing him or her videos and reading materials on what is happening in Palestine and Ambon, Indonesia. Those who show further interest in performing *jihād* (*al-qitāl* and *jihād muṣallah*) would then be recommended to join the organisation.⁷⁵

Jl prefers these methods so as to prevent infiltration by the authorities. Generally, those who are recruited through these means have already gained the approval of family members or friends before being admitted into the system. As proven in many cases, kinship and friendship are practically intertwined. When friendship is established with the new recruits, the relationship is further strengthened through familial ties, usually through arranged marriages. For Jl, marriage is a way of strengthening relationships among members.

Recruitment through kinship can be divided into four categories through siblings, arranged marriages, in-laws and the father-son relationship. Recruitment through siblings occurs when a member brings his or her sibling as a new member

⁷⁴ The Islamic religion is built on five central ideas (five pillars of Islam) which include *shahada* (declaration of faith), *salat* (prayer), *zakāt* (almsgiving), *sawm* (Muslims fasting during the month of Ramadan) and *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). See Cory Gideon Gunderson, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, (Edina, Minnesota: ABDO, 2004).

⁷⁵ Harry Setyo R., interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, April 5, 2011.

into the organisation. This method is effective and reliable especially when carrying out an important mission. The effectiveness of this method was proven during the first Bali bombings in 2002, a mission that was executed by a group of brothers comprising of Mukhlas, Amrozi and Ali Imron. These brothers were responsible for different aspects of the operation such as planning, bomb-making and logistics.⁷⁶

The JI recruitment process through arranged marriage encompasses two-stages. According to Noor Huda Ismail, when a person is recruited into JI either from a mosque or *madrasah*, or through an existing member, he is married to the daughter or sister of another member. This is to cement mutual bonds, thus creating kinship between the individuals. This is an effective tactic, because it is difficult for the new recruit to move away from the group without betraying his closest friends and family. The logic of this kinship is to entrench the new member into the JI “family”.⁷⁷ Noor Huda Isamil said that in other words, if the person betrays the organisation, the betrayal would directly or indirectly affect his whole family including his siblings, brothers-in-law or children who are still part of the organisation. This family connection also creates a very closely-knit group, which discourages infiltration by government agents.⁷⁸ An example of such arranged marriage can be seen between Mukhlas and Paridah Abas,⁷⁹ the daughter of a radical family based in Malaysia. Paridah Abas is also the sister of Nasir Abas, the second leader of *Mantiqī Thālīth* and Hashim Abas who was reportedly involved in a bomb plot in Singapore.

JI also practices a form of sustainable development through the father-son relationship, in order to ensure the grooming of future JI leaders. Children of JI members are sent to further their religious education in Pakistan and to undergo military training in Afghanistan. An example of this was the *al-ghuraba* cell⁸⁰ which was set up by Hambali in 1999 to take over the JI leadership in the future.

⁷⁶ Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, June 2, 2006, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=79](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=79).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Noor Huda Ismail, interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, April 5, 2011.

⁷⁹ Paridah Abas, *Orang Bilang, Ayah Teroris*, (Solo, Indonesia: Jazera, 2005).

⁸⁰ The *al-ghuraba* (meaning “foreigners”) cell was led by Abdul Rahim, Abu Bakar Ba’āsyir son and Hambali’s brother Rusman Gunawan @ Gun Gun. The cell consisted of the children’s of JI members that have been nurtured from a young age to become the next generation JI leaders. They were sent to Pakistan to undertake advance religious studies and military training. See Zachary Abuza, “The Social Organization of Terror in Southeast Asia: The Case of Jemaah Islamiyah,” in *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2008); The Special Branch Officer, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 2011.

This cell consists of the children of JI members who were sent to Pakistan for religious and military training. However, in November 2003, 13 of them were detained in Pakistan and handed over to the Malaysian authorities.

The underlying idea in sending the children out of the country is also to ensure that they are safe from detection by the authorities. Also, should there be any effort to crush JI in Malaysia, these children would be able to reorganise and re-establish JI abroad and continue the struggle. They can also recruit more members for JI through the friendship method, thus widening recruitment. The fact of the cells being based in Pakistan and Afghanistan would make it more difficult for the Malaysian government to cripple the network.

Jl's main criteria for recruits include that they are Muslims who practice the five pillars of Islam, have an inclination towards radical thought and have the willingness to use violence to achieve their ideological aims. The prospective recruit would also share the dream of creating an Islamic state governed by *Shari'ah* law in Southeast Asia and be willing to sacrifice his life for this goal if necessary. JI is very selective in recruiting new members to ensure that once a person has been selected, he would always comply with achieving the group's aims and not abandon the struggle.

Jl adopt a very selective and secretive practice in their recruitment process, in line with the philosophy of the group being a secret organisation (*tanzim sirri*). JI uses code names such as "JM" and "*tanzim*" in referring to itself among its members. They also have a specific way of introducing one new member to another by using phrases like "*ini ikhwan kita*" (this is our brother), or "*mereka ni ikhwan-ikhwan kita*" (they are our brothers) and similar kinds of encrypted phrases.⁸¹ By virtue of this, the message is conveyed to the other party without exposing the identity of the organisation they are representing.

Selection Criteria

In order to become a member of the organisation, one must fulfill a set of criteria as follows:

1. The recruit must be a Muslim;

2. The recruit should understand the teachings of Allah and the Prophet and must understand the needs and commitments of the congregation (*jamā'ah* – JI);
3. Before a person is offered *iltizām* (offer of commitment to the struggle of the group), the person must join a programme called *ṭalabul 'ilmī* (religious classes for improving the recruit's knowledge of Islam) that is conducted over a period of between six months and two years. This is to ensure that the member understands the philosophy and the ideology of JI and is well versed in the Qur'ān and Sunnah;
4. The person has reached *akil bāligh* (puberty); and
5. The person has passed the *tamhīsh* (selection process) and believes that the reason he is joining the organisation is to fight for Islam; this is also to ensure that the person is not part of an infiltration attempt by the enemy.

The Process of becoming a Member

Jl places high emphasis on religious education as clearly stated in PUPJI. It constitutes part of the four major programmes that the JI leadership should implement for its members. Therefore, the *ṭalabul 'ilmī* programme is an essential process for the recruit to become a new member of JI. Potential members must go through several levels of the selection process.

The first level is *tabligh*, consisting of general teachings and sermons about the religion. It is meant for the public in general and held at *madrasahs*, mosques, universities, or through the printed media such as newspapers, books and magazines. The second level is *ta'lim* or *usrah* or the religious dialogue session for a group that is smaller than the *tabligh*. Usually the session is focused on *hajj* and *umrah* related matters and also includes an Arabic language learning session. The third level is *tamrīn* or a closed discussion for selected individuals who had previously attended the *tabligh* and the *ta'lim* sessions. This session discusses matters related to Islamic beliefs such as *aqīdah* (belief), *akhlāk* (moral), *'ibādah* (worship) and *īmān* (faith).

Upon the recruit successfully attending this *tamrīn*, the next step would be the *tamhīsh* stage. *Tamhīsh* is a closed gathering of a small group that discusses matters such as *hijrah* (religious migration), *imāmah* (leadership), *jamā'ah* (congregation), *jihād* (struggle) and *bay'ah* (pledge of loyalty). During *tamhīsh*,

the ten principles of JI as given in the PUPJI would be introduced, and cultivated by the participants. Individuals who are selected to attend *tamhish* are those considered by JI's existing members to be earnest and sincere in learning from the teachings of the senior members. Those who have passed the *tamhish* would be offered *iltizām*. Subsequently, the individual who accepts *iltizām* would perform a *bay'ah* or pledge of loyalty to the *amīr* of JI. The *bay'ah* can be made directly to the *amīr* or through his representative. The *bay'ah* made by the members to the *amīr* is considered a sacred act, comparable to the oath of allegiance given to the Prophet Muḥammad. The person performing the *bay'ah* would be regarded as a true believer. Thus, *bay'ah* must be maintained at all costs. One who violates the *bay'ah* is considered as having committed a grave sin for betraying the struggle of the *jamā'ah* and the *amīr*. Jajat Burhanuddin stated that JI like other terrorist organisations have characteristics of a cult group based on the emphasis on ideology, loyalty and blind acceptance of the leader's instructions.⁸² Thus, it is difficult for members to leave the organisation.

Nasir Abas explained that during the *bay'ah* ceremony, all JI members will sit in a *halāqah* (circle) and after an introduction and opening speech by a senior member, the new members would move forward one by one and sit facing the *amīr*. While shaking the hands of the *amīr*, the person would then declare “*aku berbai'ah untuk mendengar dan taat kepada amīr dalam keadaan senang dan susah*” (I will obey and be faithful to the *amīr* during good and difficult times).⁸³ They will then shake each other's hands and the *amīr* will close the ceremony with a sermon to the group.⁸⁴ Upon becoming a member of the JI, they must perform their duties which would require them:

1. To be loyal and obedient to the *amīr*;
2. To obey the JI's rules and regulations;
3. To obtain permission to be released from any task given by the *amīr* or his representative if the recruit is unwell and unable to carry out the duties given;
4. To protect and defend the *jamā'ah*;
5. To obey the *amīr* as long as he is right and to correct him when he is wrong;
6. To protect and defend the *amīr*; and

⁸² Jajat Burhanuddin, interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 4, 2011.

⁸³ Nasir Abas, interview.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*.

7. To cooperate and work together with other JI members.

Jl members are not limited to people from within a particular state borders but can come from anywhere in the world. Therefore, one Jl member can carry out his duties wherever he resides as long as he follows the religious order of Jl and complies with the rules set by the *amīr*. Jl believes that preaching should not be confined to areas within man-made boundaries but should be available all over the world.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ The Special Detachment 88 officer, interview by Author, Kuala Lumpur, March 9, 2011.

AI-JAMĀ'AH AL ISLĀMIYYAH (JI) IN MALAYSIA

As an organisation, JI was established by two Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'āsyr, in January 1993 while they were fugitives from Suharto's regime in Indonesia. Prior to that, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr were members of DI in Indonesia. The movement was crippled by the Indonesian army in the 1960s, and between the 1970s and 1980s, an offshoot of DI known as *komando jihad* emerged; it was responsible for the bombing of churches, night clubs, and cinemas in Indonesia. By then, the Suharto regime had discovered that DI and the *komando jihad* networks were made up of students from Pondok Ngruki in Solo, Central Java, which was operated by Sungkar and Ba'āsyr.

In 1978, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr were arrested by the Suharto regime. Amongst the charges against them were their alleged involvement in *komando jihad*'s subversive activities, their active support of the implementation of *sharī'ah* law in Indonesia, their non-recognition of the Indonesian national ideology, *Pancasila*, and the refusal of their schools to salute the Indonesian flag, signifying the continual refusal of Sungkar and Ba'āsyr to recognise the authority of a secular Indonesian state. The two were put on trial in 1982 and sentenced to nine years in prison. However, their sentence was reduced to three years and both of them were released from prison in 1985.

Soon after their release, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr were brought again before prosecutors on similar charges and this time they were also linked to the bomb attack on the Buddhist monument Borobudur in January 1985. In February 1985, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr decided to flee to Malaysia to avoid being arrested again by the Indonesian authorities. They left Indonesia via Medan in Northern Sumatera and settled down temporarily in Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan. They equated their journey to Malaysia to escape persecution in Indonesia to *hijrah*.

Sungkar and Ba'āsyr started their years in exile in a small village called Kampung Parit in Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan. In this place, both of them were well received by Ustaz Hashim Ghani who assisted them in carrying out *usrah* and religious activities in the state. Sungkar and Ba'āsyr disguised themselves as preachers who had come to Malaysia to conduct a study comparing missionary activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. They were later followed by their disciples from Indonesia such as Abu Dujana, Abu Jibril, Ali Ghuftron @ Mukhlas, Mustofa, Mustaqhim and Zulkarnaen. In Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'āsyr together with their

followers began to expand their *usrah* and religious activities from Negeri Sembilan to Johor, Kuala Lumpur, Selangor and Pahang, as well as Singapore.

Malaysia was considered an ideal hideout for Sungkar and Ba'āsyir because they saw it as a Muslim-majority country with a booming economy. Therefore it was easier for them to carry out their agenda of spreading their ideology, recruiting new cadres as well as financing their activities. Furthermore, Malaysia is geographically close to Indonesia, making it easier for them to monitor the situation in Indonesia, the country considered the main conflict zone for JI. Sungkar and Ba'āsyir also pioneered the sending of Indonesian *mujahiddīn* recruits to Afghanistan via Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s. This was because sending the *mujahiddīn* directly from Indonesia to Pakistan would have attracted the suspicion of the Indonesian government. Based on these advantages, Sungkar and Ba'āsyir chose to reside in Malaysia during their exile.

JI Activities in Malaysia

According to Nasir Abas, JI adopted the *tanzīm sirrī* approach and thus operated secretly in carrying out their activities in Malaysia under the guise of religious programmes. He further explained that the JI concept of *jamā'ah* was different from what was commonly understood by the majority of Muslims, primarily because it does not recognise the mainstream *jamā'atul muslimīn* as true Muslims. To the JI, true Muslims mean only their group, which they regard as *jamā'atun minal muslimīn*, meaning the group that represents the true Muslims. The mainstream majority was not regarded as true Muslims because, according to JI, they do not follow the original teachings of Islam, in the manner that was prescribed by the *salaf al ṣāliḥ*. Thus, the prefix “al” was inserted in “al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah” specifically to distinguish JI from the mainstream *jamā'ah Islāmiyyah* of Muslim society.⁸⁶

Therefore, in their efforts to disseminate their ideology and to distinguish themselves from mainstream Muslims, JI mapped out a comprehensive plan of action under the guise of religious works and activities such as *da'wah*, economic activities, education and training, and cooperation with other salafī-jihādīst groups in order to achieve their idealistic goal of establishing the *dawlah Islāmiyyah*.

⁸⁶ Nasir Abas, interview.

***Da'wah* Activities**

JI carried out their *da'wah* activities in *madrasah*, mosques and religious gatherings, through *khutbah* (sermons) and *usrah*. Through these *da'wah* activities, JI called upon their audience to practice Islamic *Shari'ah* in their lives and also attempted to incite them to overthrow the secular government for failing to implement the *Shari'ah* law.⁸⁷ In the 1990s, JI actively carried out their *da'wah* activities in Malaysia, in the states of Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Kelantan, Pahang, Perak, Sabah and Johor and recruited many followers to subscribe to their ideology.

Economic Activities

JI also encouraged their members to become actively involved in economic activities. Members worked as construction workers, steel mill workers, furniture factory operators, farmers, lecturers and businessmen using these occupations as fronts for JI business activities. Economic activities were important for JI to enable them to fund their *jihad* and militant activities. Apart from receiving funds from al-Qaeda and their allies outside Malaysia, JI was also funded by personal donations (*infāq*) or 5 per cent of members' personal incomes and 10 per cent of profits from businesses carried out by its members.

Economic activities were also used as “cover” for JI's militant activities. These include obtaining bomb-making materials such as ammonium nitrate, and funding weapon and bomb-making training for members in Afghanistan and southern Philippines. For example Yazid Sufaat, a JI member, used his company, Green Laboratory Medicine, to obtain 4 tonnes of ammonium nitrate intended to be used as explosive material in an attempt to attack vital installations in Malaysia and Singapore.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Abd. Aziz Hussin, “*Salafiyah Jihadiyah dan Keganasan Politik: Kajian Terhadap Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)*,” (Master's thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2009).

⁸⁸ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003).

Education Activities

In order to ensure the continuity of its ideology, JI established education institutions to disseminate its ideology under the guise of teaching Islamic education to children and young people. For instance, in the 1980s, JI built a religious school known as Sekolah Islam Lukmanul Hakiem (SILH) in Ulu Tiram,⁸⁹ Johor with the assistance of local JI member, Jaafar Anuar, who donated his land to be used as the site for the school. Soon after that, SILH opened a new branch in Tanah Merah, Kelantan with the assistance of another local JI member, Zaini Zakaria. The schools were not only places for JI to educate and teach their children their own ideology, but were also meeting places for JI members. The schools were also used as physical training centres and as hideouts from the authorities.

Training Activities

In order to ensure that JI's goal was achieved through armed *jihād*, JI members had to undergo military training in preparation for planned future attacks on secular governments. Military training activities were handled by the *tajnīd* (the military unit in JI) which is led by senior JI members. The *tajnīd* and JI veterans, who had undergone military training in the *Sāddah* training camp in Afghanistan, would train the newly-recruited JI members in fitness exercises, map reading, weapons, bomb-making and military tactics. The training was carried out in remote mountainous areas such as Gunung Pantī, Gunung Ledang, Gunung Belumut and coastal areas near Mersing and Batu Layar in Johor to avoid detection by the authorities.⁹⁰ Besides physical training, JI also conducted spiritual training such as religious lectures related to *jihād*.

The JI leadership would then choose those who they perceived to have the spirit of *jihād* to undergo further training in the al-Qaeda training camps outside Torkham, Afghanistan and in the *Hudaibiyah* training camp in southern Philippines. Marhudi Hariano @ Yusof, a former Indonesian terrorist adds that

⁸⁹ Muhammad Hanif bin Hassan, "Key Considerations in Counterideological Work Against Terrorist Ideology," in *Terrorism Study: A Reader*, ed. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2012).

⁹⁰ Abd. Aziz Hussin, *Salafiyah Jihadiyah dan Keganasan Politik: Kajian Terhadap Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)*.

in southern Philippines, training would involve live combat experience against those deemed as infidels i.e. the Philippines government and *tāghūt* (Muslims who JI regards as allies to the Philippines government).⁹¹ This experience is necessary to ensure that all JI members are well prepared to wage *jihād* in order to topple secular governments under infidels and *tāghūt* leadership and to replace them with the *dawlah Islāmiyyah*.

Cooperation with other Militant Groups

In order to carry out their militant activities, JI built a network and cooperated with other militant groups in the Southeast Asia region and beyond. The loose alliance was known as the Coalition of Mujāhidīn (*Rabītatul Mujāhidīn*). Justin V. Hastings explained that *Rabītatul Mujāhidīn* was not an attempt to set up a new organisation but to avoid any overlap in operation activities with other militant groups.⁹² Meanwhile, Gérard Chaliand, indicate that the coalition aimed to standardise combat practices among militant groups at the transregional level.⁹³ This coalition consisted of several militant groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from the Philippines; *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM) from Malaysia; Several Indonesian militant groups from Sulawesi, Maluku and Jawa (Java); Burmese members of Rohingya Front; and militant groups from southern Thailand.⁹⁴ It was reported that, the *Rabītatul Mujāhidīn* held three meetings in Selangor, Malaysia, the first in late 1999; the second in August 2000; and the last in November 2000.⁹⁵

Another example of JI's networking was the cooperation with the al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda is reported to have financed JI's *jihād* operations in this region, while JI in return provided logistical support for al-Qaeda operatives during their short stay in Malaysia in January 2000. It was also reported that JI's Afghan veterans used to travel to southern Philippines to be instructors in MILF's *Hudaibiyah* training camp. Some of them even fought with the MILF against

⁹¹ Marhmudi Hariano @ Yusof, interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, April 5, 2011.

⁹² Justin V. Hastings, *No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*.

⁹³ Philippe Migaux, "Al Qaeda", in *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda*, ed. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2007).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist extremists*.

Philippines forces. This cooperation was made possible only because of their shared vision and mission and besides, it was to their advantage.⁹⁶

JI Attempted Attacks

In December 2001, there were two attempts made by three JI members from *wakālah* Johor to launch an attack in the Straits of Tebrau. The first attempt was to launch an attack on the Immigration and Customs Checkpoint in Woodlands, Singapore, using a truck bombs.⁹⁷ This plan was under the supervision of Hambali, the head of *Mantiqī Ūlā*.⁹⁸

The second attempt was to launch an attack on a United States naval ship docked in Singapore by using a speed boat loaded with explosives.⁹⁹ According to their plan, they are going to infiltrate the area by posing as fishermen before carrying out the actual mission.¹⁰⁰ This operation was headed by the JI bomb maker, Noordin Mat Top. However, both operations were aborted prematurely due to the successful intelligence sharing between Malaysia and Singapore.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Nasir Abas, interview.

⁹⁷ The Special Branch Officer, interview.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, "Understanding Al Qaeda and its Network in Southeast Asia" in *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and World Scientific Publishing Co. Ptd. Ltd., 2003).

¹⁰⁰ The Special Branch Officer, interview.

¹⁰¹ *New Straits Times*, "Militants thwarted," April 18, 2012.

CONCLUSION

In Malaysia, terrorism cases were originally handled by the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP). Given the nature of the cases, the RMP formed a new division known as Special Task Force (Operation / Counter-Terrorism) in 2009 to specifically handle terrorism cases. Since 2001, the RMP have arrested at least 129 members of JI in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Since then, they have either been released or deported back to their countries of origin, mainly to Indonesia and Singapore.¹⁰²

Various methods have been employed by the JI to ensure the survival of their ideology and struggle. As stated in PUPJI, to ensure success in the struggle of JI to establish a *dawlah Islāmiyyah* based on *Sharī'ah* law, various activities and programmes were planned by the JI leadership. Among them were missionary activities, economic, education and training programmes. JI also established religious schools through educational programmes to achieve their objective of recruiting youth as JI members. The authorities were able to detect a number of religious schools that served as recruitment places for a new cadre. Among these were the SILH in Ulu Tiram, Johor and Tanah Merah, Kelantan. Both were successfully shut down by the authorities in 2002. However, it appears that the closure of this school has not hindered efforts to spread JI ideology in Malaysia. In 2009 and 2010, the authorities managed to trace two other religious schools that had adopted the salafī-jihadist ideology and had spread the teaching among their students. The two schools are the Al-Quran Waddin in Bandar Baru Uda, Johor Bharu and the Raudhatul Muwahidun in Kelantan; both were established by JI elements in Malaysia.¹⁰³

Recruitment of youth and teenagers is not a new phenomenon in militancy. Angelo Bani and Henning Glaser agreed in an interview that militant groups continually target youth and teenagers to fill their ranks for the group's continual existence and to evade detection by the authorities.¹⁰⁴ In 2003, 13 students from SILH who formed the *al-ghuraba* cell were arrested in Pakistan. Most of the students were sons of JI members. Therefore the monitoring of

¹⁰² *Jakarta Globe*, "Exporting Jihad: Is Thailand the New Front in Southeast Asia's Terror Fight?," January 12, 2011.

¹⁰³ *Utusan Malaysia*, "3 sekolah agama sebar Salafiah Jihadiah ditutup," June 22, 2011.

¹⁰⁴ Angelo Bani, interview by Author, Bangkok, Thailand, September 22, 2011; Henning Glaser, interview by Author, Bangkok, Thailand, September 23, 2011.

religious schools should be done not only by the police but also by religious departments and the community as a whole.

Although the terrorist threat in Malaysia is relatively low,¹⁰⁵ it is important for us to always be vigilant and ready to face any potential threat in the future.¹⁰⁶ Continuous efforts to closely monitor former terrorists are also important to ensure that the latter will not take part in any related terrorist activities once they have been released from detention. Malaysia also understands the need to rehabilitate not only terrorist offenders but also their family members and relatives. This is carried out through a Special Re-Education Programme (SREP)¹⁰⁷ to neutralise them from the terrorists' twisted ideology and influence. Countering the terrorists' ideology is indeed a challenging task. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for all government agencies to work hand in hand with the public to ensure that the threat of terrorism can be effectively dealt with before it undermines Malaysia's national security and stability.

¹⁰⁵ *Utusan Malaysia*, "Ancaman pengganas di Malaysia terkawal-Hisham," July 20, 2010.

¹⁰⁶ Hamzah Osman, "Pantau militan," *Harian Metro*, October 29, 2010.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel J. Mabrey and Richard H. Ward, *Terrorist De-radicalization: Comparative Approaches in Reintegrating Terrorist into the Community, Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism*, (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press BV, 2009).

PROFILES OF PROMINENT MEMBERS AND INDIVIDUALS LINK TO AL-JAMĀ‘AH AL-ISLĀMIYYAH (JI)

1. Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir @ Ustaz Abdus Somad¹⁰⁸

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir bin Abu Bakar Abud¹⁰⁹
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹¹⁰
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1938
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kota Jombang, East Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gontor Islamic Boarding School, East Java, Indonesia • Al-Irsyad University, Surakarta, Indonesia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the 1960s, he and Abdullah Sungkar founded the <i>Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta</i> (Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta) that advocated the imposition of <i>Shari‘ah</i> law in Indonesia. • On 10 March 1972, he co-founded <i>Pasentren al-Mukmin @ Pondok Ngruki</i> in Solo together with Sungkar. • In 1977, he was detained by Indonesian authorities for urging the people not to vote in national elections. • In 1978, he was rearrested together with Sungkar for alleged involvement in <i>Komando Jihad</i> and Dārul Islām (DI) subversive activities, following a crackdown on Muslim political activists in Indonesia by Suharto’s regime. • In 1985, he fled with Sungkar into exile in Malaysia. • In 1993, he and Sungkar established the al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI) while in Malaysia. • In 1998, he went back to Indonesia following the fall

¹⁰⁸ Abu Bakar Ba‘āsyir, *Catatan Dari Penjara Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam*, (Beji: Penerbit Mushaf, 2006).

¹⁰⁹ Bagus BT Saragih and Mustaqim Adamrah, “Arrested RI man may be linked to Ba‘āsyir,” *The Jakarta Post*, August 3, 2008, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/13/arrested-ri-man-may-be-linked-ba%E2%80%99asyir.html>.

¹¹⁰ *Berita Harian*, “Abu Bakar terbuka dengan isteri, anak,” October 18, 2010.

	<p>of Suharto’s regime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2000, he headed the <i>Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia</i> (MMI) (Indonesian Mujahedeen Council) in Indonesia. • In 2005, he was arrested by the Indonesian authorities on a charge of conspiracy in relation to the 2002 Bali Bombing. • In June 2006, he was released from prison and the Supreme Court overturned his conviction.¹¹¹ • In August 2010, he was arrested for alleged involvement in funding a militant training camp in Aceh.¹¹² • In June 2011, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. • In November 2011, he launched a formal appeal to the Supreme Court in Jakarta. • In February 2012, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal and maintained the original sentence of 15 years in prison.¹¹³
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2. Abdullah Sungkar @ Ustaz Abul Halim @ Abah¹¹⁴

Name	• Abdullah bin Ahmad Sungkar
Marital Status	• Married ¹¹⁵
Year of Birth	• 1937

¹¹¹ Peter Alford, “Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir arrested for alleged involvement in terrorism,” *The Australian*, August 9, 2010, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesian-cleric-abu-bakar-bashir-arrested-for-alleged-involvement-in-terrorism/story-e6frg6so-1225903041646>.

¹¹² *The Guardian*, “Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir arrested over links to terrorist group,” August 9, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/09/abu-bakar-bashir-arrested-terrorist-group>

¹¹³ *The Jakarta Post*, “Court rejects Ba’asyir’s appeal,” February 27, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/27/court-rejects-ba-asyir-s-appeal.html>.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ “Istri Abdullah Sungkar: Suami saya cuma berdakwah,” *Liputan6*, last modified November 12, 2002, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/44792/istri-abdullah-sungkar-suami-saya-cuma-berdakwah>.

Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1999
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solo, Central Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian
Education ¹¹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>SD Al Irsyad</i>, Solo, Indonesia • Modern Islamic School, Solo, Indonesia • <i>SMA Muhammadiyah</i>, Solo, Indonesia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the 1960s, he and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir established the <i>Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta</i> (Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta) that advocated the imposition of <i>Sharī'ah</i> law in Indonesia. • On 10 March 1972, he co-founded <i>Pasentren al-Mukmin @ Pondok Ngruki</i> in Solo together with Ba'asyir. • In 1977, he was detained by Indonesian authorities for urging the people not to vote in national elections. • In 1978, he was rearrested together with Ba'asyir for alleged involvement in <i>Komando Jihad</i> and <i>Dārul Islām (DI)</i> subversive activities, following a crackdown on Muslim political activists in Indonesia by Suharto's regime. • In 1985, he fled with Ba'asyir into exile in Malaysia • In 1993, he and Ba'asyir established <i>al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah (JI)</i> while in Malaysia. • In 1998, he went back to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's regime. • In 1999, he died of a natural cause in Bogor, Indonesia.

¹¹⁶ Imam Muhlīs, “Abdullah Sungkar,” *Lazuardi Birru*, last modified July 11, 2012, <http://www.lazuardibirru.org/jurnalbirru/ensiklopedia/abdullah-sungkar-2/>.

3. Abdul Aziz @ Imam Samudra¹¹⁷

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abdul Aziz bin Akhmad Syihabuddin¹¹⁸
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Married¹¹⁹
Year of Birth ¹²⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1970
Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2008
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serang, East Java, Indonesia.
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indonesian
Education ¹²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Madrasah Ibtida'iyah al-Khairiyyah</i>, Serang, Indonesia <i>Madrasah Aliyah Negeri</i>, Serang, Indonesia <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From 1993 to 1996, he received military training in Afghanistan. In 2000, he was the JI field commander for the Atrium bombings and the church bombings in Jakarta. In 2002, he was the JI field commander for the 2002 Bali bombing. In November 2002, he was arrested in Banten by the Indonesian police.¹²² In 2004, he published an auto-biography entitled <i>Aku Melawan Teroris!</i>. In November 2008, he was executed by firing squad in Nusakambangan, Indonesia.

¹¹⁷ "Imam Samudra," *Global Jihad*, last modified June 28, 2007, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=272

¹¹⁸ Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris!*, (Solo: Jazera, 2004).

¹¹⁹ *Suara Merdeka*, "Istri Imam Disembunyikan," November 24, 2002, <http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0211/24/nas2.htm>

¹²⁰ *BBC*, "Profile: Imam Samudra," October 24, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7689338.stm>

¹²¹ *Tempo.Co*, "Jihad Ala Si Kutu Buku," accessed November 15, 2012, <http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/profil/prof-imamsamudra.html>

¹²² Fredrick Rieuwpassa, "Kisah Perburuan Kelompok Imam Samudra," *Liputan6*, last modified October 12, 2012, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/443817/kisah-perburuan-kelompok-imam-samudra>.

4. Abdul Manaf Kasmuri¹²³

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abdul Manaf bin Kasmuri¹²⁴
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Married
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1955
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selangor, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Malaysian.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Royal Military College (RMC), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the United Kingdom
Activities ¹²⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He was a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Malaysian Army. He was a senior leader of <i>Pertubuhan al-Ehasan</i>, a charity established in 1998 in Malaysia to fund JI activities in Poso and the Maluku Islands in Indonesia. He set up Excelsetia Sdn Bhd as a front company for the al-Qaeda.¹²⁶ In February 2003, he was arrested by the Malaysian authorities. In October 2006, he was released from prison.¹²⁷

¹²³ “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.K.115.03. ABDUL MANAF KASMURI by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI12503E.shtml>.

¹²⁴ Lt Kol Abdul Manaf Kasmuri (B), *Kolonel Jihad, Antara Mitos dan Realiti*, (Kuala Lumpur: Nur ilham, 2010).

¹²⁵ Zachary Abuza, “Malaysia Releases 17 More Members of JI & KMM,” *Counterterrorism Blog*, October 20, 2006, http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/10/malaysia_releases_17_more_memb.php.

¹²⁶ Eddie Chua, “Colonel Jihad,” *The Malay Mail*, Mar 17, 2003, <http://www.mmail.com.my/Monday/Frontpage/20030317105822>.

¹²⁷ Ruhaidini Abd. Kadir and Mazli Bidu, “11 tahanan ISA termasuk anak MB Kelantan dibebaskan,” *Utusan Malaysia*, October 19, 2006.

5. Ali Ghufron @ Muklas

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Huda bin Abdul Haq
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹²⁸
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1960
Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2008
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Pasantren al-Mukmin @ Pondok Ngruki, Solo, Indonesia</i>
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He fought in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989. • He met Osama bin Laden in 1987 and was the head of the JI Military Academy in Afghanistan. • He was the first headmaster of <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i> in Ulu Tiram, Johor, in the late 1980s. • He was a close associate of Hambali, who he had met at the SILH and was regional commander of JI <i>Mantiqī Ūlā</i>, replacing Hambali in 2001. • He was in charge of the 2002 Bali bombing and was present at the February 2002 meeting in Bangkok to plan the attack. • He was given the task of implementing the attack and received US\$30,500 from Wan Min Wan Mat for the 2002 Bali bombing. • In December, 2002, he was arrested in Central Java by the Indonesian police. • In November, 2008, he was executed by firing squad in Nusakambangan, Indonesia.

¹²⁸ Zakir Hussain, "The school where it all started & Bomber principal's widow stays on," *Singapore United*, September 11, 2011, <http://www.singaporeunited.sg/cep/index.php/News-Room/The-school-where-it-all-started-Bomber-principal-s-widow-stays-on>.

6. Amran @ Henry Mansor @ Andi Saputra¹²⁹

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abdul bin Mansor¹³⁰
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Married¹³¹
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1964
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Johor, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He was a businessman and owned Gulf Shore Sdn. Bhd., a company that supplied hardware, valves and instrumentation.¹³² He received firearms and explosives training in Afghanistan. He supplied explosives and weapons to JI members and took part in the preparation of the bombing of churches in Indonesian in December 2000. In February 2004, he was arrested in Solo, Indonesia in connection with the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹²⁹ “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.M.116.03. AMRAN MANSOR by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI12503E.shtml>.

¹³⁰ Lourdes Charles, “Game’s up for JI leader disguised as burger seller,” *The Star*, March 3, 2004, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2004/3/3/nation/7444112&sec=nation>.

¹³¹ Eddie Chua, “He sold dumplings while on the run,” *AccessMyLibrary.com*, March 3, 2004, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-20533713_ITM.

¹³² Reme Ahmad, “STS: JI suspects say Islamic oath of loyalty shackled them to group,” *The Straits Times*, April 3, 2004. <http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/asia/story/0,4386,243782,00.html?>

7. Amrozi H Nurhasyim

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amrozi bin H Nurhasyim
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹³³
Year of Birth ¹³⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1962
Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2008
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Langmongan, East Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities ¹³⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1985, he went to work in Malaysia for six months. • In 1992, he returned to Malaysia and studied under Mukhlas at the SILH. • He returned to Indonesia in 1997. • He was a self-taught computer, mobile phone and car repair man. • He bought the chemicals used to make the Bali bombs and also bought the Mitsubishi L300 to transport the Bali suicide bombers. • He was arrested in November 2002, in Tenggulun by the Indonesian police. • In November, 2008, he was executed by firing squad in Nusakambangan, Indonesia.

¹³³ *Detik Surabaya*, "Istri Amrozi Pasrah Dengan Takdir yang Diterima Suaminya," August 27, 2008, <http://surabaya.detik.com/read/2008/08/27/172337/995763/475/istri-amrozi-pasrah-dengan-takdir-yang-diterima-suaminya>

¹³⁴ *BBC*, "Profile: Amrozi," November 8, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2632043.stm>

¹³⁵ *The Age*, "Amrozi: a killer who did not repent, a clown who kept smiling," August 8, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/07/1060145797290.html>

8. Azahari Husin (Dr.)¹³⁶

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Azahari Husin
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹³⁷
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1957
Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2005
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malacca, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reading University, United Kingdom • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was an engineer and a lecturer at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM). • He received extensive bomb training in Afghanistan and was a bomb expert of JI. • He is said to be the author of the JI bomb manual, which was used in the 2002 Bali bombing. • In November 9, 2005, he was killed by the Indonesian police in Malang, Indonesia.

9. Dulmatin @ Amar Usman¹³⁸

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joko Pitoyo
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹³⁹
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1970

¹³⁶ *BBC*, “The Bali bombing plotters,” March 10, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2385323.stm#Dr%20Azahari%20Husin>

¹³⁷ *The Independent*, “Azahari Bin Husin Terrorist 'Demolition Man',” November 14, 2005, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/azahari-bin-husin-515216.html>

¹³⁸ “Dulmatin,” *Global Jihad*, last modified November 24, 2007, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=531.

¹³⁹ *Kompas*, “Istri Dulmatin Belum Tahu Suaminya Tewas,” March 10, 2010, <http://www1.kompas.com/read/xml/2010/03/10/16483741/isteri.dulmatin.belum.tahu.suaminya.tewas>

Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2010
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian.
Education ¹⁴⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SLTP Negeri 2 Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia • SMA Negeri 1 Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia • SMA Muhammadiyah III Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Activities ¹⁴¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He worked as a used car dealer in Malaysia. • He was known as a technician and electronics expert. • He was said to be a student of Dr Azahari Husin in bomb making. • In late 1990's, he was trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. • After the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta, he fled to Mindanao, the Philippines. • He was the operational commander of al-Qaeda in Aceh, a new militant group set up and funded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Aceh, Indonesia.¹⁴² • In March 9, 2010, he was killed in a police raid in Pamulang, Indonesia.

10. Idris al Gembrot @ Jhoni Hendrawan¹⁴³

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mohamed Ihsan @ Idris al Gembrot @ Jhoni Hendrawan
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1968
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian

¹⁴⁰ *Tempo.Co*, "Jejak Dulmatin," accessed December 21, 2012, <http://tempointeraktif.com/khusus/selusur/teroris/page06.php>

¹⁴¹ *BBC*, "Bali bomber' Dulmatin confirmed dead in Indonesia raid," March 10, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8559054.stm>

¹⁴² *BBC*, "Indonesia's Ba'asyir rejects 'made-up' charges," February 14, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12445335>

¹⁴³ *ABC*, "Person of interest by Four Corners," accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm

Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Pasantren al-Mukmin @ Pondok Ngruki</i>, Solo, Indonesia.¹⁴⁴
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was an entrepreneur from East Java. • He played a role in logistic, organised transport, accommodation and communication for the 2002 Bali Bombing. • He bought the motorcycle used in the bombing and rented the flat where the bomb was put together. • He owned the phone that set off the Sari Club bomb. • He was involved in the robbery of Bank Lippo Medan in 2003.¹⁴⁵ • He was arrested in Medan on June 2003.¹⁴⁶

11. Mas Selamat Kastari¹⁴⁷

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mas Selamat bin Kastari
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹⁴⁸
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1961
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kendal, Central Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singaporea
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kaki Bukit Primary School, Singapore • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He joined the Dārul Islām (DI) movement in 1990. • He joined the JI <i>wakālah</i> Singapore in 1992 and was

¹⁴⁴ *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, “Asia Report N°114 – 5 Mei 2006 Terorisme Di Indonesia: Jaringan Noordin Top,” October 5, 2012.

¹⁴⁵ Idris, “Tersangka Bom Bali yang Buron Ditangkap,” *Liputan6*, June 30, 2003, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/57481/tersangka-bom-bali-yang-buron-ditangkap>.

¹⁴⁶ “Jhoni Hendrawan,” *Global Jihad*, last modified October 24, 2007, http://globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=511.

¹⁴⁷ *AsiaOne.com*, “Mas Selamat Captured,” accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.asiaone.com/specials/mas_captured/theman.html

¹⁴⁸ *Suara Karya Online*, “Slamet Kastari Kabur Saat Diizinkan ke Kamar Kecil,” February 28, 2008, <http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=193890>

	<p>sent to Afghanistan for military training in 1993 and to study the Taliban system of government training in 1998.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was appointed as JI operation leader in Singapore and planned to attacks the Yishun MRT station, the United States naval vessels, the United States Embassy, the British High Commission and the Changi Airport in Singapore. • In 2001, he fled to Indonesia following the arrest of 13 JI members by Singapore authorities. • In February 2003, he was arrested by the Indonesian authorities in Tanjung Pinang, Bintan, Indonesia. • He was sentenced to 18 months jail in Indonesia for immigration offences. • In January 2006, he was again arrested in Indonesia for using a fake identity card and deported to Singapore in February 2006. • In February 2008, he escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre, Singapore. • In April 2009, he was arrested by the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in Johor, Malaysia. • In September 2010, he was deported back to Singapore.¹⁴⁹
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12. Nasir Abas¹⁵⁰

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mohamad Nasir bin Abas @ Solaiman @ Joko @ Malik @ Santoso
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1969
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian

¹⁴⁹ *Berita Harian*, “Singapura berterima kasih kepada Malaysia kerana hantar balik Mas Selamat,” September 24, 2010.

¹⁵⁰ Nasir Abbas, interview.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1978, Nasir Abas's family moved from Singapore to Johor Bharu, Johor and became Malaysian citizens.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sekolah Kebangsaan Temenggong Abdul Rahman 2</i>, Johor, Malaysia • <i>Sekolah Dato' Jaafar</i> (SDJ), Johor, Malaysia • <i>Maahad Ittiba' u As-Sunnah</i>, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From 1987 - 1990, he was a trainee in the Afghanistan <i>Mujāhiddīn</i> Military Academy, also known as the <i>Saddah</i> camp. • He and Mat Beduh were the first two Malaysians to join <i>Mujāhiddīn</i> fighters in Afghanistan. • From 1990-1993, he was an instructor in the Afghanistan <i>Mujāhiddīn</i> Military Academy. • In 1994, he came back to Malaysia and went to southern Philippines to become an instructor to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters and founded the <i>Hudaibiyah</i> training camp. • In early 1997, he moved back to Johor Bharu, Johor and worked as a teacher at <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem</i> (SILH), under Mukhlas and as the head of <i>kirdās</i> under <i>wakālah</i> Johor in Johor Bharu under <i>Mantiqī Ūlā</i>. • In August 1997, he was promoted as the head of <i>wakālah Badar</i> in Sandakan under <i>Mantiqī Thālith</i>. • In April 2001, he was promoted again as the head of <i>Mantiqī Thālith</i> by Abu Bakar Ba'āsyr in Solo, Indonesia. • In April 2003, he was arrested in Bekasi, East Java by the Indonesian police and was released in February 2004. • He is now actively assisting the Indonesian authorities in countering terrorism.

13. Noordin Mohamed Top¹⁵¹

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noordin bin Mohamed Top @ Noordin Mat Top
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married¹⁵²
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1968
Year of Death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2009
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Johor, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Johor, Malaysia¹⁵³ • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was elected as the second headmaster of <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, replacing Mukhlas. • He was an explosives expert, recruiter, bomb-maker and trainer for JI. • He fled to Indonesia in December 2001 as Malaysian and Singaporean police pursued members of JI. • He was the mastermind for the following incidents: the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 JW Marriot hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombing and the 2009 JW Marriott hotel and the Ritz Carlton hotel bombings. • He was killed in September 17, 2009, by the Indonesian police in Solo, Central Java, Indonesia.

¹⁵¹ “Jemaah Islamiya Senior Operative,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, accessed September 9, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/noordin_top.htm.

¹⁵² *Okezone News*, “Istri Noordin M Top Lupa Wajah Suaminya,” August 4, 2009, <http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/08/04/1/245002/istri-noordin-m-top-lupa-wajah-suaminya>.

¹⁵³ Rohani Ibrahim, “Pengikut Jemaah Islamiyah bijak sembunyikan identiti,” *Utusan Malaysia*, June 24, 2010.

14. Riduan Isamuiddin @ Hambali¹⁵⁴

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riduan Isamuiddin @ Encep Nurjaman¹⁵⁵
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Married¹⁵⁶
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1964
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indonesian
Education ¹⁵⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Madrasah Manarul Huda</i>, Cianjur, Indonesia Al-Ianah Islamic High School, Cianjur, Indonesia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 1985, he went to Malaysia and worked as a cleric and trader. In the late 1980s he went to Afghanistan and spent three years in Osama bin Laden's training camps before returning to Malaysia. He became Head of <i>JI Mantiqī Ūlā</i> comprising of Singapore and Malaysia, and was replaced by Muklas in late 2002. He was the chief of Operations for <i>JI</i> as well as the Coordinator for the al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. In January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, he held a key planning meeting with two of the 9/11 hijackers. In late 2000, he attended a meeting with other leaders in which plans were made to bomb churches in Indonesia and to attack the United States and other Western targets. He played a role as the architect of the 2002 Bali bombing and provided the funds (USD 30,500) for the bombing operation to Wan Min bin Wan Mat.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ "Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.I.87.03. NURJAMAN RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," *The United Nations*, last modified March 28, 2011, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml>.

¹⁵⁵ Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist extremists*.

¹⁵⁶ Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

¹⁵⁷ Dwi Wiyana, Upiek Supriyatun and Muchid Albintani, "Tuduhan Berlapis buat Hambali," *Tempo.Co*, February 24, 2002, <http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/min/uta-8.html>.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In August 2003, he was arrested in Ayutthaya by the Thai police and handed over to the United States authorities.¹⁵⁹ • He is currently imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay detention camp, Cuba.¹⁶⁰
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15. Umar Patek @ Umar Kecil @ Abu Syekh @ Zacky

Name	• Umar Patek ¹⁶¹
Marital Status	• Married ¹⁶²
Year of Birth	• 1966 ¹⁶³
Place of Birth	• Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia ¹⁶⁴
Nationality	• Indonesian
Education	• SMA Muhammadiyah 1 Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2000, he was one of the masterminds in a series of bombings on Christmas Eve in Indonesia. • He was one of the masterminds and bomb maker of the 2002 Bali bombings. • He spent almost 10 years on the run as one of Southeast Asia's most wanted man. • The Rewards for Justice Program, by the US Department of States issued a \$1 million bounty on him in 2005.

¹⁵⁸ *Tempo.Co*, “Akhir Pelarian Hambali,” August 18, 2003, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2003/08/18/LU/mbm.20030818.LU89711.id.html>

¹⁵⁹ Baradan Kuppasamy, “Hambali: The driven man,” *Asia Times Online*, 19 August 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EH19Ae06.html.

¹⁶⁰ Joe Boyle, “Hambali and the Guantanamo problem,” *BBC*, March 4, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7912678.stm>.

¹⁶¹ Prayitno Ramelan, “*Intelijen Bertawaf*,” (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2009).

¹⁶² Maria Ressa, “Bali bomber Umar Patek’s journey to meet bin Laden,” *ABS-CBN News*, June 22, 2011, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/blogs/insights/06/22/11/bali-bomber-umar-patek%E2%80%99s-journey-meet-bin-laden>.

¹⁶³ Maria Yuniar, “Umar Patek Divonis Penjara 20 Tahun,” *Tempo.Co*, Jun 21, 2011, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/21/063412137/Umar-Patek-Divonis-Penjara-20-Tahun>.

¹⁶⁴ Zumrotul Muslimin, “Umar Patek Dikenal Biasa Saja Semasa SMA,” *Liputan6*, March 31, 2011, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/327175/umar-patek-dikenal-biasa-saja-semasa-sma>.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In January 2011, he was arrested by Pakistani authorities in a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. • In August 2011, he was deported back to Indonesia.¹⁶⁵ • In June 2012, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his role in several terrorist activities in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings by the Indonesian authorities.¹⁶⁶
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16. Wan Min Wan Mat

Name	• Wan Min bin Wan Mat ¹⁶⁷
Marital Status	• Married
Year of Birth	• 1960
Place of Birth	• Kelantan, Malaysia
Nationality	• Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manchester University, the United Kingdom • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem (SILH)</i>, Johor, Malaysia
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was a lecturer at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM). • He was a co-founder of the SILH in Ulu Tiram in Johor. • He was trained at the <i>Hudaibiyah</i> camp in Mindanao, the Philippines in 1996. • He received military training in Afghanistan in 2000. • He was present at the February 2002 meeting in

¹⁶⁵ “Umar Patek held at Brimob detention center in Kelapa Dua,” *Institute for Defense Security and Peace Studies (IDSPS)*, August 11, 2012, <http://idsps.org/en/english-news/idsps-news/umar-patek-held-at-brimob-detention-center-in-kelapa-dua/>.

¹⁶⁶ Sara Schonhardt, “Militant Gets 20 Years in Prison for Bali Bombing,” *The New York Times*, June 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/world/asia/indonesian-militant-gets-20-years-in-prison-for-bali-bombing.html?_r=0.

¹⁶⁷ “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.S.125.03. WAN MIN WAN MAT by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI12503E.shtml>.

	<p>Bangkok and was assigned to give Mukhlas US\$30,500 in two instalments for the purpose of the 2002 Bali bombings.¹⁶⁸</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In September 2002, he was arrested in Kelantan by the Malaysian police. • In 2005, he was released from the Malaysian prison after the authorities concluded he no longer posed a threat to Malaysia.
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17. Yazid Sufaat¹⁶⁹

Name	• Yazid Sufaat ¹⁷⁰
Marital Status	• Married ¹⁷¹
Year of Birth	• 1964
Place of Birth	• Johor, Malaysia
Nationality	• Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sekolah Tinggi Kluang</i>, Johor, Malaysia • Royal Military College (RMC), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia • California State University in Sacramento, the United States
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He served in the Malaysian army as a medical technician, reaching the rank of Captain. • In 1993, he joined JI after he got acquainted with Hambali, and set up a pathology laboratory in Malaysia called Green Laboratory Medicine, where he

¹⁶⁸ *Suara Merdeka*, “Dana JI Berasal dari Al-Qaeda, Kesaksian Wan Min bin Wan Mat,” August 1, 2003, <http://www.suamerdeka.com/harian/0308/01/nas12.htm>

¹⁶⁹ “Al-Qaeda WMD Researcher,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, accessed September 19, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/yazid_sufaat.htm.

¹⁷⁰ “Yazid Sufaat,” *Global Jihad*, last modified September 15, 2007, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=437.

¹⁷¹ Leong Kar Yen, “Govt has no proof of KMM existence, says counsel,” *Malaysiakini*, June 10, 2012, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/11713>.

	<p>is said to have developed Anthrax on behalf of the al-Qaeda.¹⁷²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From 5 to 8 January 2000, he hosted a meeting with al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks. • From 2000 - 2001, he received militant training in Afghanistan by the Al-Qaeda. • In December 2001, he was arrested at the immigration checkpoint in Bukit Kayu Hitam, Kedah by the Malaysian police on his return from Pakistan via Thailand. • In December 2008, he was released from the Malaysian prison.¹⁷³ • In February 2013, he was arrested again at the Jalan Duta High Court, Kuala Lumpur under the Security Offences (Special Measures) 2012 Act for recruiting new cadres.¹⁷⁴ • In May 2013, he was acquitted and discharged by the Kuala Lumpur high court.¹⁷⁵ • In June 2013, he was rearrested and charged with involvement in terrorist activities as well as being a member of a terrorist group, <i>Tanzim al-Qaeda Malaysia</i>.¹⁷⁶
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¹⁷² “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.S.124.03. YAZID SUFAAT by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI12403E.shtml>.

¹⁷³ Mark Hosenball, “A Germ Warfare Guru Goes Free,” *The Daily Beast*, December 16, 2008, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/16/a-germ-warfare-guru-goes-free.html>.

¹⁷⁴ Jennifer Gomez, “Yazid Sufaat pleads not guilty to promoting ideology intended to incite people of Syria,” *New Straits Times*, February 20, 2013.

¹⁷⁵ *Utusan Online*, “Yazid Sufaat dibebaskan daripada tuduhan keganasan” May 20, 2013, http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/Mahkamah/20130520/ma_05/Yazid-Sufaat-dibebaskan-daripada-tuduhan-keganasan

¹⁷⁶ Tashny Sukumaran and Qishin Tariq, “Ex-ISA detainee Yazid Sufaat, canteen worker Hilmi Hashim charged again over terror activities,” *The Star*, May 27, 2013.

18. Zaini Zakaria¹⁷⁷

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zaini bin Zakaria
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Married
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1967
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kelantan, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sekolah Islam Luqmanul Hakiem</i> (SILH), Johor, Malaysia • He was an electrical engineer.
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the early 90s', he helped JI in setting up SILH branch in Kelantan.¹⁷⁸ • He received military training at the al-Qaeda's camp in Afghanistan in 1999. • He enrolled in a flight school and obtained a license to fly a small plane in 2000. • He was involved in the foiled Library Tower plot in Los Angeles in 2001.¹⁷⁹ • He surrendered to the Malaysian authorities in December 2002.¹⁸⁰ • He was released from prison in February 2009.

¹⁷⁷ "Narrative summary of reasons for listing, QI.Z.127.03. ZAINI ZAKARIA by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml>.

¹⁷⁸ "Zaini Zakaria," *Global Jihad*, last modified October 2, 2008, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1147.

¹⁷⁹ "Library Tower Plot," *Global Jihad*, last modified October 2, 2008, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1148.

¹⁸⁰ *NBC News*, "Malaysian linked to 2002 Calif. terror plot," October 2, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11266564/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/malaysian-linked-calif-terror-plot/#.UPNaL_LD790

19. Zulkepli Marzuki¹⁸¹

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Zulkepli Marzuki¹⁸²
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1968
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Selangor, Malaysia
Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Malaysian
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), Selangor, Malaysia¹⁸³
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• He was a businessman and a chartered accountant.• He was a senior leader of <i>Pertubuhan al-Ehasan</i>, a charity established in 1998 in Malaysia to fund JI activities in Poso and the Maluku Islands in Indonesia.• He acted as a point man for JI operatives visiting Malaysia, financier and was a close aide to Hambali.• He attended the February 2002 Bangkok meeting to plan the 2002 Bali bombings.• He was released from prison in May 2009.¹⁸⁴

20. Zulkifli Hir @ Marwan¹⁸⁵

Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Zulkifli Bin Hir @ Marwan¹⁸⁶
Year of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1966
Place of Birth	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Johor, Malaysia

¹⁸¹ “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, *Q.I.B.117.03. ZULKEPLI BIN MARZUKI* by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1889 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE09202E.shtml>.

¹⁸² *Malaysiakini*, “Tiada kaitan dengan pemansuhan ISA,” May 9, 2009, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/103963>

¹⁸³ *The Star*, “Fourth man linked to Bali blast,” January 21, 2003.

¹⁸⁴ *The Star*, “Hindraf leaders among 13 ISA detainees to be released,” May 9, 2009.

¹⁸⁵ “Wanted Information leading to the location of Zulkifli bin Hir Up to \$5 Million,” *Rewards for Justice*, accessed November 18, 2011, <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=zulkifli&language=english>.

¹⁸⁶ Eddie Chua, “Malaysian brothers charged with having terror links,” *The Star*, August 5, 2007.

Nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian
Education ¹⁸⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sekolah Datuk Abdul Razak</i>, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia • He was a telecommunication engineer trained in Arizona, United States.¹⁸⁸
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He was the head of the <i>Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia</i> (KMM) and a member of JI.¹⁸⁹ • He is wanted in Malaysia for the murder of Lunas assemblyman Dr Joe Fernandez and the attempted bombing of a Hindu temple in Pudu in 2000, as well as for his role in leading KMM in the Southern Bank robbery in Petaling Jaya in May, 2001. • He helped the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in bomb-making training and cooperated with the ASG to attack and bomb several American interests and military bases in the Philippines.¹⁹⁰ • The Rewards for Justice Program, US Department of State issued a \$5 million bounty on him.¹⁹¹ • In February 2012, he was reportedly killed during an airstrikes by the Philippine armed forces in Jolo Island. However, his body was never found and there is a possibility that he is still alive and hiding in southern Philippines.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ *Utusan Malaysia*, “U.S. adds Malaysians to Jemaah Islamiyah suspects,” September 7, 2003.

¹⁸⁸ Zachary Abuza, “Zulkifli bin Hir: JI’s U.S.-Trained Engineer,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, April 5, 2007, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=4056](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4056).

¹⁸⁹ “ZULKIFLI ABDHIR,” *The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)*, accessed August 11, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/zulkifli-abdhir.

¹⁹⁰ “Narrative summary of reasons for listing, *Q.I.A.109.03*. ZULKIFLI ABDUL HIR by Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” *The United Nations*, last modified May 21, 2009, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQ110903E.shtml>.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *United Press International*, “Malaysia: Terrorist Zulkifli still alive,” March 19, 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/03/19/Malaysia-Terrorist-Zulkifli-still-alive/UPI-29591332180634/

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