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

THOMAS KORUTH SAMUEL

Japan-ASEAN Cooperation

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First published in 2018.
SEARCCT is dedicated to advocating the understanding of issues pertaining to terrorism and counter-terrorism and contributing ideas for counter-terrorism policy. The Centre accomplishes this mainly by organising capacity building courses, research, publications and public awareness programmes.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

FOREWORD

'The deepest definition of youth is life as yet untouched by tragedy.'

I start by quoting the insightful observation of Alfred North Whitehead but am quickly brought back to reality as I read and witness how the young are not spared and instead, many a time, are the centre of pain, misery and the horrors of conflict. Sadly, the youth are not just 'touched by tragedy', but often times are the 'focus of tragedy'.

In particular, I am aghast, not just by the number of young people who have been injured or even killed by terrorism, but rather at the terrorists' ability to identify, indoctrinate, radicalise and subsequently recruit young people to carry out the dastardly acts of violence against innocent civilians, ironically, on behalf of the people.

How has this happened?

In my opinion, the answer lies in 'cognitive radicalisation'; which is a very fancy way of saying the ability of the terrorists to 'mess' with the hearts and minds of our young people. And to their credit, the terrorists have invested the time, effort and resources to bridge the divide with the youth and initiate this cognitive radicalisation process.

What can we do to reverse this?
What programmes can we formulate?
What committees and action groups should we form?
And what laws must we promulgate?

Thomas K. Samuel, is of the opinion that before we do anything, pronounce any declaration or formulate any proposal, we need to: (i) 'hear' our youth; and (ii) evaluate what matters to them, particularly with regards to issues in terrorism and counter-terrorism. Realising that what affects the youth in one country has the potential to impact the youth in another part of the region, he decided to 'hear' and 'evaluate' the terrorism and counter-terrorism views of the youth in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Given the growing concern that terrorists are deliberately targeting and recruiting educated young people, the focus of the study was further narrowed to look specifically at undergraduate radicalisation in this region.

And listen and evaluate, he did.

He met with more than 8,000 undergraduates in Malaysia alone, and undertook together with various colleagues from across the region, a survey of more than 9,000 respondents from the five ASEAN countries.

To achieve this mammoth task, he was well assisted. In particular, I would like to record on behalf of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia my deepest gratitude to the Japanese Government which so generously funded this research project via the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF). My appreciation also goes to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta which provided solid technical advice and support throughout the entire duration of this project.

Given that this research is a quantitative study, allow me to end with a statistical anecdote which I think is of some relevance to the subject at hand. The youth are said to make up 22 per cent of the world's population, but lest we forget, they make up 100 per cent of our future.

Perhaps, we better start listening to them.

Dato' Azmil Zabidi
Director-General
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia.

May 2018

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AKP	Ansarul Khilafah Philippines
AMLATFPUAA	Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BNPT	Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
CENS	Centre for Excellence in National Security
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
FOSIS	Federation of Student Islamic Societies
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSVE	International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ISA	Internal Security Act
ISL	Islamic State of Lanao
ISP	Islamic State Philippines
JAD	Jamaah Ansharud Daulah
JAIF	Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
KCL	King's College London
KLIA	Kuala Lumpur International Airport
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
MBS	Marina Bay Sands
MEDIU	Madinah International University
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs

MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIT	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur
MUIS	Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	New People's Army
NTU	Nanyang Technological University
NUS	National Union of Students
NUS	National University of Singapore
OSDFS	Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
PERGAS	Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PSA	Public Service Announcement
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organisation
RMP	Royal Malaysia Police
RRG	Religious Rehabilitation Group
RSIS	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
SEARCCT	Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism
SLAYER	Student Leaders Against Youth Extremism and Radicalisation
SMATA	Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act
SOSMA	Security Offences (Special Measures) Act
TPP	Tehrik-i-Taliban
UEL	University of East London
UIN	Universitas Islam Negeri
UiTM	Universiti Teknologi MARA
UMK	Universiti Malaysia Kelantan
UMS	Universiti Malaysia Sabah
UN	United Nations
UNIMAS	Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
UNITEN	Universiti Tenaga Malaysia
UTM	Universiti Teknologi Malaysia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study seeks to understand the perception of undergraduates from both public and private universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The research was carried out by examining the current literature on the subject, studying countries beyond the region that face similar challenges, seeking the views and opinions from experts in the field, and conducting a quantitative survey on undergraduates from the five respective countries in the region.

The purpose of the research was firstly, to obtain a 'situational understanding' based on statistical analysis on the views, reasoning and understanding of the undergraduates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on the various issues surrounding terrorism and counter-terrorism. After having a better understanding of the relationship and dynamics between the undergraduates, the universities and the various components of terrorism and counter-terrorism; the second objective was to identify areas of concern that require intervention. The third and final objective was to suggest recommendations or possible ways forward with regard to the potential challenges vis-à-vis undergraduate views on radicalisation in the Southeast Asian countries mentioned above.

A major component of this study was the quantitative survey conducted in the five countries. The survey focused on having a better understanding of the thought processes of the undergraduates in seven core areas, namely: (i) their sources of information when it came to the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism; (ii) their views on what constitutes terrorism; (iii) their perception on various issues surrounding terrorism; (iv) their ideas on how traditional media and the Internet have influenced their thinking and actions in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism; (v) their opinions on both the hard and soft approaches in relation to countering terrorism; (vi) their opinions on the dynamics of mental radicalisation; and (vii) their thoughts on the possible alternatives to terrorism and its subsequent effectiveness.

The survey yielded numerous insights into the thinking and behavioural patterns of the undergraduates on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the five countries. Among the key findings were: (i) radical violent and 'not-yet' violent ideas were a clear and present danger; (ii) undergraduates were very aware of terrorism and were of the opinion that it would affect their lives; (iii) images and videos were powerful mediums utilised by terrorists, and could also be used in counter terrorism efforts; (iv) there was an urgent need to identify and develop credible alternatives to terrorism in the context of addressing grievances and addressing conflict; (v) both the television and the Internet had the potential to be tremendous tools in countering terrorism; (vi) there was a small but significant minority of undergraduates who were actively seeking out terrorists and violent extremist content via the Internet; and (vii) there was a distinct and significant role that universities had played in the area of radicalisation and could play in the field of deradicalisation as well.

With regards to the way forward, the areas that need further attention and careful deliberation are: (i) the need for universities to be much more involved in countering terrorism; (ii) the need to involve and partner undergraduates in countering violent extremism; (iii) the need to further exploit the media in countering terrorism; (iv) the need to target non-violent radicalisation activities/advocates to prevent violent extremism; (v) the need to tell the stories of the victims and former terrorists; (vi) the need to publicise the alternatives to terrorism; (vii) the need for digital story-tellers; (viii) the need for real-life heroes and heroines; (ix) the need to re-channel curiosity; (x) the need for critical thinking; and (xi) the need to move from 'selective CVE-inoculation' to 'comprehensive CVE-inoculation'.

The study concludes with two additional discoveries that are significant. Firstly, that universities can potentially provide a conducive environment for undergraduate radicalisation, and secondly, that universities and undergraduates can be significant partners as well as stakeholders in countering violent extremism.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

Southeast Asia has in the past been labelled as the second front for terrorism. The Jakarta Stock Exchange bombings in September 2000, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and October 2005, the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, the Super Ferry bombings in the Philippines in February 2004, the Valentine's Day bombings in the Philippines in February 2005, the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta in September 2004, the Jakarta bombings at the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in July 2009, the suicide attack at a mosque in Cirebon, Indonesia in April 2011, the central Jakarta bombings in January 2016, the twin suicide bombings in East Jakarta in May 2017, the Movida grenade attack in Puchong, Malaysia in June 2016, and the Marawi Siege carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute brothers from May to October 2017 in the Philippines are but a few examples of the atrocities that have been carried out by terrorists in this region. Therefore, while the premise that Southeast Asia is the second front for terrorism remains contentious, it cannot be denied that the region has been affected.

Why the need for such a study?

It is significant to note that while there are studies focusing on radicalised individuals and youth who had joined terrorist organisations, there was a lacuna on the perception of young people on the issues of terrorism and counter-terrorism. This means that while we might have some understanding on why certain specific young people are radicalised, we know very little about the rationale, thinking and attitude of young people on the issues of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Hence, it is hoped that this study can act as a baseline to gauge and evaluate the opinions of youths in general and undergraduates specifically in these selected countries on these two issues.

This is of significance as gaining insights into their way of thinking is essential to evaluate and measure the general response and reaction of the young people on terrorism and counter-terrorism. These insights would be particularly valuable when developing strategies to win the 'hearts and minds' of the young people on the ground as well as when formulating policies with regards to countering terrorism. Not knowing and understanding the thinking and feeling of the young people on these important issues and subsequently developing and formulating

strategies to detect, deter, deny, disrupt and destroy the influence of terrorists and the hold of extremism would be a futile effort of 'shooting in the dark'.

This is in contrast to the growing tendency of terrorist organisations from all around the world to firstly, understand young people, and subsequently, factor in and employ young recruits in their strategies and operations. The absence of substantial empirical data and convincing analytical models, particularly with regards to the thinking, rationale and reasoning of young people in this region indicate a compelling need to carry out research into this subject matter.

Given that the definition and categorisation of youth can vary from country to country, this study hopes to focus specifically on undergraduates, who typically fall within the age group of 17 to 25. Indeed, a report from Pakistan on this issue concluded that, "any study that seeks to understand the phenomenon of radicalisation in any society cannot afford to ignore the educated youth" [1]

Focusing on undergraduates has also allowed the survey questionnaires to be distributed via universities across the five countries, thereby simplifying logistics and enabling a better geographical sampling within the countries. The method of conducting a survey was chosen as there was relatively limited possibilities in finding out the link between the perception of undergraduates and the issues of terrorism and counter-terrorism other than by conducting a quantitative study.

The specific aims of this research is to:

I.   Study the perception of university undergraduates on terrorism and counter-terrorism in five countries in this region, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand via a quantitative study;

II.   Identify lacunas of knowledge and propose areas of concern in this field that could benefit from intervention; and

III. Propose policy recommendations at the strategic and operational levels guided by the research findings, experience and lessons learned from other countries, available literature and discussions among the relevant experts in this particular field.

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[1] *Radicalisation: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan,* Pak Institute of Peace Studies, September 2010. file:///C:/Users/searcct/Downloads/45.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2018).

The Education Sector as a Target

History has shown that extremists and terrorists have always seen education and, by extension intellectuals, as both a threat and an opportunity. The persecution of Arab and Jewish scholars in Spain during the 15th century, the suppression of Jewish and communist intellectuals by the Nazis, and the mass targeted killings of scholars by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia are but a few historical examples.[2]

UNESCO published a detailed global study in 2010 on targeted political and military violence against the education system. While that study covered the whole spectrum of the education system and did not focus exclusively on undergraduates from institutions of higher learning, the research did shed light on possible motives for such attacks, which were: (i) attacks on schools or teachers as they were seen to be symbols of the imposition of an alien culture, philosophy or ethnic identity; (ii) attacks on schools, teachers or students with the purpose of preventing the education of girls; (iii) attacks on schools, teachers, universities and academics with the aim of preventing any form of education; (iv) attacks on schools and universities as they were seen to be symbols of government power which was opposed by rebels; (v) attacks on schools, universities, education offices, students, teachers, other staff and officials with the intent to undermine the confidence in government control of a particular area; (vi) attacks on schools, teachers or students to extract revenge for civilian killings; (vii) attacks on education-related infrastructure and officials to undermine the functioning of the education system; (viii) abduction of children and at times adults, with the intent of recruiting them to provide forced labour, sexual services and/or logistical support; (ix) abduction for ransom; (x) sexual violence by members of armed groups, soldiers or security forces as a tactic of war or due to disrespect for gender rights; (xi) attacks on students and academics with the intent to silence political opposition or prevent the voicing of alternative views; (xii) attacks on students and academics to specifically silence human rights campaigns; (xiii) attacks on academics to limit research on sensitive topics; and (xiv) destruction of education institutions by invading forces as a tactic of defeating the enemy and destructing education buildings in revenge.[3] Given the depth, range and variety of attacks that can be perpetrated by terrorist organisations on the education sector, it is then understandable why this particular sector is often times identified and targeted, as seen by the examples below.

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[2] Anthony Welch, *Countering Campus Extremism in Southeast Asia*, International Higher Education, Number 82 (Fall 2015) https://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ihe/article/viewFile/8864/7935 (accessed on 18 January 2018).

[3] Brendan O'Malley, *Education Under Attack*, UNESCO, 2010, http://unesdoc.unesco.org images/0018/001868/186809e.pdf (accessed on 13 January 2018).

On 2 April 2015, fighters who claimed to be from Al-Shabaab attacked Garissa University in Garissa, Kenya. The five terrorists initially took 700 students as hostages, and subsequently freed Muslim students and killed those who were identified as Christians. In the end, they killed 148 people (of which 142 were students) and injured another 79 people. Al-Shabaab was reported to have attacked the university because it was 'at war with Kenya'. This could possibly have been in reference to the Kenyan army entering Somalia in October 2011 in their efforts to prevent Al-Shabaab from crossing into Kenya and kidnapping its citizens.[4] It is also significant to note that as a result of the attack, more than 60 per cent of the schools in Garissa were closed as teachers refused to go back to work out of fear.[5]

On 16 December 2014, fighters associated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TPP) attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar, Pakistan. The seven fighters, wearing explosive belts and armed with automatic weapons and grenades, entered the school and opened fire indiscriminately on the school children, subsequently killing 149 individuals of which 132 were students, with ages ranging from eight to eighteen.[6] The TTP spokesman Muhammad Omar Khorasani was subsequently reported to have said, "We targeted the school because the army targets our families. We want them to feel our pain."[7]

On 20 January 2016, fighters allegedly associated with the TPP attacked Bacha Khan University, near Charsadda, Pakistan. The four fighters, armed with suicide vests were reported to have killed at least 22 people with another 20 seriously wounded.[8] A university official reportedly said that while the university had its own security staff, they were unfortunately "not adequate enough to face the well-armed and trained Taliban".[9] What was also significant was the warning issued by the TPP after the attack, that 'universities, cadet colleges and army schools will be targeted in Pakistan'. [10]

[4] *Kenya al-Shabab attack: Security questions as dead mourned*, 4 April 2015, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32177123 (accessed on 14 January 2018).

[5] *Kenya charges 5 in Garissa University attack*, Voice of America, Reuters, 4 June 2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-charges-5-men-in-garissa-university-attack/2807411.html (accessed on 14 January 2018).

[6] *Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead*, BBC News, 16 December 2014, http://www.bbc-com/news/world-asia-30491435 (accessed on 14 January 2018).

[7] *Police: Taliban attack over, all gunmen killed, Al Arabiya (English)*, 16 December 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/asia/2014/12/16/Three-dead-in-Taliban-attack-on-Pakistan-school.html (Accessed on 14 January 2018).

[8] *Sophia Saifi, Ben Brumfield, Euan McKirdy, At least 22 killed in attack on Bacha Khan University in Pakistan*, CNN, 21 January 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/20/asia/pakistan-university-militant-attack/ (accessed on 14 January 2018).

[9] *Mureeb Mohmand, Iftikhar Firdous, Irfan Ghauri, Riaz Ahmed, Abdul Manan, Kamran Yousaf, Sohail Khat-tak, Tahir Khan, Breakthrough achieved in identifying Charsadda attackers: DG ISPR, The Express Tribune*, 20 January 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1030820/gunfire-heard-at-bacha-khan-university-in-charsadda/ (accessed on 14 January 2018).

[10] Ibid.

Also, terrorists and extremists have been looking at institutions of higher learning and their students (undergraduates) as a source of recruitment and support. These undergraduates are seen as a 'strategic target audience' and that by recruiting them, the terrorist network would be able to 'build up a support base' amongst a group that might one day become 'influencers themselves in the wider community'[11] and future leaders.[12] These educated young people are also seen as possessing skills and knowledge, for example, in the field of engineering that might prove useful for terrorist activities such as bomb-making.[13]

According to an expert, the undergraduates' minds are simply 'more ripe' for influence than minds that are more exposed and more experienced, and as such has fewer built-in 'safe-guards' against extremism. Without the means for comparison and capacity for seeing things in relative terms, for numerous undergraduates, 'radical ideology does not seem radical at all'.[14] For instance, the famed Al-Azhar University in Egypt, acknowledging the possibility of its undergraduates being radicalised, was forced to establish academic committees that were tasked to revise textbooks and purge them from radical religious ideas.[15]

With regards to Southeast Asia, the issue of radicalisation, particularly among students and undergraduates, is not new. Radical and extremist movements in this region are 'decades old, and in some cases linked to the desire for regional autonomy, or to fighting for Islam.'[16] For instance, hundreds of Filipinos, Malaysians and Indonesians, and among them students and undergraduates, volunteered as Mujahideen warriors to fight in Afghanistan and subsequently returned radicalised.[17] More contemporary cases will be discussed below.

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[11] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.
[12] Email communication with Dr. Roy Anthony Rogers, University Malaya on 31 January 2018.
[13] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.
[14] Email communication with Benjamin Zawacki, Researcher UNODC, UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Thailand on 26 January 2018.
[15] Anthony Welch, *Countering Campus Extremism in Southeast Asia*, International Higher Education, Number 82 (Fall 2015) https://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ihe/article/viewFile/8864/7935 (accessed on 18 January 2018).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.

Selected Literature Review

Mohd. Mizan Mohammad Aslam's paper on the 'Threat of Daesh in Universities: Malaysia's Experience'[18] was based on the premise that there was a 'growing traction' of the self-proclaimed Islamic State among the youth, and in particular, university undergraduates in Malaysia. With this in mind, the author was advocating the need for the Malaysian Government to formulate a 'holistic strategy' to counter Daesh's influence particularly in Malaysian universities. The paper specifically looked at the reasons that caused university students to either join or sympathise with terrorist groups such as Daesh. According to the author, Malaysian youth below the age of 25 were especially susceptible to radical ideology due to their inexperience, lack of critical thinking skills, the desire and urge to act like adults, the desire to assert their independence, the need for atonement and redemption for past wrong-doings by engaging in violent jihad, and the hope for love and companionship particularly among Malaysian females who went or attempted to go to Iraq and Syria. The author posited that to counter the growing influence of Daesh, the Malaysian Government needed to create and provide more space for the youth to express their feelings and ideas with the hope that this would dissuade them from gravitating toward extremist approaches to change the status quo. He also felt that more detailed and background security checks ought to be conducted by the university authorities; the need for monitoring the Internet activities of undergraduates; providing them with 'recreations' that could act as 'distractions' from potential extremists; monitoring undergraduates who were known to have radical Islamic views; making universities 'restricted areas' and ensuring that no unauthorised activities take place in the university facilities; enhancing security at university access points; monitoring the attendance of university undergraduates; having universities partner with the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) to monitor extremist activities; strengthening the undergraduates' Islamic religious understanding; and partnering with parents to detect early signs of radicalisation. This insightful work, however, did not include any quantitative data when looking at the drivers and triggers for the undergraduates to become radicalised and relied solely on selected case studies.

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[18] Mohd. Mizan Mohammad Aslam, *Threat of Daesh in Universities: Malaysia's Experience,* Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, April 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

The School of International Studies (SoIS), University Utara Malaysia (UUM) with the support of the Institute of Youth Research Malaysia (IYRES) under the purview of the Ministry of Youth and Sports conducted a study titled 'The Influence of The Islamic State of Iraq And Syria (ISIS): A Study on the Potential for Acceptance and Rejection Among Students of Higher Learning Institutions in Peninsular Malaysia'.[19] This study focused on undergraduates in universities in Peninsular Malaysia and looked at three main areas, namely, (i) to understand the level of comprehension and awareness on Daesh among the undergraduates; (ii) to ascertain the level of acceptance and rejection of the Daesh ideology; and (iii) to evaluate the perception of the undergraduates on the counter terrorism efforts undertaken by the Government of Malaysia. The findings indicate that the comprehension of the undergraduates on Daesh was rather limited. While they were generally aware of Daesh, they however lacked understanding on the ideology and affiliation of the group. With regards to the acceptance of Daesh among the undergraduates, the study highlights that while the acceptance of Daesh's struggle was relatively low, there was nevertheless the potential for this to change. Of concern, was a minority of undergraduates who respected Daesh's ideology (15.10%), agreed that Daesh's struggle would be rewarded in heaven (9.30%), contributed efforts or financial assistance towards Daesh (19.5%), defended Daesh's struggle (6.80%), donated to Daesh (7.90%), asked their friends to join Daesh's struggle (4.80%), asked their social media friends to join Daesh's struggle (4.80%), bought Daesh related merchandise (4.20%), considered Daesh's action to be in line with Islamic teaching (14.60%), considered that Daesh did not give a negative image of Islam (11.20%), considered that Daesh was not a cruel group (7.60%) and considered that Daesh should not be considered a terrorist organisation (11.20%). Based on this, the authors of the study was of the opinion that the 'seeds towards acceptance' for the Daesh struggle was already present among undergraduates in Peninsular Malaysia and that there was the possibility that this trend had the potential to grow if counter-measures were not put in place. The authors of the study also highlighted five main factors that they perceived would determine if the undergraduates in institutions of higher learning in Peninsular Malaysia either rejected or accepted Daesh and this was: (i) sympathy; (ii) religious knowledge; (iii) peers influence; (iv) curiosity; and (v) exposure to the internet/social media. This study was well researched in terms of quantitative analysis and methodically looked at the undergraduates understanding, acceptance and rejection of Daesh as well as their perception on the actions taken by the Government in countering Daesh. However, the questions posed to the undergraduates were rather limited and the study was limited to universities in West Malaysia.

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[19] Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, *Bendung radikalisasi IS di IPT tempatan*, Berita Harian Online, 1 March 2016, https://www.bharian.com.my/node/129489 (accessed on 16 June 2018).

A report titled Trends in Student Radicalisation across University Campuses in Afghanistan by Robert Zaman and Abdul Ahad Mohammad[20] examined undergraduate radicalisation across eight university campuses in Afghanistan. The significant findings include, firstly, the discovery that the universities in Afghanistan did not play a strong role in the radicalisation of its undergraduates but instead, it was the 'charged political climate' and the speed of mobilising within universities that was the trigger for radicalisation. Secondly, the mere presence of extremist and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the militant wing of Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar in a particular university was a strong driver of radicalisation. Thirdly, the majority of the lecturers from the universities surveyed did not follow the syllabus recommended by the Afghan Ministry of Education but instead developed their own religious syllabus which was more in line with their own religious thinking and interpretations. This, in turn, increased the chances for the religious education to move from a moderate to a more extreme understanding. Fourthly, the majority of the undergraduates rejected the notion that Islam justified violence and that their reason to be 'radicalised' was more of a reaction towards the violence they were witnessing against perceived civilians. Lastly, the undergraduates were more concerned with their social and economic prospects after they complete their studies in the university rather than getting involved with political ideologies.

Given these developments, the authors of the report proposed the following recommendations. Firstly, the authorities should form a coalition comprising civil society and other relevant actors to prevent the infiltration of extremists and terrorist organisations into the universities. Secondly, the Ministry of Education should standardise the university education curriculum across Afghanistan and ensure that the lecturers are trained and that they follow the designated syllabus. Thirdly, university authorities should institutionalise job placements, internship and fellowship programmes to ensure the best chance for undergraduates to obtain gainful employment, given that unemployment had the potential of being a major driver of radicalisation. Fourthly, the Ministry of Education should provide funding and support for undergraduate associations that emphasise diversity instead of concentrating their resources solely on religious-based associations. This detailed report was, however, limited in its scope as it only covered selected universities in Afghanistan.

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[20] Robert Zaman and Abdul Ahad Mohammadi, *Trends in Student Radicalisation across University Campuses in Afghanistan*, Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47807/1/Trends%20in%20 Student%20Radicalization%20across%20University%20Campuses%20in%20Afghanistan_Zaman.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2018).

The Quilliam Foundation's paper titled 'Radicalisation on British University Campuses: A Case Study'[21] provides an excellent starting point on radicalisation among undergraduates and showcases how universities in the United Kingdom have the potential to become an incubator for extremists and potentially violent forms of political thought. This project proposal reiterates the British Governmental paper[22] that there are 'four identifiable factors that have the potential to contribute to radicalising an individual towards making them believe in the option of terrorist violence'. These four contributory factors are, firstly, the exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimise or require violence by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history. Secondly, the exposure to people or groups that directly and persuasively articulate an ideology and then relate it to aspects of a person's own background and life history. Thirdly, a crisis of identity and often, uncertainty about belonging which might be triggered by a range of further personal issues, including experience of racism, discrimination, deprivation and other criminality (as victim or perpetrator), family breakdown or separation, and fourthly, a range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response. Nonetheless, this detailed report was limited in its scope to universities solely in the UK and since it was conducted in 2010, was not able to take into account the radicalisation process of groups such as Daesh.

The Homeland Security Institute prepared a report titled 'Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups' for the United States Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS)[23]. The objective of this research was to better understand the manner in which school-aged youth were recruited, radicalised and used by various international terrorist groups. The research specifically looked into the role that schools and educators played in the radicalisation process of young people and also the initiatives that had been taken internationally to address the issue of the recruitment and radicalisation of young people. Additionally, to identify practical implications; the tactics and inducements offered by terrorists and the ways in which these challenges were tackled at the global level were also studied. The

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[21] Quilliam Briefing Paper: *Radicalisation on British University Campuses - A Case Study* (October 2010), Quilliam Foundation, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/radicalisation-on-british-university-campuses.pdf?dm_i=JI3,9VVO,2Q60WK,QMSG,1

[22] *Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists (A guide for local partnerships)*, UK Government, March 2010. http://www.macls.com/pluginfile.php/36443/mod_resource/content/1/channel-guidance.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2018).

[23] *Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups prepared for the Homeland Security Institute,* 23 April 2009, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c664/9103b3d86b13fa58b2c1a2942b5b7 ada91d7.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2018).

research was guided by eight framing questions which were: (i) are school-aged youth recruited by terrorist groups; (ii) how are youth recruited; (iii) who recruits youth; (iv) what are youth recruited to do; (v) who is recruited; (vi) from where are youth being recruited; (vii) what are the benefits of recruitment; and (viii) have any programmes or initiatives been developed to try to counter the recruitment of youth by the terrorist groups. Based on the findings of the study, at least 23 of the 42 groups that were designated (at that time) by the U.S. Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organisations had used young people in some capacity or other in carrying out acts of terrorism. This detailed and comprehensive study conducted in 2009 however did not take into account groups like Daesh which might employ differing methods of recruitment and indoctrination among the youth.

Rupert Sutton in his report titled 'Preventing Prevent: Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campus'[24] highlighted that the threat of terrorism in the UK was predominantly from individuals who were born and raised in the country. Based on UK's counter-radicalisation strategy, 'Prevent', the Higher Education sector had been identified as a potentially vulnerable sector. Numerous terrorism offences were reported to have been perpetrated by undergraduates studying at UK universities and there were evidence to suggest that a number of graduates from UK universities who were involved in terrorism-related activities could have been radicalised during their studies. Also of significance was the development of non-violent extremism in several UK university campuses. This was seen with the invitation of extremist speakers onto campuses to deliver lectures; the sharing of extremist material with fellow undergraduates via the social media pages of undergraduate societies; and extremists targeting universities.

Given this development, selected government agencies such as the police and certain Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) had assisted in producing guides on challenging extremism in universities. These efforts include disseminating information with regards to the procedures when inviting speakers, providing case studies for universities, developing training materials for university undergraduates and staff as well as training them to identify signs of extremism. Nevertheless, according to the author, there had been problems and opposition to the 'Prevent' strategies in the university settings. Among the problems were the accusation that 'Prevent' was inherently a racist policy which stereotyped all Muslims as extremists, that the lecturers were forced to spy on the undergraduates, that vulnerable individuals would be stigmatized and that

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[24] Rupert Sutton, *Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campuses,* The Henry Jackson Society, 2015. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_webversion3.pdf (accessed on 21 March 2017).

freedom of expression would be curtailed. The author of the report asserts that much of these criticisms could actually be traced back to the extremist groups themselves and recommends that the relevant authorities develop the necessary counter narratives and subsequently train and support undergraduates who challenge extremist speakers and materials. This insightful study however, focused solely on universities in the United Kingdom and looked exclusively at the efforts undertaken via the 'Prevent' programme. The triggers and drivers of radicalisation and subsequently the efforts to counter such a phenomenon in the UK would in most likelihood differ to that of other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Characteristics of 'Generation Y' and 'Generation Z'

It is important to understand the target audience that we are focused on. The undergraduates that are currently in universities or institutions of higher learning fall under the age-group of 18-25, meaning that they were born between the years of 1993 and 2000.

The young people in this age group have been categorised into two particular generations. Firstly, we have 'Generation Y' (that name is based on 'Generation X', the generation that preceded them[25]) or 'Millennials' who are generally defined as being born in the 1980s or 1990s.[26] Some marketing experts narrow down this group further by categorising them as those born between 1981 and 1994.[27] Secondly, we have 'Generation Z', who are defined as those born between 1995 and 2012.[28] For the purpose of this study, I would like to focus generally on 'Generation Y' and particularly on 'Generation Z' as they make up the majority of the undergraduates in the universities.

'Generation Y'

This generation would be individuals between the ages of 24 and 37. The youngest of this generation would be at the tail end of their university programmes. The formative experiences of 'Generation Y' would be the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States, the US invasion of Iraq, the advent of the Play Station, social media,

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[25] *Definition of "Generation Y"*, BusinessDictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Generation-Y.html (accessed on 1 February 2018).

[26] *Definition of 'millennial'*, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/millennial (accessed on 1 February 2018).

[27] *The Generation Guide: Millennials, Gene X, Y, Z and Baby Boomers*, FourHooks, 26 April 2015. http://fourhooks.com/marketing/the-generation-guide-millennials-gen-x-y-z-and-baby-boomers-art5910718593/ (Accessed on 1 February 2018).

[28] *Generation X, Y, Z and the others*, WJSchroer, http://socialmarketing.org/archives/generations-xy-z-and-the-others/ (Accessed on 1 February 2018).

reality television and Google Earth. Their aspirations focused on freedom and flexibility. They were digital natives and digital entrepreneurs focused on working with organisations and not for organisations. The signature product of this generation were tablets and smart phones which they used to communicate via text or social media preferable over online or mobile networks.[29]

'Generation Z'

This generation would be individuals between the ages of six and 23, and currently make up the large majority of university undergraduates. The formative experiences of 'Generation Z' would be the economic downturn, global warming, mobile devices, the Arab Spring, cloud computing, Wiki-leaks and producing their own media. Though they are young, they might be employed in either part-time jobs or new apprenticeships. Unlike 'Generation Y' which is considered 'digital natives', Generation Z is said to be 'technoholics', meaning that they are entirely dependent on Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and have never known a world without computers and cell phones. Hence, they have integrated technology seamlessly into their lives.[30] In terms of their attitude towards their careers, they are 'career multitaskers' and seamlessly move between organisations and pop-up businesses. The relevant signature products of this generation include the Google glass, nano-computing, graphene, 3-D printing and driverless cars. The communications media that is being developed in this generation includes hand-held and even integrated into clothing communication devices, and their preferred choice of communications include Facetime. It is also significant to note that many of their decisions would be made digitally via crowd-sourcing.[31] This generation would be the most 'materially endowed, technologically saturated and formally educated generation' that the world has ever seen. On the average, they would live longer and stay in education for a longer period of time. This would also translate to them working across far more numerous careers than any prior generation to them.[32]

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[29] *The Generation Guide*: *Millennials, Gene X, Y, Z and Baby Boomers*, FourHooks, 26 April 2015. http://fourhooks.com/marketing/the-generation-guide-millennials-gen-x-y-z-and-baby-boomers-art5910718593/ (Accessed on 1 February 2018).

[30] *'Generation Z'*: *Digital*, McCrindle. http://generationz.com.au/blog/ (accessed on 1 February 2018).

[31] *The Generation Guide*: Millennials, Gene X, Y, Z and Baby Boomers, FourHooks, 26 April 2015. http://fourhooks.com/marketing/the-generation-guide-millennials-gen-x-y-z-and-baby-boomers-art5910718593/ (Accessed on 1 February 2018).

[32] *Generation Z: Trends*, McCrindle. http://generationz.com.au/trends/ (accessed on 1 February 2018).

In a study conducted by Adobe on the learning attitudes, traits and behaviour of 'Generation Z' in the classrooms in 2016,[33] it was highlighted that many of them consider technology to be their defining characteristic, believe they learn best by both doing and creating, believe that they will shape their own future, believe that they are more creative than previous generations, are always looking for new ways to do things, believe that their ability to access the ideas of other people enable them to be more creative, and doubt their preparedness to face the future.

It is also significant to note that both 'Generation Y' and particularly 'Generation Z' interact with the media and this can be seen through shows like Malaysian Idol and other reality shows in which the producers engage and get the audience to participate in the show by voting for their contestants.[34] It is also telling that 'Generation Z's idea of a leader greatly differs from previous generations for they tend to follow leaders who inspire and engage and not necessarily those who were older, higher in the hierarchy or more authoritarian in nature. This generation look instead at those who could communicate well, connect relationally, understand emotionally and lead strategically.[35]

Implications to undergraduate radicalisation

It is significant to note that the formative experience of 'Generation Y' is said to be the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States and the US invasion of Iraq and for 'Generation Z'; the Arab Spring is often times cited. All these events have a terrorism and regime change dimension, meaning that employing political violence to change the status quo is something that is familiar to this generation. As 'Generation Y' is considered to be digital natives and digital entrepreneurs while 'Generation Z' is labeled as 'technoholics', given their dependence on ICT; the Internet becomes inseparable from these two generations. In this regard, the terrorists' formidable presence and exploitation of the cyber world are critical developments and strategic moves to identify, target, radicalise, indoctrinate and recruit young people.

The significance of these two generations wanting to work with organisations and not for organisations is also pivotal. Given the inability of the terrorists to recruit through the conventional means and coupled with their inability to compensate their recruits with the standard incentives and perks, the terrorists are forced to

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[33] *Generation Z in the Classroom: Creating the Future,* Adobe, October 2016. http://www.adobeeducate.com/genz/global-education-genz (Accessed on 1 February 2018).
[34] *Generation Z: Media Consumption,* McCrindle. http://generationz.com.au/media-consumption/ (accessed on 1 February 2018).
[35] *Generation Z: Leadership*, McCrindle. http://generationz.com.au/leadership/ (accessed on 1 February 2018).

appeal and persuade their potential recruits through other means. In this regard, if we examine terrorists and extremists messaging, they are adept at portraying themselves as seeking 'partners' to work 'with' them to bring about supposed 'change'. The relationship is seen as one that is of joint responsibility, with equal recognition and mutual respect. The terrorists do not instruct but rather appeal, constantly affirming the young people and reaffirming the idea that they are seeking to bring about change in 'collaboration' with the young people. This gels well with 'Generation Z's need to work *with* and not *for* an organisation.

Technology plays a pivotal role in the lives of those in 'Generation Y' and Z. It is also interesting to note that though young in age, many of them are already employed in part-time jobs or as apprentices. In this regard, very much like the young people, terrorists are also very much dependent on the ICT. In my earlier works[36], I mentioned Daesh's capability in exploiting the media, highlighting the following;

> *"Daesh has had tremendous success in terms of its ability to exploit the media. This is a carefully crafted, deliberate and calculated move. Its ability to have such a profound influence to the extent of radicalising and recruiting thousands of FTF in a conflict that is essentially an internal one (a Syrian civil war), has been possible, due to a large extent because of its ability to reach such diverse groups of people via the social media. Daesh is essentially "crowd sourcing its propaganda".*

This 'crowd sourcing' is actively done among the members of 'Generation Y' and 'Generation Z'. In this regard, the terrorists have been very adept in using these young people, particularly their skills in ICT, to play an active and significant role in developing and promoting the slick propaganda and messaging of the terrorists. Hence, while they might not be 'weaponized' with guns and bombs, they have nevertheless been unleashed in the cyber world to create, propagate and disseminate terrorists' propaganda, rhetoric and messaging.

Another significant trait of the youth from 'Generation Z' is that many of their decisions were made digitally via crowd-sourcing. Their decision-making process was guided and facilitated by their online friends. What this means is that the cyber world plays a very important role in shaping and determining the choices and decisions of an undergraduate. What this also means is that if a terrorist can develop and facilitate a digital environment or a 'digital eco-system' for a selected

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[36] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2016.

group of young people, they then have the potential to shape and mould the choices and decisions, and ultimately, the subsequent thinking and behaviour of the youth.

It is also interesting to note that members of both 'Generation Y' and particularly 'Generation Z' have a strong tendency to interact and engage with the media. Hence, traditional media, which was generally a one-way street in which the end-user received information and was not able to interact or influence the message, has now evolved. The audience can now participate and even play a pivotal part in the outcome of the media messaging. Hence, in shows like Asia's Got Talent, the audience decides who the eventual winner would be. Basically, the target audience has a role in determining the outcome of a particular situation that is presented by the media. 'Generation Z' does not merely want to be a spectator but expects to participate. Terrorist media outlets cater, encourage and allow such participation. They do not just inform but they seek the opinions of their target audience. At times they put out a general call and then expect the audience to plan and execute. For example, *Daesh*'s call[37] for its members to strike in the US and Europe and the subsequent feedback that it received from its members show that the group has proven to be very adept at engaging and communicating with its members and sympathisers. Compare and contrast that with the government and the authorities' ways of utilising the media in which communication seems to be going one-way and there is very little in terms of engagement and interaction. Hence, the terrorists' way of utilising the media as a channel that allows communication and subsequent engagement and interaction might be preferred by the youths to that of the authorities.

It would also be worth considering the type of leaders that members of 'Generation Z' tend to follow. They are more receptive to follow leaders who inspire and engage with them. This is in contrast to previous generations which tended to have leaders who were older and had a more commanding presence. It is also unfortunate that terrorist influencers and thought leaders over the internet tend to be extremely inspiring and are tremendously creative in engaging with the audience. This is in contrast to authorities who generally tend to be more top-down and authoritarian in nature. Hence, it is not surprising that leaders of terrorist organisations are at times far better able to attract and inspire youth when compared to the authorities.

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[37] Zoie O'Brien, *Lone wolves rise up: ISIS calls on Jihadis to attack US and Europe in revenge for Mosul*, The Express, 11 July 2017. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/826914/ISIS-call-jihadi-attack-US-Europe-revenge-Mosul-Iraq-War-Islamic-State (accessed on 1 February 2018).

Making Sense of Undergraduate Radicalisation

In 2007, Peter Neumann in a study for the European Commission highlighted that,

> *like prisons or like the internet, universities were places of vulnerability. They are places of vulnerability because you get people of a certain age, often away from home for the first time, often feeling quite lost and often experiencing a sort of crisis of identity and so on. That makes it easy for extremist groups to pick them up and to say to them, "Come along to our meeting, we are like you".[38]*

Universities and institutions of higher learning have the potential to become recruiting pools for terrorists. Associate Professor Bilveer Singh from RSIS, Singapore,[39] was of the opinion that there was a growing trend of undergraduates being radicalised by terrorist organisations. This was further reiterated by Mr. Jajat Burhanudin who highlighted that terrorists have in the past assigned their members to join student or youth organisations and subsequently act as mentors to youth and undergraduates with the purpose of recruiting them in the future.[40] Noor Umug, a former terrorist in the Philippines, postulated that in his experience, terrorist organisations in the Philippines radicalised youth (17-18 years) through education, citing the use of student and undergraduate associations in schools and universities by communist-based terrorists groups to recruit potential terrorists. According to him, Muslim-based radical groups established religious schools and subsequently provided scholarships to attract young people to study in these institutions. He gave the example of how Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden established a school in Southern Philippines with the intention of recruiting youths into terrorism.

According to Associate Professor Ramakrishna, young people who constitute the majority of university undergraduates 'are still maturing both emotionally and intellectually' and this makes them 'susceptible to idealistic appeals from charismatic ideologues who seem to have clear-cut answers for the confusion that these undergraduates might feel about the world around them.'[41]

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[38] *Roots of Violent Radicalisation*, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 19th Report of Session 2010-2012, February 2012, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf (Accessed on 27 March 2017).

[39] Interview with Associate Professor Bilveer Singh, RSIS, Singapore on 10 March 2011.

[40] Interview with Dr. Jajat Burhanudin, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia on 4 April 2011 in Jakarta, Indonesia.

[41] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.

In Afghanistan, findings from a report indicate that often times, extremist and terrorist groups make full use of their 'access to universities' and exploit the 'mobilising power of student protests' as a means to further their own vested interests. The manner in which this is done is similar to a barter system in which these extremist and terrorist groups develop a 'patron-client relationship' with the undergraduates, whereby they provide assistance and funding support to undergraduate associations as well as opportunities after graduation. What these extremist and terrorist groups demand in return is that the undergraduates become their 'mouthpieces' in advocating and disseminating their ideologies and belief systems in the university environment. Needless to say, it was then observed that such ideologies, rooted in extremism, not only promoted division but also fueled aggression along ethnic and sectarian lines.[42]

Associate Professor Ramakrishna was of the opinion that there were occasions where undergraduates 'coming from broken homes or homes where the parenting had not been very strong or influential might prove to be even more susceptible to ideologues who may come across as "father figures" to them, as was the case with Hambali and Ustaz Abdullah Sungkar of Jemaah Islamiyah.[43] It is also significant to note that in most cases, the intention of the youth studying in such institutions was purely benign, such as wanting to become a religious leader but unfortunately, according to Noor Umug, many of them were deceived and subsequently radicalised. This process which approximately took one to two years often times even included military training as part of the curricula.[44]

Another significant development was when foreign students and lecturers from countries that were in conflict zones utilised lecture sessions to vividly describe the atrocities and injustices occurring in their respective countries. Over a period of time, these lecturers moulded their undergraduates into thinking that the 'propaganda of the deed' was the only recourse left. For example, it was reported on 28 February 2009 that a 23-year old Malaysian undergraduate from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Muhammad Fadly Zainal Abidin, was arrested in Southern Thailand for allegedly attempting to steal a motorcycle to wage jihad against the Thai military. The final year mechanical student from Melaka was influenced by a radical religious teacher who showed him a video footage of the Tak Bai incident. The teacher then convinced him that the Thai Muslims were

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[42] Robert Zaman and Abdul Ahad Mohammadi, *Trends in Student Radicalisation across University Campuses in Afghanistan*, Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47807/1/Trends%20in%20Student%20Radicalization%20across%20University%20Campuses%20in%20Afghanistan_Zaman.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2018).

[43] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.

[44] Interview with Noor Umug in Manila on 30 March 2011.

oppressed by the Thai government, and that he should slip into Southern Thailand to help them. He was specifically instructed by the teacher to buy knives and a parang, steal a motorcycle, kill Thai soldiers and subsequently take their weapons.[45]

Hence, it is important to note that undergraduates in institutions of higher learning have the potential to develop the necessary critical thinking skills which could then enable them to frame their ideas in a coherent manner and subsequently speak in an intelligent fashion. Therefore, universities play the important role of hosting the 'venue' where undergraduates are exposed to various ideas, thinking, beliefs and principles advanced, advocated and debated by their peers, lecturers and visitors to these institutions of higher learning. It is in this environment that the undergraduates have the chance to develop their own line of thinking and the avenue to present, debate and advocate such opinions.[46] Nevertheless, while universities have both the intention and mandate to instil, nurture and develop critical thinking and the subsequent expression and debates that follow, often times, such 'peaceful discussions can swiftly transform into activism before intensifying into radicalism'.[47] [48] [49]

Research Methodology

The research project is a combination of empirical and theoretical research methods with the purpose of understanding the thinking and perception of undergraduates in selected countries in the Southeast Asian region on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism. A five-countrywide survey was then conducted in both public and private universities and institutions of higher learning in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Views from experts in the relevant fields as well as literature on the subject were also obtained and reviewed.

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[45] Rashvinjeet S. Bedi, *Falling into the extremists' net*, The Star Online, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2010/07/04/falling-into-the-extremists-net/ (accessed on 21 April 2018).

[46] Robert Zaman and Abdul Ahad Mohammadi, *Trends in Student Radicalisation across University Campuses in Afghanistan*, Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47807/1/Trends%20in%20Student%20Radicalization%20across%20University%20Campuses%20in%20Afghanistan_Zaman.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2018).

[47] Robert W. White, *From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army*, American Journal of Sociology (1989): 1277-302

[48] Seraphim Seferiades and Hank Johnston, T*he Dynamics of Violent Protest: Emotions, Repression and Disruptive Deficit*," in Violent Protest, Contentious Politics, and the Neoliberal State, edited by Seraphim Seferiades and Hank Johnston. London: Ashgate, 2012.

[49] R.G. Frey and Cristopher W. Morris, *Violence, Terrorism and Justice*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

A comprehensive survey in English was designed by SEARCCT which was then tested on three (3) focus groups in several universities in Malaysia. The questions were then amended after obtaining feedback from both the undergraduates who participated in the survey, as well as the lecturers who conducted the survey. The survey was later translated into Bahasa Indonesia and the Thai language to suit the respondents in Indonesia and Thailand respectively.

The survey sought to understand the perception of undergraduates in the selected countries in the region on a range of issues pertaining to terrorism and counter-terrorism. The survey started by obtaining the demographic details of the undergraduates (i.e. age, gender, place of birth, ethnicity, religion, faculty and course of study). Then, the survey focused on attempting to understand the thinking and rationale of the undergraduates in seven (7) core areas, which were:

I.   **Their source of information** on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism; whether it was local or foreign news and the kind of medium (Internet, traditional media, etc.) from which that information was transmitted;

II. **Their definition of terrorism** by asking their views on what constituted terrorism by giving them examples of possible acts of terrorism as well as allowing them to define the term through open-ended questions;

III. **Their perception of terrorism** on specific issues such as whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, whether it was a problem just confined to the West or at a global level, whether it was an effective strategy to achieve a particular objective, whether the world was winning the war against terrorism, whether there was any end at sight when it came to terrorism, whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, whether terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) was legal and ethical, whether understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, whether the 9/11 bombing in the US was an act of terrorism, whether the Palestinian issue was a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, and whether the Islamic State (IS) was a terrorist group;

IV. **The dynamics and interactions between the undergraduates, the media, the Internet and terrorism;** whereby to ascertain the connection between the Internet and the undergraduates, wanting to know if undergraduates would visit a terrorist website or chat with terrorists, to ascertain the possibility of a terrorist using the Internet to recruit members, and the role that the media plays in either creating an environment conducive to terrorism or otherwise;

V. **Their perception on counter-terrorism;** whereby to evaluate if undergraduates viewed military action as an effective way in dealing with terrorism, the need to stop the recruitment of terrorism as an essential component in countering terrorism, the need for the support of the population in halting terrorism, the possibility of negotiating with terrorists, the idea that negotiating with terrorists would have the effect of encouraging terrorism to grow, and the notion that winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people was the only way to effectively counter terrorism;

VI. **Their perception on mental radicalisation;** whereby undergraduates felt that the initial step for the radicalisation of a terrorist started out by them having violent radical ideas, whether it was possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whether it was wrong if one merely had violent radical ideas as long as they did not engage in terrorism, whether it was possible for undergraduates to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism, whether it was possible for an undergraduate to move from violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism, whether graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause individuals to be radicalised and subsequently move on to terrorism, whether the feeling that arose when seeing others suffer could radicalise and subsequently lead an individual to defend such victims via terrorism, and whether friends and lecturers play a significant role in an individual developing radical ideas and subsequently engaging in acts of terrorism; and

VII. **Their views on possible alternatives to terrorism;** whereby to evaluate if undergraduates felt that there were successful alternatives to violence in addressing grievances, if people knew that such alternatives existed and if indeed that knowledge was present there would be fewer people who would then resort to violence, whether Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence strategy in India was considered a success, whether Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts in the US was considered a success, whether Aung San Suu Kyi's earlier efforts in the 1990s in Myanmar was considered a success, whether the International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) efforts in bringing about humanitarian aid in conflict areas were considered a success, and whether the United Nations (UN) efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions were considered a success.

Survey Distribution

The survey was distributed in both public and private learning institutions/ universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

In Indonesia, a total of 4,442 undergraduates were surveyed and they were from Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta), Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga (Yogyakarta), Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (Yogyakarta), Universitas Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Surakarta), Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Malang, Universitas Muhammadiyah (Semarang), Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (Purwokerto), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Manado), Universitas Negeri (Medan), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Medan) and Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Ambon). Out of all the surveys, only 4,423 or 99.6% were completed accurately.

In Malaysia, a total of 2,116 undergraduates were surveyed and they were from Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK), Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Universiti Tenaga Malaysia (UNITEN), Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) and Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS). Out of all the surveys, only 1,989 or 94.0% were completed accurately.

In the Philippines, a total of 782 undergraduates were surveyed and they were from University of the Philippines (Mindanao Campus), University of Southern Philippines, Mindanao State University (Iligan Institute of Technology), Mindanao State University (Main Campus), Mindanao State University (Maguindanao Campus), Western Mindanao State University (Zamboanga City), University of the Philippines Diliman and University of Makati. Out of all the surveys, only 779 or 99.6% were completed accurately.

In Thailand, a total of 1,555 undergraduates were surveyed and they were from Khon Kaen University, Ubon Ratchathani University, Chiang Mai University, Maejo University, Mae Fah Luang University, Prince of Songkla University, Kasetsart University, Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Mahidol University and Srinakharinwirot University. All 1,555 surveys (100%) were completed accurately.

In Singapore, a total of 171 undergraduates were surveyed and they were from the National University of Singapore (NUS) and the Nanyang Technological University (NTU). All 171 surveys (100%) were fully completed accurately.

Parameters and Limitations of the Study

The relatively limited availability of literature on undergraduate radicalisation in the five countries surveyed was an area of concern. While more work on this subject had been done beyond this region, particularly in South Asia and the West, the models and theories developed there were at times ill-suited to explain the phenomenon of undergraduate radicalisation in this region.

The language issue, particularly in several of the five countries, meant that there was always a risk of miscommunication and inaccurate reporting. While great care was taken in translating the survey to minimize this problem, the possibility of getting 'lost in translation' is acknowledged.

Access to certain data, particularly with regards to undergraduates arrested for terrorism-related offences in the five countries, was at times considered sensitive due to the age of the alleged offenders and the nature of the subject of terrorism, and hence difficult to obtain. Conducting interviews with such individuals or even the law enforcement officers involved in their incarceration was, on many occasions, extremely difficult.

The time required to carry out a quantitative analysis of this magnitude was underestimated. This was due to the different administrative and logistical challenges that needed to be sorted out before the study could be carried out.

Cultural and/or other forms of biasness may emerge when carrying out a survey of this nature. While survey questions were framed taking cognizance of this, there was nevertheless the possibility of biasness on the part of the respondent that could affect the accuracy of the study.

Chapter Two

UNDERGRADUATE RADICALISATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The original 'Prevent' Strategy was launched in 2007 by the Labour Government with the aims of stopping radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and violent extremism, and discouraging people from becoming terrorists. The 'Prevent' Strategy is one of four pillars of UK's overarching counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST (the other three pillars being Pursue, Protect and Prepare).

The initial version of the 'Prevent' Strategy had five central tenets, which had the express objective of (i) challenging violent extremist ideology and providing support for mainstream voices; (ii) disrupting parties who promote violent extremism whilst providing much needed support to the institutions where they were from; (iii) providing support to individuals who were vulnerable to 'being targeted and recruited' to the cause of violent extremism; (iv) increasing the resilience and ability of communities to stand up against violent extremism; and (v) addressing the grievances which ideologues and radicals were exploiting.[50]

In August 2005, a Home Office Working Group highlighted that "universities are a major recruiting ground for extremists" and that "the dissemination of extremist propaganda in universities" was a significant cause of concern.[51]   In 2011, the Revised 'Prevent' Strategy reinforced this point by stating that there was evidence to suggest that extremist organisations were indeed targeting specific universities and colleges which had a large number of Muslim students with the aim of 'radicalising and recruiting students.'[52]

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[50] Alex Hirschfield, Kris Christmann, Aidan Wilcox, Paul Thomas, Santokh Gill, *Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, Youth Justice Board For England and Wales*, 2012, http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/16233/1/preventing-violent-extremism-process-evaluation.pdf (Accessed on 27 March 2017).

[51] '*Preventing Extremism Together', Working Groups*, Home Office (August 2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf (Accessed on 27 March 2017).

[52] Ibid.

In June 2011, Theresa May, UK's then Home Secretary, criticised universities for their apparent 'complacency' in countering the threat of radicalisation and Islamic extremism on university campuses.[53] The Daily Mail citing a Whitehall report, highlighted that universities in England had become a 'breeding ground for extremism and terrorist recruitment' and went on to cite officials who had identified 40 English universities where there was the possibility for 'radicalisation or recruitment on campuses.'[54] The article quoting the report went on to warn of hard line Islamist groups pushing messages of 'hate and violence' that were specifically targeting institutions of higher learning in the UK which had bigger number of Muslim students. There was also growing concern that the undergraduates in certain universities were even 'engaging in terrorism related activities while being members of university societies'.[55]

In 2012, the Home Affairs Select Committee reported that "some universities may have been complacent" in challenging extremism. The authors went on to add that they were "not convinced that extremists on campus are always subject to equal and robust challenge."[56]

In September 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron prioritised 'tackling extremism in universities and colleges' by putting it on 'top of the agenda'.[57] He went on to say that,

> "All public institutions have a role to play in rooting out and challenging extremism. It is not about oppressing free speech or stifling academic freedom, it is about making sure that radical views and ideas are not given the oxygen they need to flourish. Schools, universities and colleges, more than anywhere else, have a duty to protect impressionable young minds and ensure that our young people are given every opportunity to reach their potential".

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[53] *Universities 'complacent' over Islamic extremism, warns Theresa May,* The Guardian, 6 June 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/06/universities-attacked-over-islamic-extremism (Accessed on 20 March 2017).
[54] James Slack, *40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror as hardline groups peddle hate on campus,* The Daily Mail, 6 June 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394625/40-UK-universities-breeding-grounds-terror.html (accessed on 17 March 2017).
[55] Ibid.
[56] *Roots of Violent Radicalisation*, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 19th Report of Session 2010-2012, (February 2012), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf (Accessed on 27 March 2017).
[57] *Press Release: PM's Extremism Taskforce: Tackling extremism in universities and colleges top of the agenda*, Home Office, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, 17 September 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pms-extremism-taskforce-tackling-extremism-in-universities-and-colleges-top-of-the-agenda (accessed on 20 March 2017).

The Press Release issued by the Home Office then went on to list names of undergraduates who they claimed had links with extremism. The list included 'people committing terrorist-related offences while at a UK university' and these included individuals such as Erol Incedal, a law student at London South Bank University (LSBU), who in November 2014 was 'found guilty of possession of a bomb-making manual' and Afsana Kayum, a law student at the University of East London (UEL), who in March 2015 was sentenced to 18 months in jail for possession of a record containing information useful in the commission of terrorism.

The Press Release also cited two suspected individuals who had attended a British university and were convicted of their 'role in terrorism' and were likely to have at least been partially radicalised during their time studying'. Those individuals were Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who was convicted in 2012 for 'attempted murder and terrorism' after trying to detonate a bomb on a flight to Detroit in 2009, and Roshonara Choudhry who was suspected in May 2010 to have tried to assassinate the Labour Member of Parliament Stephen Timms.

The third category from the Press Release contained names of 'radicalised foreign fighters who had studied in the UK'. The individuals named were Aqsa Mahmood, a radiography student at Glasgow Caledonian University, who in 2013 dropped out of her course and was suspected to have travelled to Syria, and David Souaan who was studying at Birkbeck, University of London when he was apprehended in May 2014 and subsequently convicted in December 2014 of 'preparing for terrorist acts' as he tried to go into Syria for the second time. Rashed Amani, another individual cited, was pursuing Business Studies at Coventry University. He was suspected to have travelled to Syria in March 2014. The last individual in this category was Zubair Nur, a student from Royal Holloway, University of London who was alleged to have travelled to Syria in March 2015.

In their comprehensive report titled 'Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campuses',[58] the Henry Jackson Society highlighted that undergraduates had been involved in terrorism-related offences since 1999. Amongst them were:

> ➤ Amer Mirza; an undergraduate at University of Humberside (now called University of Lincoln) who was convicted in 1999 for a petrol-bomb attack on a Territorial Army base in West London.

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[58] Rupert Sutton, *Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campuses*, The Henry Jackson Society, 2015, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_web-version3.pdf (Accessed on 21 March 2017).

- Mohammed Naveed Bhatti; an undergraduate at Brunel University who was convicted in June 2007 for conspiracy to cause explosions.
- Omar Abdur Rehman; an undergraduate at the University of Westminster who was convicted alongside Bhatti, for conspiracy to cause explosions.
- Jawad Akbar; an undergraduate at Brunel University who was convicted in April 2007 for conspiring to cause explosions. He was also alleged to have been attending a militant Islamist political group while attending Brunel.
- Waseem Mughal; an undergraduate at University of Leicestershire who in July 2007 admitted 'to inciting murder for terrorist purposes overseas'.
- Adel Yahya; an undergraduate at London Metropolitan University who was involved in the July 2005 bomb plot and was convicted in November 2007 for 'collecting information useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism'.
- Waheed Zaman; also an undergraduate at London Metropolitan University, who in 2010 was found guilty of conspiracy to murder, as part of the transatlantic 'liquid bomb' plot.
- Mohammed Gul; an undergraduate at Queen Mary University of London, who was imprisoned in February 2011 for the dissemination of terrorist publications.
- Khobaib Hussain; an undergraduate at the University of Wolverhampton, who in 2012 confessed to 'travelling abroad for terrorist training'.

The report also highlighted UK university graduates who were convicted of involvement in terrorism and had the possibility of being at least partially radicalised during their study. They include:

- Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh; a student at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), who in 2002 was subsequently convicted for the kidnap and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.
- Anthony Garcia; who was convicted in 2007 for multiple offences in relation to a planned fertiliser bomb attack. Even though not a student at UEL, Garcia was allegedly radicalised after attending talks at the university.
- Omar Sharif; an undergraduate at King's College London (KCL) who was killed in 2003 after a malfunction in his suicide device which nevertheless killed three in an attack in Tel-Aviv, Israel.
- Kafeel Ahmed; who in June 2007, died during an attempted attack on Glasgow Airport. It was alleged that he had been radicalised while studying at Anglia Ruskin University.

The report also highlighted several individuals who had enrolled in UK universities and who were suspected to have travelled to Syria. They include:

➢ Mohammad Qadi Riha; an undergraduate at UEL when he travelled to Syria in 2012; and
➢ Anil Khalil Raoufi; an undergraduate at University of Liverpool when he travelled to and was subsequently killed in Syria in February 2014.

The report went on to suggest that there was evidence that indicated a developing 'culture conducive to the promotion of non-violent extremism' on a number of British institutions of higher learning. This culture manifested through invitations to lectures or sermons in universities by extremist speakers, student societies sharing extremist materials through social media platforms, and the focus of both religious-based extremists as well as far-right groups to target institutions of higher learning.[59]

As mentioned earlier, in the United Kingdom, the governing counter-terrorism approach is known as the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.[60] This Act, also known as the Prevent Duty, contains specific tasks for specified authorities to do in order to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. In this regard, the updated Prevent Duty Guidance will make it mandatory and legally binding for institutions of higher learning in the UK to 'put in place specific policies to stop extremists radicalising students on campuses' and subsequently 'support students at risk of radicalisation'. The key thrusts and premises of the 'Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales'[61] include the following:

➢ The realisation that the youth remain vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist ideology. Hence, institutions of higher learning must realise that young people "continue to make up a disproportionately high number of those arrested" for both terrorist-related offences and also attempting to join terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq.

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[59] Rupert Sutton, *Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campuses,* The Henry Jackson Society, 2015, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_web-version3.pdf (Accessed on 21 March 2017).

[60] Section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 ("the Act") imposes a duty on "specified authorities", when exercising their functions, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

[61] *The 'Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales*, 16 July 2015 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445916/Prevent_Duty_Guidance_For_Higher_Education__England__Wales_.pdf (Accessed on 20 March 2017).

➢ With regards to the process of radicalisation, there is the possibility that there is a spectrum of radicalisation that takes place at the university; ranging from undergraduates who are already radicalised before they join, to those who are radicalised due to campus activities, to those who are radicalised due to activities occurring out of the campus.

➢ With regards to inviting speakers, the university authorities must carefully consider whether the views expressed are extremist in nature and have the risk of 'drawing people into terrorism' or are views that are actually shared by terrorist groups.

➢ For the university authorities to be trained and prepared to identify behavioural changes in those who are radicalised and to have the discernment to identify tell-tale signs, particularly on the social media platforms.

➢ The need for the university authorities to carry out 'risk assessments' for their institutions and to identify 'where and how' the undergraduates could be influenced and radicalised.

➢ For that to happen, there is a need for the university authorities to be trained to help prevent undergraduates from being 'drawn into terrorism' while simultaneously challenging and debunking extremists ideas and viewpoints.

➢ For the university authorities to look into the welfare of the undergraduates and to ensure that sufficient chaplaincy and pastoral support in available for all.

Challenges in the UK

There have been numerous challenges faced by the UK government in their efforts to counter radicalisation among students in universities, particularly via the 'Prevent' programme. Chiefly, the pushback and resistance from the students themselves towards the programme have been evident.[62] Student bodies 'have attempted to deliberately evade scrutiny' and at times have even 'actively worked to hinder Prevent delivery'. For example, the National Union of Students (NUS) even went as far as to pledge 'to oppose counter-radicalisation work'. In most cases, the criticism towards 'Prevent' has been focused on the following reasons. Firstly, the perception that the programme was a 'racist policy' which has the covert intention to depict the 'Muslims as a suspect community'. Secondly, that the lecturers and the authorities would be 'forced to spy on the students.'

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[62] Rupert Sutton, *Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campuses*, The Henry Jackson Society, 2015, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_web-version3.pdf (Accessed on 21 March 2017).

Thirdly, the programme would inadvertently lead to the 'stigmatisation' of an already 'vulnerable' group of people and lastly, that the programme would affect the freedom of speech and lead to the clamping down of 'controversial ideas on campuses' and subsequently target those who 'dissent from mainstream opinions.'[63]

It is significant to note the role that has been played by extremists groups in levelling the criticisms against the 'Prevent' programme. Many of the challenges against the programme has been 'directly influenced by extremist groups' who have made this a core issue in their 'campaigning platforms.' In this regard, it has been reported that there have been a few student groups that have 'pledged to work alongside the extremist groups' that promote such criticisms. For example, the NUS had decided to work with CAGE,[64] which was alleged to be a pro-terrorist prisoner lobby group while the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) had also worked with CAGE on certain occasions.

The other side of the coin

There are also those who question the connection between universities and the radicalisation process, and are critical of whether there is indeed a link between the two. For example, Universities UK were of the opinion that "simplistic linkages have been made between violent radicalisation and the fact that an individual has attended university without acknowledgement that the radicalisation process is far more nuanced and difficult to predict".[65]

There was also the Home Office Rapid Evidence Assessment which looked at open source empirical studies and highlighted that individuals who were involved in Islamist violence "tend to be educated to a similar level as the broader population in which they live", thereby diminishing the connections between the university and the process of radicalisation. In this regard, Professor Geoff Petts, from Universities UK opined that universities while "acknowledging the threat" of universities being used in the radicalisation process, did "not see evidence to support that". [66]

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[63] Ibid.

[64] https://www.cage.ngo/about-us

[65] *Roots of Violent Radicalisation*, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 19th Report of Session 2010-2012, (February 2012), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf (Accessed on 27 March 2017).

[66] Ibid.

FOSIS, often times being the centre of the controversy, were unsurprisingly certain that there was little linkages between universities and radicalisation. Nabil Ahmed from the Federation was of the opinion that

> "There are various myths surrounding the issue of campus extremism. There is far too much sensationalism and insufficient evidence or expertise in this wider discussion. There is a notion that campuses are hotbeds of extremism, which is unfounded in the expertise and experience of the sector and the experience of students. There is a notion that, just because these people who have gone on to become terrorists went to university, in some way those two things are connected—the evidence suggests not." [67]

Faisal Hanjra, a spokesman for FOSIS, highlighted that, "there remains no evidence to suggest that Muslim students are at particular risk of radicalisation or that university campuses are vulnerable to people seeking to recruit to this extreme ideology.'[68] He went on to highlight that,

> "Since 7/7, since 2005, up to today, there has been not a single piece of evidence to suggest that universities or Islamic societies are breeding grounds in any way, for radicalisation or extremism, and our stance, the Muslim community's stance against this has been vindicated to that extent, that there hasn't been a single case which suggests that a Muslim student has gone on to a university campus, studied there for three years, and has come out a terrorist.[69]

The Possible Case of Undergraduate Radicalisation: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

'The attack should occur on board a U.S. airliner'.

This was the instruction that Anwar al-Awlaki had told Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the infamous 'underwear bomber' in a safe house in Yemen in 2009 according to a recent report by the New York Times.[70]

Umar Farouk, a 23-year old Nigerian, later admitted and was subsequently convicted of attempting to detonate plastic explosives hidden within his

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[67] Ibid.
[68] *Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A Comprehensive List of Extremist Speakers at UK Universities*, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/RADICAL-ISLAM-ON-CMAPUS.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2018).
[69] Ibid.
[70] Scott Shane, *Inside Al Qaeda's Plot to Blow Up an American Airliner, The New York Times*, 22 February 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/anwar-awlaki-underwear-bomber-abdulmutallab.html (Accessed on 17 March 2017).

underwear on 25 December 2009 while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 heading for Detroit.[71]

Umar Farouk was at University College London (UCL) in September 2005 where he studied for an undergraduate degree in Engineering with Business Finance and subsequently earned a degree in Mechanical Engineering in June 2008.

The issue which was pertinent for this particular case was, where did Umar Farouk's radicalisation process take place?

Was UCL the grounds in which this process was either initiated, triggered or nurtured?

Could anything have been done, at the university setting, to have reversed this process?

The UCL Department of Mechanical Engineering went on to say that Umar Farouk "never gave his tutors any cause for concern, and was a well-mannered, quietly spoken, polite and able young man".[72]

On the other hand, it is significant to note that Fox News had quoted The Times of London and reported that Umar Farouk had 'immersed himself in radical politics while a student in London'. He was also the former President of the Islamic Society while at UCL.

The report went on to highlight that:

> "Security sources are concerned that the picture emerging of his undergraduate years suggests that he was recruited by Al Qaeda in London. Security sources said that Islamist radicalization was rife on university campuses, especially in London, and that college authorities had "a patchy record in facing up to the problem." Previous anti-terrorist inquiries have uncovered evidence of extremists using political meetings and religious study circles to identify potential recruits." [73]

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[71] *Underwear bomber Abdulmutallab sentenced to life*, BBC News, 16 February 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-17065130 (Accessed on 17 March 2017).
[72] *Statement Update on Attempted Act of Terrorism on Northwest Airlines Flight 253*, University College London, 26 December 2009, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/0912/09122601 (accessed on 17 March 2017).
[73] *Airline Bomb Suspect Reportedly Groomed While a Student in London*, Fox News, 30 December 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/12/30/airline-bomb-suspect-reportedly-groomed-while-student-in-london.html (Accessed on 17 March 2017).

Umar Farouk also happened to be the fourth president of a London student Islamic society to be facing terrorist charges in the last three years since this happened. Another student leader was facing a retrial on charges that he was allegedly involved in an attempt to utilise liquid bombs to blow up airliners in 2006. Another two individuals were convicted of terrorist offences in 2007.[74]

Given Umar Farouk's association with UCL, there are those who alleged that the university authorities did not take sufficient steps to prevent such radicalisation. The Telegraph went as far as to report that UCL was 'complicit in the radicalisation of Muslim students by failing grotesquely to prevent extremists from giving lectures on campus'. Specifically, UCL was severely criticised for their relatively 'relaxed attitude towards radical preachers'.[75]

Anthony Glees, a professor of security and intelligence studies at University of Buckingham, was of the opinion that 'UCL had no excuse for failing to root out extremism on campus' and went on record saying that,

> *"I believe Abdulmutallab's radicalisation from being a devoted Muslim to a suicide bomber took place in the UK and I believe Al ¬Qaeda recruited him in London. Universities and colleges like UCL have got to realise that you don't get suicide bombers unless they have first been radicalised".[76]*

Douglas Murray from the Centre for Social Cohesion had equally strong words for UCL, stating that,

> *"UCL has not just failed to prevent students being radicalised, they have been complicit. If any other society at UCL invited someone to speak who encouraged killing homosexuals, that society would be banned immediately, but academics are afraid of taking action when it involves Islamic societies in case they are accused of Islamophobia. It's time that Islamic societies on campus were treated like everyone else and by everyone else's standards, and by everyone else's standards they have failed grotesquely to clamp down on extremism."[77]*

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[74] Ibid.

[75] Gordon Rayner, *Detroit bomber: British university 'complicit' in radicalisation,* The Telegraph, 30 December 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6906669/Detroit-bomber-British-university-complicit-in-radicalisation.html (Accessed on 17 March 2017).

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

In January 2010, however, the UCL Council set up an independent inquiry which subsequently led to a very detailed report.[78] It detailed "the nature of Mr Abdulmutallab's experience as an undergraduate student of UCL between 2005 and 2008, including his period as President of the Student Islamic Society". The report also considered if there were conditions at the university that could have "led to Mr Abdulmutallab's engaging in acts of terrorism" and subsequently if there existed conditions in the university that could "facilitate the possibility of other students doing so in future." The panel concluded in the report that there was no clear evidence to indicate that Umar Farouk had indeed been "radicalised while a student at UCL or that conditions at UCL during that time or subsequently are conducive to the radicalisation of students."[79]

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[78] Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: *Report to UCL Council of Independent Inquiry Panel*, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/caldicott-enquiry/caldicottreport.pdf (Accessed on 18 March 2017).
[79] Ibid.

<div align="center">Chapter Three</div>

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN INDONESIA

Introduction

In 2017, there were 12 terrorist attacks and five failed plots in Indonesia. This was a decrease from 16 attacks and ten failed plots in 2016.[80] The decline was credited to the weakening of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), possibly due to the death of their leader Santoso in July 2016. It is significant to note that the attacks in 2017 focused on bombings, shootings and stabbings that mainly targeted police officers. The perpetrators of the attacks were mostly returning fighters from Marawi, Iraq and Syria, deportees and lone-wolf actors. In 2017, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) was the largest pro-Daesh group that was most active in Indonesia.[81]

In response to this, Indonesia's police anti-terror unit, Detachment 88, arrested 96 suspects and killed 14 others in 2017 as compared to 170 arrested and 33 killed in 2016. Indonesians deported from other countries played a significant role in the terrorism landscape. Since 2015, there have been approximately 490 Indonesians who were deported from various countries for their links with either Daesh or Al-Qaeda. In this regard, the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) has conducted deradicalisation programmes for approximately 200 of the said detainees. It was reported that there were 95 Indonesian returnees from Syria and six returnees from the Philippines.[82]

It is also pertinent to note that while Daesh has garnered most of the attention, other groups like Jemaah Islamiyah remain and should not be ignored. Though many of the group's leaders have either been killed or detained, the possibility that the organisation has fragmented and the lengthy duration since its last bombing in 2009; there are nevertheless those who believe that the group is merely lying low; in line with their strategic concept of I'dad, or "rebuilding one's strength in time of weakness and striking when it was ripe to do so."[83]

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[80] *Kumpulan Insiden Terrorisme 2016-2017*, Pusat Kajian Radikalisme dan Deradikalisasi (PAKAR) quoted in the *Annual Threat Assessment, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[81] *Annual Threat Assessment*, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[82] Ibid.

[83] Bilveer Singh, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Still a Latent Threat, RSIS Commentary*, No. 75, 24 April 2017. https://www.

Undergraduate Radicalisation

Institutions of higher learning in Indonesia refer to five types of entities, namely, academies, polytechnics, colleges, institutes and universities. Academies and polytechnics specialise in vocational education while colleges are considered to be specialised institutes focusing on a particular academic discipline. Institutes, on the other hand, are focused on a particular group of disciplines, for example, science and technology or arts and agriculture. Out of the 3,500 universities in Indonesia, the majority are private with only approximately 150 universities that are established and operated by the government. Most of the universities are geographically located in the islands of Jawa (43.7%) and Sumatera (29.1%).[84]

In May 2017, it was reported that the Research and Technology and Higher Education Ministry was preparing 'regulations to control the spread of radical views on campuses'. This was as a result of students and lecturers from universities across Indonesia who had been 'influenced by radicalism' which in turn, authorities believed, could lead to a 'high risk of national disintegration' or in other words, violent radicalisation leading to instability. The 'regulations' that the Ministry wanted to insert in the university curriculum was seen as an 'anticipatory measure' and was to include material on 'state defence (bela negara)' and the national vision or 'wawasan kebangsaan'.[85]

According to an Indonesian academic, support for Daesh was first openly declared on 6 July 2014 at the Syahidah Inn auditorium, which was the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta's university accommodation. It was also alleged that the mosque at the university was used as a venue for radicalisation and recruitment prior to the declaration. The university authorities have since been actively trying to counter the radicalisation efforts of extremists by partnering with Indonesia's BNPT and other government and civil society agencies.[86]

rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CO17075.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[84] Bagyo Yuwono Moeliodihardjo, *Higher Education Sector in Indonesia*, prepared for the International seminar on Massification of Higher Education in Large Academic Systems, British Council, https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/indonesian_higher_education_system.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[85] Suherdjoko, *New regulation to prevent spread of radicalism on campus*, The Jakarta Post, 6 May 2017,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/06/new-regulation-to-prevent-spread-of-radicalism-on-campus.html (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[86] Communication with Dr. Badrus Sholeh, Head, Department of International Relations, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta.

Research Findings

A total of 4,442 surveys were conducted with undergraduates from Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta), Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga (Yogyakarta), Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (Yogyakarta), Universitas Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Surakarta), Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Malang, Universitas Muhammadiyah (Semarang), Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (Purwokerto), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Manado), Universitas Negeri (Medan), Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Medan) and Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Ambon).

General Information

Chart 1: Undergraduates who heard/read about terrorism?

In Indonesia, 95.55% of the undergraduates surveyed had either heard or read about terrorism.

Out of this, the percentage of females who knew or had read about terrorism was slightly higher (96.07%) when compared to males (94.26%).

Chart 2: Females and males who know about terrorism

For the Indonesian undergraduates, their source of information on terrorism was mainly from local news (88.40%), followed by foreign news (59.60%).

Chart 3: Sources of information on terrorism news

In terms of the kinds of media that the undergraduates obtained information on terrorism from, the television was ranked highest (90.29%), followed by the Internet (70.29%), followed by the newspapers (54.88%), followed by books (25.71%), followed by the radio (21.23%), followed by magazines (16.10%) and lastly, seminars/courses/conferences (15.99%).

Chart 4: Kinds of media to obtain information on terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on the definition of terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates considered riots/strikes (64.13%) to be an act of terrorism, followed by murder (63.36%), followed by killing of civilians (60.14%), followed by hijacking (44.69%), followed by armed robbery (43.06%), rape (15.54%) and lastly, street demonstrations (10.30%).

Chart 5: Definitions of terrorism

87.22% of the undergraduates felt that there was a need for a commonly accepted definition for terrorism before it could be solved. 76.74% felt that there was hope that all nations would eventually accept a common definition for terrorism.

Chart 6: The need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism before it can be solved & the hope that all nations would accept a common definition

General perception of undergraduates on terrorism

With regards to whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, 41.23% of the undergraduates either strongly agreed or agreed, whilst 38.91% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

Chart 7: I believe that terrorism is a modern day phenomenon

Approximately 77.10% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that home-grown terrorism in the West was a serious problem, while only 5.51% felt otherwise.

Chart 8: I believe that homegrown terrorism in the West is a serious problem

An overwhelming majority (90.58%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was indeed a serious global problem, with only 3.85% feeling otherwise.

Chart 9: I believe that terrorism is a serious global problem

It is significant to note that while 61.54% of the undergraduates did not agree that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective, there was nevertheless nearly a quarter (24.24%) who felt that it was.

Chart 10: I believe that terrorism is an effective strategy to achieve an objective

With regards to winning the war on terrorism, more than half (55.95%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was so, while 10.00% felt otherwise.

Chart 11: I believe that the world is winning the war on terrorism

With regards to solving the issue of terrorism, the undergraduates were more optimistic than pessimistic. 44.33% felt that it was possible, while 23.50% thought that it was an exercise in futility.

Chart 12: I believe that the issue of terrorism will be solved

On whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, 31.13% were of the opinion that this was the case, while only 22.63% felt otherwise.

Chart 13: I believe that the US has the right strategy when dealing with terrorism

On the question of terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) being illegal and unethical at all times, an overwhelming majority of 77.84% agreed, with only 8.22% disagreeing, while 7.09% remained neutral.

Chart 14: Terrorism (killing of civilians) is illegal & unethical at all times

On the premise that understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, only 17.34% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, while the majority (64.03%) disagreed.

Chart 15: Understanding terrorism means that we justify terrorism

On whether the 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism, more than half of the undergraduates (51.05%) felt that it was so, with only 10.17% feeling otherwise.

Chart 16: The 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism

36.03% of the undergraduates felt that the Palestinian issue was a pretext used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, while 18.26% disagreed.

Chart 17: The Palestinian issue is a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West

Terrorism and Undergraduates

Slightly more than half (54.69%) of the undergraduates believed that they were targets for extremist/radical teachings. Approximately one-fifth (20.35%) disagreed.

Chart 18: Undergraduates are targets of extremist/radical teaching

Less than half (41.94%) of the undergraduates felt that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism, while approximately one-third (33.46%) felt otherwise.

Chart 19: Universities can be used as breeding grounds for terrorism

Two-thirds (66.21%) of the undergraduates felt that universities could play a role in countering extremist/radical teachings, while only 13.92% disagreed.

Chart 20: Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/ radical teachings

More than half (54.29%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives, while 15.98% felt otherwise.

Chart 21: Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

Perception of undergraduates on the Internet and terrorism

The overwhelming majority of the undergraduates (86.67%) felt that they could not be separated from the Internet, while only a small minority (4.84%) thought otherwise.

Chart 22: The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

On whether they would visit a known militant/terrorist website, 45.09% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they would not, while approximately 11.83% said that they would.

Chart 23: Would you visit a known militant/terrorist website?

Whilst 59.67% of the undergraduates were not willing to chat in a chat-room with people who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective, there were nevertheless 10.50% who were willing to do so.

Chart 24: Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political obective?

The majority of the undergraduates (64.77%) felt that terrorists could use the Internet to recruit members, while only 10.90% thought otherwise.

Chart 25: The terrorist can use the Internet to recruit members

With regards to whether the foreign media's reporting on terrorism could be trusted, there was an equal mix in which 25.68% felt that it could be trusted, whilst only 26.30% felt otherwise.

Chart 26: The foreign media's report on terrorism can be trusted

Slightly more than half of the undergraduates (54.38%) felt that the foreign media conveniently linked terrorism with Islam, with only 15.91% feeling the other way.

Chart 27: The foreign media conveniently links terrorism with Islam

30.50% of the undergraduates felt that there was sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media, while 23.90% felt otherwise.

Chart 28: There is sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media

More than half (56.27%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism needed the media to grow, whilst 16.77% thought that was not the case.

Chart 29: Terrorism needs the media to grow

42.83% of the undergraduates felt that the local media was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, while 15.46% were of the opinion that this was not true.

Chart 30: The local media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

With regards to the foreign media, there was a slight drop whereby 40.58% felt that it was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, with 16.01% thinking otherwise.

Chart 31: The foreign media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on countering terrorism

A majority or 63.59% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that military action was the most effective way in dealing with terrorism, while only 12.65% disagreed with this premise.

Chart 32: Military action is the most effective way in dealing with terrorism

On the subject of negotiating with terrorists, 37.13% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not acceptable to negotiate with terrorists, while approximately a quarter (26.21%) thought that it was permissible.

Chart 33: It is acceptable to negotiate with terrorists

41.23% felt that negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism, while approximately a quarter (24.45%) thought otherwise.

Chart 34: Negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism to grow

An overwhelming majority (83.89%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that stopping the recruitment of terrorism was essential in countering terrorism, whilst only 4.20% felt otherwise.

Chart 35: Stopping the recruitment of terrorists is essential in countering terrorism

The majority (67.02%) of the undergraduates felt that the support of the people was essential when dealing with terrorism, whilst less than one-tenth (9.83%) felt that it did not matter.

Chart 36: You cannot deal with terrorism if you do not have the support of your people

The majority (53.75%) of the undergraduates felt that winning the 'hearts and minds' was the only way to effectively counter terrorism, with 15.70% disagreeing with this premise.

Chart 37: Winning the hearts and minds is the only effective way to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on mental radicalisation

The majority (73.12%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a terrorist usually started out by having violent radical ideas. Only 7.00% of the undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 38: A terrorist usually starts out by having violent radical ideas

Approximately half (47.72%) of the undergraduates believed that it was possible to have radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whilst more than one-tenth (10.70%) thought otherwise.

Chart 39: It is possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism

In this regard, 39.40% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not wrong to have violent radical ideas as long as one did not engage in terrorism, while 29.43% thought otherwise

Chart 40: It is not wrong to have violent radical ideas just as long as you do not engage in terrorism

Narrowing it down to themselves, 39.11% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was possible for them to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism. Only 25.94% thought otherwise.

Chart 41: It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism

Slightly less than half (48.36%) of the undergraduates felt that it was very much possible for them to move from having such violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism. 20.49% disagreed with that premise.

Chart 42: It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

45.62% of the undergraduates felt that graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause an individual to be radicalised and consider perpetrating acts of terrorism. Only 17.62% felt otherwise.

Chart 43: Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism

More than half (53.34%) of the undergraduates felt that the feelings of a group of people when witnessing others of the same race/religion/culture who were suffering unjustly in other parts of the world had a part to play in subsequently leading those with such feelings to conduct violent acts in order to defend such victims. Only 14.49% of undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 44: The feeling that people of the same race/religion/culture are suffering unjustly in other parts of the world can lead to violent acts such as terrorism in order to defend them

The majority (61.28%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that friends could play an important role for an individual to have radical violent ideas. Only 10.18% disagreed with this.

Chart 45: Friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

On a follow-up question, a similar percentage (59.25%) believed that friends could play an important role in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. 13.66% of the undergraduates did not share this opinion.

Chart 46: Friends could play an important role in an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

With regard to lecturers, 46.40% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they could play an important role in an individual developing radical violent ideas. 19.54% however disagreed with this.

Chart 47: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

Similarly, the undergraduates (42.50%) were of the opinion that lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism. Approximately 22.54% felt otherwise.

Chart 48: Lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on alternatives to terrorism

More than half of the undergraduates (59.46%) were of the opinion that there were successful alternatives to terrorism, while only 6.08% thought otherwise.

Chart 49: There are successful altenatives to violence in order to address grievances

More than half (62.07%) were unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence, while only 7.48% knew of such initiatives.

Chart 50: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence

The majority (68.71%) of the undergraduates agreed with the premise that should people be aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there would then be the possibility that fewer people would subsequently resort to violence. This was in contrast to 7.63% who felt otherwise.

Chart 51: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to violence

The majority (70.36%) of the undergraduates felt that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, with 6.29% feeling otherwise.

Chart 52: Non-violence is a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice

58.07% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works. Only a small minority (4.05%) felt otherwise.

Chart 53: Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works

More than half (51.19%) of the undergraduates felt that Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in the US without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (4.84%) felt otherwise.

Chart 54: Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about postive change

In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, approximately half (49.93%) of the undergraduates felt that her efforts to fight for her belief without resorting to violence in Myanmar was an example of a non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (4.92%) felt otherwise.

Chart 55: Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 65.85% of the undergraduates felt that their efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas was an example of a non-violent strategy that had the potential to bring about positive change. Only 3.11% felt otherwise.

Chart 56: The International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) efforts in bringing about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the United Nations (UN), more than half (66.12%) of the undergraduates felt that their efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions was an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change. This was in sharp contrast to only 5.47% who felt otherwise.

Chart 57: The United Nations'(UN) efforts in facilitating the peace talks between various warring factions is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

Significant findings on the perception of undergraduates in Indonesia

Quantitative data suggests that the overwhelming majority of Indonesian undergraduates recognised the phenomenon of terrorism. There was also a higher tendency for them to get their information from local rather than foreign news. The television was seen as the undergraduates' overwhelming main choice for obtaining information, followed by the Internet and then, the newspapers. Hence, the Indonesian local television was an extremely powerful medium when it came to educating, disseminating and forming opinions with regards to terrorism and counter-terrorism.

In light of these findings, more resources, energy and expertise could be poured into local television channels to expose the lies and the rhetoric of the terrorists, uncover the duplicity and vested interests of the terrorists, counter the terrorist narratives, create alternative narratives, and build mental-firewalls in the 'hearts and minds' of specific targeted audience.

Given the influence of local television over young people, it could prove to be highly beneficial to utilise local celebrities such as actors and actresses, sports personalities and music celebrities to produce and disseminate content that

counter extremism, violence and hatred. Local marketers, advertisers and psychologists could be roped in to increase the reach and impact of such contents, particularly among the Indonesian youth.

It was disconcerting to note that the majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they were targets for extremist and radical teachings, and that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives. This admission could have been based on their experience or formed from their own observations and perception. Either way, it should serve as a warning to the Indonesian authorities that extremists could be targeting university undergraduates.

The undergraduates were also of the opinion that universities could play dual roles: a breeding ground for violent extremism as well as a venue for countering extremist teachings. The realisation of the counter-terrorism role that universities could play is not well developed, which is a great pity, given the possible acceptance of such an idea by the undergraduates. In light of this, the authorities involved in countering terrorism could identify, plan and develop more activities that focus on countering terrorism within the university setting.

The Indonesian undergraduates acknowledged that the Internet played a prominent part in their lives. It is significant to note that more than one-tenth of the undergraduates were willing to both visit and chat with those who advocated terrorism over the Internet. There is a need to further study why this is so. Are the undergraduates visiting those sites because they are genuinely interested? Are they merely curious? It was also disconcerting to note that the undergraduates were even willing to communicate with those who advocated terrorism. The authorities need to study the reasons behind this.

Many Indonesian undergraduates believed that having violent radical ideas were the prerequisite for terrorism. Nearly 40% were of the opinion that it was possible for them to also have such ideas, and nearly half of them felt that moving from radical ideas to violent acts was very much a possibility. It was also disturbing to note the significance that the undergraduates put on the relationship between radical ideas and the development of a terrorist. Radical violent ideas, according to the undergraduates, were the foundation to violent acts of the terrorists. Given this, it might be noteworthy for the Indonesian authorities to seriously consider the danger of radical violent ideas. While ideas are abstract and by themselves do not necessarily go against the law, such violent radical ideas do have the possibility of translating into violent conduct, given the right 'triggers' and 'enablers'.

Watching graphic images and videos of people suffering and witnessing the suffering of others who shared one's race, culture and religion were triggers to terrorism for nearly half of the Indonesian undergraduates. This would explain

the terrorists' frequent use of graphic imagery and clips that depicted the injustice, suffering and despair that were inflicted upon the people. Such images were developed and disseminated to illicit sympathy, arouse anger and lead to violent actions on behalf of the perceived 'victims'.

Friends played a vital role in the radicalisation process as well as a trigger for an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. The influence that their fellow peers had on them, both in introducing terrorism as well as developing and nurturing such violent ideologies, was significant. On the flip side, there is also the possibility that their fellow peers could be utilised as a positive influence in both countering the terrorist narratives as well as presenting an alternative narrative to that of extremism and terrorism. Given the role that their peers played in their lives in this particular area, the relevant authorities could consider firstly, training and subsequently, outsourcing to university undergraduates some of the efforts in countering the terrorist narratives. To a lesser extent, lecturers played a vital role in the radicalisation process as well as triggering an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism.

The majority of the undergraduates felt that while there could be successful alternatives to terrorism, there was nevertheless a need to publicise such alternatives which in turn would reduce the number of people resorting to violence. Hence, while there was a general consensus that there could be possible successful alternatives to terrorism, the reality was that the undergraduates were not familiar with them. This ignorance of practical, sustainable and feasible alternatives to terrorism, according to them, led to an increase of those who believed the erroneous assumption that terrorism was the only viable alternative available.

When given specific examples such as the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas, or Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence, or Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in the US without resorting to force, or Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar, or the United Nations' efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions; the undergraduates were extremely positive in their opinions of such examples.

Chapter Four

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN MALAYSIA

Introduction

As of early April 2018, 389 individuals have been arrested in Malaysia for terrorism-related offences, out of which 293 (75.32%) were Malaysians, while the remaining 96 (24.68%) were foreigners.

It was initially estimated that there were 95 Malaysians in Syria. It has also been revealed that 34 Malaysians have died in Iraq and Syria, of which eight were suicide bombers. Eight other Malaysians have returned. Among the reasons that they gave for leaving the terrorist groups were that they were not treated fairly, that they were only assigned menial work such as sentry and domestic duties, that they were not able to achieve martyrdom, that they were having family and health problems, and that they were injured. After accounting for those who have died and those who have left, it is estimated that at present, there remains 53 Malaysians in Syria. Out of this 53 individuals; 24 are adult males (45.23%), 12 are adult females (22.64%), nine male children (16.98%) and eight female children (15.09%).

It is also significant to note that between 2014 and 2017, approximately 50 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) had entered Malaysia and thus far, 36 of them have been deported back to their countries. Between 2013 and 2017, the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) have been able to successfully foil 19 terrorist plots within Malaysia.[87]

However, Malaysia suffered its first, and thus far, sole Daesh attack on 28 June 2016 when a nightspot in Puchong, Selangor was attacked by two individuals who threw a grenade that injured eight people. The attackers were subsequently arrested, charged and sentenced. Twenty-six year-old Malaysian, Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi, also known as Abu Hamzah Al Fateh, was alleged to have directed the attack from Syria.[88]

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[87] Communications with Senior RMP officers in December 2017, January 2018 and April 2018.

[88] M. Kumar, *Cops confirm Movida bombing first ever IS attack in Malaysia*, The Star Online, 4 July 2016, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/07/04/movida-igp-confirm-is-attack/ (accessed on 20 January 2018).

In terms of the law, Malaysia has specific counter terrorism legislations, and these include the Malaysian penal code; Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 or SOSMA which provides for 'special measures relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and security';[89] the Prevention of Crime Act or POCA which provides for the 'more effectual prevention of crime throughout Malaysia and for the control of criminals, members of secret societies, terrorists and other undesirable persons';[90] the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2015) or POTA which provides for the 'prevention of the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organisations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country and for the control of persons engaged in such acts and for related matters';[91] the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries (SMATA) Bill 2015 which provides for 'special measures to deal with persons who engage in the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organisations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country and for related matters';[92] and the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLATFPUAA), which provides for the 'offence of money laundering, the measures to be taken for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing offences, and to provide for the forfeiture of property involved in or derived from money laundering and terrorism financing offences, as well as terrorist property, proceeds of an unlawful activity and instrumentalities of an offence, and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith.'[93]

Undergraduate Radicalisation

Malaysia has been quite successful in its goal to develop an educated population. In 1979, only four per cent of those who were eligible to be enrolled in universities actually did. In 2016, this figure rose to almost 40 per cent, or a ten-fold increase.[94]

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[89] *Act 747, Security Offenses (Special Measures)* Act 2012, (as at 1 August 2015), Malaysian Attorney General's Chambers Official Portal, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/EN/Act%20 747%20-%20Security%20Offences%20(Special%20Measures)%20Act%202012.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[90] *Act 297, Prevention of Crime Act 1959*, Malaysian Attorney General's Chambers Official Portal, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/EN/Prevention%20of%20Crime%20Act%201959%20 %5BAct%20297%5D.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[91] *Act 769, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015,* Malaysian Attorney General's Chambers Official Portal, http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/aktaBI_20150604_Act769(BI).pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[92] *Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries* (SMATA) Bill 2015, http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/pdf/smata/SMATA_en.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[93] Act 613, *Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001*, http://www.bnm.gov.my/documents/act/en_amlatfa_v3.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[94] Dato' Seri Idris Jusoh, *Soaring Upwards With Higher Education*, BFM Radio, 14 July 2016. https://www.bfm.my/bg-dato-seri-idris-jusoh-minister-of-higher-education-soaring-upwards-with-higher-education.html (accessed on 20 January 2018).

There is however the possibility that extremist and terrorist groups like Daesh could be targeting vulnerable undergraduates in Malaysia for its activities.[95]

In this regard, there have been reports on the possibility that 'universities and colleges in Malaysia have become breeding grounds for militants.'[96] The Malaysian Home Minister was reported to have highlighted that the RMP was monitoring the 'covert recruitment process' as there was a possibility that 'universities might not be aware of what was going on'. He added that the Malaysian youth were targeted and recruited by extremists 'operating under the cover of being students in local institutions of higher learning' through 'cyberspace via chat forums and on social media' as well as through more traditional ways such as 'talent spotting', 'religious gatherings and 'usrah' (small discussion groups) sessions. He said that these students were motivated and 'led to believe in heavenly rewards for their jihad'.

It was also reported that due to their age and inexperience, youth under the age of 25, which is the typical age of an undergraduate, were far more susceptible to radical ideology.[97] It was further reiterated that "radicalisation is especially prevalent among younger individuals who are more liable to see the world in black and white, to have a sense of idealism in stark contrast to the grubby realism and pragmatism of the day to day world".[98]

In 2016, three Malaysian undergraduates from public universities were detained. In the first three months of 2017, four more Malaysian undergraduates from public universities were detained. Out of the four undergraduates, two were females planning to travel to Syria and Iraq by going through Turkey. Comparatively, in 2016, four undergraduates from private institutions were detained in connection with the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh in July of that year. In January 2017, two undergraduates from Madinah International University

[95] Mohd. Mizan Mohammad Aslam, *Threat of Daesh in Universities: Malaysia's Experience*, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, April 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[96] *Tertiary institutions under scrutiny*, Star Online, 12 July 2014, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2014/07/12/tertiary-institutions-under-scrutiny-universities-and-colleges-are-hubs-for-talentspotting-of-potent/ (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[97] Mohd. Mizan Mohammad Aslam, *Threat of Daesh in Universities*: Malaysia's Experience, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, April 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).

[98] *Rising concern over Malaysian youths joining ISIS, what can we do to curb this extremism*, , malaysiandigest.com , 18 January 2016. http://www.malaysiandigest.com/frontpage/282-main-tile/590507-rising-concern-over-malaysian-youths-joining-isis-what-can-we-do-to-curb-this-extremism.html (accessed on 20 January 2018).

(MEDIU), Selangor were arrested for providing funds to Daesh. Prior to that, another two of the university's undergraduates were arrested for planning a Daesh-linked attack on an international school in Malaysia.[99] In December 2014, a 27-year old undergraduate from a private learning institution in the Klang Valley was arrested at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) as she was trying to leave Malaysia to join Daesh. Significantly, she had married a Western Daesh fighter via Skype two months before. In the same month, a 22-year old male from a public university north of Malaysia was also arrested at KLIA. The RMP revealed that the suspect was planning a suicide mission in Syria.[100]

Research Findings

A total of 2,116 surveys were conducted with undergraduates from Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK), Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Universiti Tenaga Malaysia (UNITEN), Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) and Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS).

<u>General Information</u>

In Malaysia, 98.54% of the undergraduates surveyed had either heard or read about terrorism.

Chart 58: Have you heard/read about terrorism?

1.46%

Yes

No

98.54%

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[99] Mohd. Mizan Mohammad Aslam, *Threat of Daesh in Universities: Malaysia's Experience*, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, April 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2018).
[100] Hariz Mohd, *Uni student marries IS fighter on Skype after Facebook fling*, The Straits Times, 2 January 2015. https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/uni-student-marries-fighter-skype-after-facebook-fling (accessed on 20 January 2018).

Out of this, the percentage of females who knew or had read about terrorism was slightly higher (98.69%) when compared to males (98.15%). This indicates that the undergraduates, both males and females, were relatively very conscious and aware about the developments in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Chart 59: Females and males who know about terrorism

For the majority of the undergraduates, their sources of information on terrorism was from both foreign news (77.17%) as well as local news (78.12%). This could indicate that the undergraduates rely and have access to both local and foreign news as their source of information.

Chart 60: Sources of information on terrorism news

In terms of the kinds of media that the undergraduates obtained information on terrorism from, the television was ranked highest (92.35%), followed closely by the Internet (90.55%), followed by the newspapers (84.65%), followed by the radio (45.10%), followed by seminars/courses/conferences (34.49%), followed by books (28.51%), and lastly, magazines (22.22%).

Chart 61: Kinds of media to obtain information on terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on the definition of terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates considered the killing of civilians to achieve a political objective (82.18%) to be an act of terrorism, followed by murder (76.56%), followed by hijacking (65.12%), followed by armed robbery (51.59%), followed by rape (47.89%), followed by riots/strikes (44.44%) and lastly, street demonstrations (29.41%).

Chart 62: Definitions of terrorism

78.56% of the undergraduates felt that there was a need for a commonly accepted definition for terrorism before it could be solved. However only 67.82% felt that there was hope that all nations would eventually accept a common definition for terrorism. The undergraduates were idealistic in wanting a commonly-accepted definition as a precursor to solving terrorism and the majority of them actually believed that nations would eventually come to the same conclusion.

Chart 63: The need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism before it can be solved & the hope that all nations would accept a common definition for terrorism

General perception of undergraduates on terrorism

With regards to whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, approximately half or 50.48% of the undergraduates either strongly agreed or agreed, whilst only 26.20% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. This could indicate that while the undergraduates recognised terrorism (as seen in the earlier survey results), the majority were nevertheless not familiar with the history of terrorism, either at the domestic or international levels. This is surprising given Malaysia's long history with terrorism, particularly with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM).

Chart 64 : I believe that terrorism is a modern day phenomenon

Approximately 68.08% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that home-grown terrorism in the West was a serious problem, while only 4.59% felt otherwise. The high percentage of undergraduates who felt that way could have been due to the recent spate of attacks in Europe by their own citizens directed or inspired by Daesh.

Chart 65 : I believe that homegrown terrorism in the West is a serious problem

An overwhelming majority (91.42%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was indeed a serious global problem, with only 2.82% feeling otherwise. This high number could be attributed to the media coverage about the issue of terrorism, particularly with the advent of Daesh in the last four years.

Chart 66 : I believe that terrorism is a serious global problem

With regards to winning the war on terrorism, only 21.02% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, while 42.03% felt otherwise, with another 16.23% not being able to make up their minds, and 20.71% taking a neutral position. The undergraduates were generally not convinced that we were winning the war against terrorism.

Chart 67 : I believe that the world is winning the war on terrorism

With regards to solving the issue of terrorism, the undergraduates were relatively divided. 29.66% strongly agreed or agreed, 34.16% were neutral or did not know, while 36.18% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Chart 68 : I believe that the issue of terrorism will be solved

On whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, 41.12% were of the opinion that this was not the case, while only 18.05% felt otherwise.

Chart 69 : I believe that the US has the right strategy when dealing with terrorism

On the question of terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) being illegal and unethical at all times, an overwhelming majority of 78.91% agreed, 7.20% disagreed, while 9.09% remained neutral.

Chart 70 : Terrorism (killing of civilians) is illegal & unethical at all times

On the premise that understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, 36.17% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, with 25.46% disagreeing.

Chart 71 : Understanding terrorism means that we justify terrorism

On whether the 9/11 bombing in the US was an act of terrorism, more than half of the undergraduates (53.40%) felt that it was so, with only 13.56% feeling otherwise.

Chart 72 : The 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism

48.78% of the undergraduates felt that the Palestinian issue was a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, while 17.64% disagreed.

Chart 73 : The Palestinian issue is a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West

Terrorism and Undergraduates

The majority of the undergraduates (65.34%) believed that they were targets for extremist/radical teachings, with only 7.94% disagreeing.

Chart 74 : Undergraduates are targets of extremist/radical teaching

More than half (53.51%) of the undergraduates felt that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism, and only 21.00% felt otherwise.

Chart 75 : Universities can be used as breeding grounds for terrorism

59.33% of the undergraduates felt that universities could play a role in countering extremist/radical teachings, while only 16.63% disagreed.

Chart 76 : Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/radical teachings

A large majority (69.66%) of the undergraduates surveyed felt that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives, while only 6.95% felt otherwise.

Chart 77 : Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

Perception of undergraduates on the Internet and terrorism

The overwhelming majority of the undergraduates (76.29%) felt that they could not be separated from the Internet, while only a small minority (5.56%) thought otherwise.

Chart 78 : The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

On whether they would visit a known militant/terrorist website, 45.33% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they would not, while approximately one-fifth (20.04%) said that they would.

Chart 79 : Would you visit a known militant/terrorist website?

Whilst 61.30% of the undergraduates were not willing to chat in a chat room with people who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective, there were still 13.84% who were willing to do so.

Chart 80: Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political objective?

A majority of the undergraduates (76.39%) felt that terrorists could use the Internet to recruit members, while only 9.15% thought otherwise.

Chart 81: The terrorist can use the Internet to recruit members

35.13% of the undergraduates felt that the foreign media's reporting on terrorism could not be trusted, whilst only 18.12% felt otherwise.

Chart 82: The foreign media's reports on terrorism can be trusted

More than half of the undergraduates (55.27%) felt that the foreign media conveniently linked terrorism with Islam, with only 13.77% feeling the other way.

Chart 83: The foreign media conveniently links terrorism with Islam

32.76% of the undergraduates felt that there was sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media, while 21.66% felt otherwise.

Chart 84: There is sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media

Close to half (49.54%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism needs the media to grow, whilst 17.87% thought that was not the case.

Chart 85: Terrorism needs the media to grow

42.62% of the undergraduates felt that the local media was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, while 16.69% were of the opinion that this was not true.

Chart 86: The local media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

With regards to the foreign media, there was a slight drop whereby 39.96% felt that it was not effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, with 19.57% thinking otherwise.

Chart 87: The foreign media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on countering terrorism

41.48% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that military action was the most effective way in dealing with terrorism, while 20.39% disagreed with this premise.

Chart 88: Military action is the most effective way in dealing with terrorism

On the subject of negotiating with terrorists, 39.96% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was acceptable to negotiate with terrorists, while 22.76% did not think so.

Chart 89: It is acceptable to negotiate with terrorists

Nearly one third (29.89%) felt that negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism, whilst 26.70% thought otherwise.

Chart 90: Negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism to grow

65.97% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that stopping the recruitment of terrorism was essential in countering terrorism, whilst 6.78% felt otherwise.

Chart 91: Stopping the recruitment of terrorists is essential in countering terrorism

More than half (62.34%) of the undergraduates felt that the support of the people was essential when dealing with terrorism, whilst 9.16% felt that it did not matter.

Chart 92: You cannot deal with terrorism if you do not have the support of your people

The majority (58.45%) of the undergraduates felt that winning the 'hearts and minds' was the only way to effectively counter terrorism, with 10.05% disagreeing with this premise.

Chart 93 : Winning the hearts and minds is the only effective way to counter terrorism

The undergraduates realised that terrorism and recruitment were inter-dependent. They also believed that the support of the population was crucial in the struggle against terrorism, and looked at the 'winning the hearts and minds' strategy as a viable model. This could suggest that the Malaysian authorities should develop a 'hearts and minds' campaign specifically targeted to 'win over' the youth in general and the undergraduates in particular.

Perception of undergraduates on mental radicalisation

The majority (69.32%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a terrorist usually started out by having violent radical ideas. Only 6.70% of the undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 94: A terrorist usually starts out having violent radical ideas

45.09% of the undergraduates believed that it was possible to have radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whilst 13.09% thought otherwise.

Chart 95: It is possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism

In this regard, 32.91% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not wrong to have violent radical ideas as long as one did not engage in terrorism, while a similar percentage (30.38%) thought otherwise.

Chart 96 : It is not wrong to have violent radical ideas just as long as you do not engage in terrorism

Narrowing it down to themselves, more than half (52.41%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was possible for them to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism. Only 18.28% thought otherwise.

Chart 97 : It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism

Slightly more than half (51.87%) of the undergraduates felt that it was very much possible for them to move from having such violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism. 14.98% disagreed with that premise.

Chart 98 : It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

57.10% of the undergraduates felt that graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause an individual to be radicalised and consider acts such as terrorism. Only 10.11% felt otherwise.

Chart 99 : Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism

More than half (54.34%) of the undergraduates felt that the feelings of a group of people when witnessing others of the same race/religion/culture who were suffering unjustly in other parts of the world could subsequently lead them to violent acts in order to defend such victims. Only 9.68% of undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 100: The feeling that people of the same race/religion/culture are suffering unjustly in other parts of the world can lead to violent acts such as terrorism in order to defend them

The majority (66.69%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. Only 6.97% disagreed with this.

Chart 101: Friends could an important role for an individual having radical violent ideas

On a follow-up question, a similar percentage (64.63%) believed that friends could play an important role in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. 7.99% of the undergraduates did not share this opinion.

Chart 102: Friends could play an important role for an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

With regards to lecturers, the majority (61.22%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. Only 8.55% disagreed with this.

Chart 103: Lecturers could play an important role for an individual to have radical violent ideas

Similarly, the undergraduates (59.77%) were of the opinion that lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism. Approximately one-tenth (10.02%) did not share this opinion.

Chart 104: Lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on alternatives to terrorism

Less than half of the undergraduates (46.62%) were of the opinion that there were successful alternatives to terrorism, while only 8.18% thought otherwise.

Chart 105: There are successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances

More than half (56.11%) were unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence, while only 6.54% knew of such initiatives.

Chart 106: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence

More than half (56.54%) of the undergraduates agreed with the premises that should people be aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there would then be the possibility that fewer people would subsequently resort to violence. This was in contrast to 7.53% who felt otherwise.

Chart 107: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to violence

Slightly more than half (52.64%) of the undergraduates felt that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, with 8.38% feeling otherwise.

Chart 108: Non-violence is a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice

67.11% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works. Only a small minority (4.77%) felt otherwise.

Chart 109: Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works

56.97% of the undergraduates felt that Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (5.04%) felt otherwise.

Chart 110: Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change

In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, 51.06% of the undergraduates felt that her efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar was an example of a non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (5.76%) felt otherwise.

Chart 111: Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 52.88% of the undergraduates felt that their efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas was an example of a non-violent strategy that had the potential to bring about positive change. Only 5.04% felt otherwise.

Chart 112: The International Committee of the Red Cross'(ICRC) efforts in bringing about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the United Nations (UN), slightly less than half (47.36%) of the undergraduates felt that their efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions was an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change. This was in contrast to 7.75% who felt otherwise.

Chart 113: The United Nations'(UN) efforts in facilitating the peace talks between various warring factions is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

Significant findings on the perception of undergraduates in Malaysia

The television, Internet and the radio are the three main media channels from which undergraduates in Malaysia obtain their information with regards to terrorism. While these three media outlets play a significant role in disseminating news with regards to terrorism, their potential in conveying counter-terrorism awareness or counter-narratives against terrorism remains severely under utilised, judging from the severe lack of such kinds of activities currently being undertaken through these three media channels. Given the significance that undergraduates, and by default the youth, put in these three channels, the counter-terrorism authorities would be remiss if they do not seek to fully exploit these three channels in Malaysia.

It is significant to note that while 65.94% of the undergraduates did not agree that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective, there was nevertheless 20.89% who felt that it was. It is disconcerting to note that approximately one-fifth of the undergraduates were actually of the opinion that terrorism was a viable and credible strategy to achieve a particular objective. This could possibly be attributed to the rhetoric and propaganda pushed by groups like Daesh. This could also serve as a wake-up call for the relevant authorities in Malaysia to realise that some undergraduates are holding on to dangerous beliefs and ideas when it came to the value of the effectiveness of terrorism.

It was chilling to note that more than 7.00% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that terrorism, even when it was defined as taking the lives of civilians, was not illegal or unethical. It was also disconcerting to note that nearly 10.00% held a neutral position on this issue. While the figure remains small, it is important to note that the number of undergraduates in the country are continuing to grow and that 7.00% of that growing number could pose a challenge. It is also significant to note that 10.00% of the undergraduate population have yet to take a stand with regards to the legality and whether terrorism was ethical. These undecided undergraduates could hold a position in either direction, and it is imperative that the authorities do everything in their power to bring them to the conclusion that terrorism is not a viable choice.

The undergraduates were also of the opinion that universities were a conducive environment for terrorism to be introduced and developed. Nonetheless, it was positive to note that the undergraduates themselves believed that the universities could play a role in reversing the proliferation of terrorist ideology.

Hence, university authorities, should they decide to develop a counter-terrorism component, would have a target audience that is both ready and receptive to their message.

It was also significant to note that undergraduates actually felt that terrorism could affect their lives. This should be seen as a plea on their part for the authorities to get involved in some possible way.

The undergraduates were candid on the importance and significance that the Internet played in their lives. In this regard, it was chilling to note that approximately 20.00% of the audience were willing to visit a terrorist site, possibly because they were curious at best or wanted to get involved at worst. Given the terrorists' ability to exploit and manipulate the Internet, this is a dangerous precedence. Subsequently, more than half of those who were willing to visit a known terrorist website were even keen to further engage with the terrorists by chatting with them online. This was despite the majority of the undergraduates being of the opinion that terrorists had the capacity and capability to recruit via the Internet.

There was a significant number of undergraduates who were of the opinion that the foreign media could not be trusted, and that there was the tendency for these foreign entities to associate Islam with terrorism. While the undergraduates were receiving both foreign and local news, they tended to trust local news outlets more.

The majority of the undergraduates believed that radical ideas were the first step in the pathway of radicalisation, and it was significant that more than half of them were also of the opinion that there was potential for them as undergraduates to develop radical ideas such as terrorism. What was also of concern was their assessment that once they develop such ideas, it was very well possible for them to move on to actually conduct acts of terrorism.

The majority of undergraduates were of the opinion that viewing graphic images of the perceived injustice and suffering of others as well as the subsequent feelings that occurred in one's heart had the potential of radicalising individuals to terrorism. Such images had the ability to arouse emotions to the point that the individual would actually consider terrorism.

The majority of undergraduates were of the opinion that friends played a major role in shaping radical ideas and conducting acts of terrorism. Similarly, the majority of the undergraduates were also of the opinion that lecturers played a major role in shaping radical ideas and conducting acts of terrorism. In this regard, the roles played by Dr. Azahari Husin and Wan Min Wan Mat as lecturers for Jemaah Islamiyah in the late 1990s and early 2000 as well as Dr. Mahmud Ahmad for Daesh in the last three years served as potent reminders of the power and influence of lecturers radicalised by terrorists.[101] According to Dr. Rogers, lecturers are considered 'thinkers' in the society and terrorists might target them not only to recruit their undergraduates but also to use their abilities and thinking skills to conceptualise the ideas of the terrorists to make it intellectually more enticing and attractive.[102]

The majority of the undergraduates did not know of non-violent alternatives to address grievances and were of the opinion that if such awareness was indeed present, there was the possibility that fewer people would then resort to violence. When given specific examples of non-violent alternatives that were undertaken by people such as Mahatma Gandhi, Aung San Suu Kyi and Martin Luther King Jr. as well as organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that non-violent strategies had the potential and the capacity to bring about positive change. In this regard, the undergraduates, and by extension the youth, related positively to non-violence when it was connected to concrete and tangible notions such as specific individuals and organisations.

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[101] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.
[102] Email communication with Dr. Roy Anthony Rogers, University Malaya on 31 January 2018.

Chapter Five

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Introduction

On 23 May 2017, the largest Daesh-affiliated groups, the Islamic State of Lanao' (ISL) and the Islamic State Philippines (ISP) captured Marawi, the capital city of Lanao del Sur in Mindanao. The ISL was led by Abdullah Maute, while the ISP was led by Isnilon Hapilon.[103] Marawi became the first city outside the Middle East and North Africa to fall to Daesh.[104] The ISP was reported to have started planning for the siege of Marawi since March – April 2017. It was also reported that there were four local groups which had initially pledged their allegiance to Daesh and they were: (i) the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) led by Isnilon Hapilon; (ii) Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP) led by Mohammad Jaafar Maguid; (iii) the Maute Group led by Omar Maute; and (iv) the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). These groups were alleged to have formed alliances 'for the purpose of establishing a wilayah (province) in Mindanao' and the Marawi attack was intended to be a precursor for such a move. It is of significance to note that Isnilon Hapilon was designated as Daesh emir in the Philippines through a Daesh video titled 'The Solid Structure'.[105] The battle for Marawi, which is said to have been the longest urban battle in the history of the Philippines, finally ended after five months with the militants defeated. However, over 1,170 people died, including 960 militants.[106] The siege in Marawi could indicate that the battleground has shifted from the jungle to urban areas. There were also a few foreigners who played a key role in the Marawi siege, including Malaysia's Dr. Mahmud Ahmad.[107] It was also reported that there were at least 40 members of the Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an Indonesian Daesh-alligned group, and

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[103] Joseph Hincks, *The Battle for Marawi* City, 2017. http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/ (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[104] Gabriel Samuels, *Phillipine soldiers battle ISIS-linked gunmen on Marawi city streets,* The Independent, 23 May 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-isis-gunmen-soldiers-army-marawi-city-street-battle-terrorist-jihadi-a7751406.html (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[105] Lian Buan, *Calida: Military knew Marawi plot as early as April,* Rappler, 13 June 2017. https://www.rappler.com/nation/172777-isis-military-marawi-crisis-martial-law-calida (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[106] *Islamic freedom fighters, Abu Sayyaf next after Maute wipeout – defence chief,* The Manila Times, 24 October 2017,http://www.manilatimes.net/islamic-freedom-fighters-abu-sayyaf-next-maute-wipeout-defense-chief/358410/ (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[107] *Annual Threat Assessment*, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

28 Malaysians who were fighting in Marawi.[108] The Philippine military was also reported to have killed two Saudis, one Yemeni, one Chechen and one Indian.[109] There were also unconfirmed reports that Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Moroccan and Singaporean fighters had 'joined local groups' in the Philippines.[110]

It is also pertinent to note that the presence of foreign fighters in the Philippines, like Dr. Mahmud, is not something new. From the late 1990s until the early 2000s, there were already Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore who were undergoing training in explosives and arms in Mindanao in MILF's Camp Abu Bakar and later JI's Camp Hudaybiyya.

In June 2016, Daesh released a propaganda video titled 'The Solid Structure', which highlighted that if sympathisers and members in Southeast Asia were not in a position to travel to Syria, to then 'go to the Philippines."[111]

On 17 October 2017, Marawi City was finally declared 'liberated'.[112] However, there are some who believe that while Daesh is 'shrinking in Iraq and Syria, and decentralizing in parts of Asia and the Middle East', the situation is quite the reverse in the Philippines and that, "one of the areas where (Daesh) is expanding is Southeast Asia and the Philippines is the centre of gravity".[113] This would be in line with Daesh's directive to its social media supporters 'to prepare for the second stage of attack in other cities in Southern Philippines,[114] highlighting that 'Marawi is just the beginning' for there will be "new cubs and soldiers"[115] who will be trained.

[108] Francis Chan, *Indonesian militant's presence in Marawi City sparks alarm,* The Straits Times, 12 June 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-militants-presence-in-marawi-city-sparks-alarm (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[109] Tom Allard, *Ominous signs of an Asian hub for Islamic State in the Philippines,* Reuters, 30 May 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-foreigners/ominous-signs-of-an-asian-hub-for-islamic-state-in-the-philippines-idUSKBN18Q0OO (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[110] Alexis Romero, *Authorities verifying presence of 89 foreign terrorists in Mindanao,* The Philippine Star, 24 June 2017. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/24/1713205/authorities-verifying-presence-89-foreign-terrorists-mindanao (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[111] Rappler, *ISIS Followers in Southeast Asia: Go to the Philippines*, 25 June 2016. https://www.rappler.com/nation/137573-isis-fight-southeast-asia-philippines (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[112] Jasminder Singh, *Liberation of Marawi: Implications for Southeast Asia,* RSIS Commentary, No. 197, 19 October 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CO17197.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[113] Rohan Gunaratna quoted in Tom Allard, *Ominous signs of an Asian hub for Islamic State in the Philippines,* Reuters, 30 May 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-foreigners/ominous-signs-of-an-asian-hub-for-islamic-state-in-the-philippines-idUSKBN18Q0OO (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[114] *Annual Threat Assessment,* Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[115] Jasminder Singh, *Liberation of Marawi: Implications for Southeast Asia*, RSIS Commentary, No. 197, 19 October 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CO17197.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2018).

Undergraduate Radicalisation

The radicalisation of undergraduates in universities in the Philippines is not solely one that is religious based. For example, to counter the recruitment of undergraduates into the communist movement, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) conducted more than 50 symposiums in Metro Manila's institutions of higher learning in 2008. This was in addition to another 50 similar symposiums that were held in villages. According to the AFP, these symposiums were carried out to "counter recruitment activities" by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), in "universities and colleges". They were said to be using these institutions of higher learning as a 'source of their cadres'.[116]

According to Amparo Pamela Fabe[117] ,

> *"In the period from 1970s up to the 1990s, the trend towards youth recruitment by the CPP accelerated. Most of the educated young members of the CPP were recruited from the country's top universities. Many of the CPP ideologues became faculty members of prestigious state universities and colleges all over the country. Marxism, Leninism and Maoism were taught openly in schools and colleges. The CPP ideologues, who became excellent professors, recruited actively on campus. For example, the University of the Philippines Diliman, the University of the Philippines Los Banos, Ateneo de Manila University and Central Luzon State University became the seedbeds of youth recruitment for the CPP."*

In a rare news conference for a group of reporters, Jaime Padilla, the Philippine communist leader, reiterated that there was a 'big pool of young people" who would continue the "people's war" even if it "would take a hundred years or more".[118]

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[116] *AFP brings fight against CPP-NPA into universities and colleges*, GMA News Online, 24 November 2008. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/135410/afp-brings-fight-vs-cpp-npa-into-universities-colleges/story/ (accessed on 1 February 2018).
[117] Amparo Pamela Fabe, *The Communist Party of the Philippines and Youth Recruitment: Local Development And Transnational Connections*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://www.searcct.gov.my/ms/penerbitan/penerbitan?id=61 (accessed on 1 February 2018).
[118] *Philippines' communist rebellion: A new generation*, AFP, 16 August 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/923139/philippines-communist-rebellion-a-new-generation (accessed on 1 February 2018).

Research Findings

A total of 782 surveys were conducted on undergraduates from the University of the Philippines (Mindanao Campus), University of Southern Philippines, Mindanao State University (Iligan Institute of Technology), Mindanao State University (Main Campus), Mindanao State University (Maguindanao Campus), Western Mindanao State University (Zamboanga City), University of the Philippines Diliman and University of Makati.

General Information

In the Philippines, 98.20% of the undergraduates surveyed had either heard or read about terrorism.

Chart 114: Have you heard/read about terrorism?

Out of this, the percentage of females who knew or had read about terrorism was slightly higher (98.79%) when compared to the males (97.30%).

Chart 115: Females and males who know about terrorism

For the undergraduates, their sources of information on terrorism were mainly from local news (81.13%), followed by foreign news (68.42%).

Chart 116: Sources of information on terrorism news

In terms of the kinds of media that the undergraduates obtained information on terrorism; the television was ranked highest (97.05%), followed by the Internet (82.54%), the newspapers (68.04%), the radio (59.18%), books (26.70%), seminars/courses/conferences (25.03%) and lastly, magazines (22.46%).

Chart 117: Kinds of media to obtain information on terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on the definition of terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates considered killing of civilians (85.62%), followed by murder (75.23%), followed by armed robbery (51.35%), followed by riots/strikes (48.52%), followed by hijacking (47.24%), followed by rape (32.48%) and lastly, street demonstrations (28.88%), to be acts of terrorism.

Chart 118: Definitions of terrorism

72.18% of the undergraduates felt that there was a need for a commonly accepted definition for terrorism before it could be solved. A similar number (72.40%) felt that there was hope that all nations would eventually accept a common definition for terrorism.

Chart 119: The need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism before it can be solved & the hope that all nations would accept a common definition for terrorism

General perception of undergraduates on terrorism

With regards to whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, more than half (57.71%) of the undergraduates either strongly agreed or agreed, whilst 15.17% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

Chart 120: I believe that terrorism is a modern day phenomenon

Approximately 68.89% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that home-grown terrorism in the West was a serious problem, while only 3.99% felt otherwise.

Chart 121: I believe that home-grown terrorism in the West is a serious problem

An overwhelming majority (82.78%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was indeed a serious global problem, with only 5.65% feeling otherwise

Chart 122 : I believe that terrorism is a serious global problem

It is significant to note that while 55.14% of the undergraduates did not agree that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective, there was nevertheless nearly a quarter (23.78%) who felt that it was.

Chart 123 : I believe that terrorism is an effective strategy to achieve an objective

With regards to winning the war on terrorism, 39.98% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not so, while 16.84% felt otherwise.

Chart 124 : I believe that the world is winning the war on terrorism

With regards to solving the issue of terrorism, the undergraduates were more optimistic than pessimistic. 37.46% felt that it was possible, while 23.43% thought otherwise.

Chart 125 : I believe that the issue of terrorism will be solved

On whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, approximately a quarter of the respondents (25.06%) were of the opinion that this was the case, while only 15.43% felt otherwise.

Chart 126 : I believe that the US has the right strategy when dealing with terrorism

On the question of terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) being illegal and unethical at all times, an overwhelming majority of 79.05% agreed, with only 9.64% disagreeing, while 7.33% remained neutral.

Chart 127 : Terrorism (killing of civilians) is illegal & unethical at all times

On the premise that understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, only 33.94% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, while 26.22% disagreed.

Chart 128 : Understanding terrorism means that we justify terrorism

On whether the 9/11 bombing in the US was an act of terrorism, more than half of the undergraduates (67.23%) felt that it was so, with only 6.68% feeling otherwise.

Chart 129 : The 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism

37.84% of the undergraduates felt that the Palestinian issue was a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, while 6.57% disagreed.

Chart 130 : The Palestinian issue is a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West

Terrorism and Undergraduates

40.20% of the undergraduates believed that they were targets for extremist/radical teachings. Approximately one-tenth (11.09%) thought otherwise.

Chart 131 : Undergraduates are targets of extremist/radical teaching

Approximately 38.15% of the undergraduates felt that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism, while 21.65% felt otherwise.

Chart 132 : Universities can be used as breeding grounds for terrorism

44.20% of the undergraduates felt that universities could play a role in countering extremist/radical teachings, while only 13.01% disagreed.

Chart 133 : Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/radical teaching

More than half (64.43%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives, while 7.09% felt otherwise.

Chart 134 : Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

Perception of undergraduates on the Internet and terrorism

39.95% of the undergraduates felt that they could not be separated from the Internet, while 18.05% thought otherwise.

Chart 135 : The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

On whether they would visit a known militant/terrorist website, 34.79% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they would not, while approximately 22.84% said that they would.

Chart 136 : Would you visit a know militant/terrorist website?

Approximately half (49.74%) of the undergraduates were not willing to chat in a chat-room with people who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective. However, there were still 13.54% who were willing to do so.

Chart 137 : Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political objective?

A majority of the undergraduates (66.92%) felt that terrorists could use the Internet to recruit members, while only 8.88% thought otherwise.

Chart 138 : The terrorist can use the Internet to recruit members

With regards to whether the foreign media's reporting on terrorism could be trusted, there was an equal mix in which 29.99% felt that it could be trusted, whilst 20.20% felt otherwise.

Chart 139 : The foreign media's reports on terrorism can be trusted

37.45% of the undergraduates felt that the foreign media conveniently linked terrorism with Islam, with only 12.10% feeling the other way.

Chart 140 : The foreign media conveniently links terrorism with Islam

32.95% of the undergraduates felt that there was sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media, while 21.06% felt otherwise.

Chart 141 : There is sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media

33.46% of the undergraduates felt that terrorism needed the media to grow, whilst 24.42% thought that was not the case.

Chart 142 : Terrorism needs the media to grow

39.53% of the undergraduates felt that the local media was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, while 16.28% were of the opinion that this was not true.

Chart 143: The local media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

With regards to the foreign media, 35.79% felt that it was not effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, with 15.25% thinking otherwise.

Chart 144 : The foreign media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on countering terrorism

A slight majority or 54.04% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that military action was the most effective way in dealing with terrorism, while only 16.54% disagreed with this premise.

Chart 145 : Military action is the most effective way in dealing with terrorism

On the subject of negotiating with terrorists, 35.46% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was acceptable to negotiate with them, while approximately one-third (30.90%) thought that it was not permissible.

Chart 146: It is acceptable to negotiate with terrorists

34.29% felt that negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism, while approximately one-third (29.20%) thought otherwise.

Chart 147: Negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism to grow

The majority (65.06%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that stopping the recruitment of terrorism was essential in countering terrorism, whilst only 8.09% felt otherwise.

Chart 148: Stopping the recruitment of terrorists is essential in countering terrorism


The majority (60.84%) of the undergraduates felt that the support of the people was essential when dealing with terrorism, whilst approximately one-tenth (10.06%) felt that it did not matter.

Chart 149: You cannot deal with terrorism if you do not have the support of your people

The majority (53.85%) of the undergraduates felt that winning the 'hearts and minds' was the only way to effectively counter terrorism, with 10.30% disagreeing with this premise.

Chart 150: Winning the hearts and minds is the only effective way to counter terrorism


The majority of the undergraduates saw the importance of halting recruitment in countering terrorism. The majority were also of the opinion that the support of the people and winning the 'hearts and minds' was essential when dealing with terrorism.

## Perception of undergraduates on mental radicalisation

The majority (65.71%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a terrorist usually started out by having violent radical ideas. Only 8.74% of the undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

**Chart 151: A terrorist usually starts out by having violent radical ideas**

Approximately half (48.56%) of the undergraduates believed that it was possible to have radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whilst approximately one-tenth (9.40%) thought otherwise.

Chart 152: It is possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism


In this regard, 37.33% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not wrong to have violent radical ideas as long as one did not engage in terrorism, while 25.71% thought otherwise.

**Chart 153: It is not wrong to have violent radical ideas just as long as you do not engage in terrorism**

Narrowing it down to themselves, 45.04% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was possible for them to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism. Only 15.01% thought otherwise.

Chart 154: It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism


Slightly less than half (44.95%) of the undergraduates felt that it was very much possible for them to move from having such violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism. 12.58% disagreed with that premise.

Chart 155: It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

More than half (52.55%) of the undergraduates felt that graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause an individual to be radicalised and consider acts such as terrorism. Only 11.14% felt otherwise.

Chart 156: Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism


More than half (53.48%) of the undergraduates felt that the feelings of a group of people when witnessing others of the same race/religion/culture who were suffering unjustly in other parts of the world could subsequently lead them to violent acts in order to defend such victims. Only 9.04% of undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 157: The feeling that people of the same race/religion/culture are suffering unjustly in other parts of the world can lead to violent acts such as terrorism in order to defend them

The majority (50.98%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. Only 10.23% disagreed with this.

**Chart 158: Friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas**

On a follow-up question, less than half of the undergraduates (48.55%) believed that friends could play an important role in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. 11.81% of the undergraduates did not share this opinion.

Chart 159: Friends could play an important role in an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

With regards to lecturers, more than half (52.99%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. 10.50% however disagreed with this.

Chart 160: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

Similarly, the undergraduates (50.52%) were of the opinion that lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism. Approximately 13.26% felt otherwise.

Chart 161: Lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on alternatives to terrorism

More than half of the undergraduates (53.70%) were of the opinion that there were successful alternatives to terrorism, while only 5.80% thought otherwise.

Chart 162: There were successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances


More than half (54.22%) were unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence, while only 7.52% knew of such initiatives.

Chart 163: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence

The majority (58.97%) of the undergraduates agreed with the premise that should people be aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there would then be the possibility that fewer people would subsequently resort to violence. This was in contrast to 6.46% who felt otherwise.

Chart 164: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to violence

48.68% of the undergraduates felt that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, with 10.16% feeling otherwise.

Chart 165: Non-violence is a possible alternative strategy to address injustice

54.75% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that worked. Only a small minority (7.26%) felt otherwise.

Chart 166: Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works

More than half (52.77%) of the undergraduates felt that Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (6.07%) felt otherwise.

Chart 167: Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence is an example of successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change

In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, slightly more than half (52.31%) of the undergraduates felt that her efforts to fight for her belief without resorting to violence in Myanmar was an example of a non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (6.21%) felt otherwise.

Chart 168: Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 58.46% of the undergraduates felt that their efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas was an example of a non-violent strategy that had the potential to bring about positive change. Only 3.84% felt otherwise.

Chart 169: The International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the United Nations (UN), more than half (57.67%) of the undergraduates felt that their efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions was an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change. This was in contrast to 5.95% who felt otherwise.

Chart 170: The United Nations'(UN) efforts in facilitating the peace talks between various warring factions are an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

Significant findings on the perception of undergraduates in the Philippines

Terrorism was something that was widely recognised by undergraduates in the Philippines. The undergraduates tended to get their information on terrorism mainly from the local news rather than the foreign news.

The majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a definition for terrorism was a pre-requisite before terrorism itself could be solved and they were generally optimistic that such a definition would be found.

It was disconcerting to note that approximately 40% of the undergraduates perceived themselves to be targets for extremist and radical teaching, and that universities were breeding grounds for terrorism. In the past, groups such as the NPA have used universities to identify, indoctrinate and recruit undergraduates and lecturers.

On a positive note, approximately the same number felt that universities had a role to play in countering such extremist teachings. This shows that there was receptivity and openness on the part of the undergraduates should the university

authorities decide to play a more proactive role in countering extremism and terrorist radicalisation in campuses.

Given that the majority of the undergraduates felt that terrorism would indeed affect their lives, it could be easier to get them involved in various counter-terrorism initiatives at the university, community and even national levels. Getting the undergraduates, who are predominantly young, to play a more active role in inter-religious forums and cross-cultural exchanges could bridge the perceived divide. The youth could also facilitate in developing and disseminating terrorist counter-narratives among their peers.

Nearly 40% of the undergraduates surveyed were of the opinion that the Internet played an integral role in their lives. It was significant to note that nearly a quarter of the undergraduates were willing to visit a known terrorist website and more than 13% were willing to engage on the Internet with people who advocated terrorism. Given the growing number of undergraduates in the country, this poses a significant challenge. At this juncture, there is insufficient data on why those undergraduates would want to visit terrorist websites or engage with terrorists over the Internet. Is it push, pull or a combination of both push and pull factors that are driving these undergraduates to visit and engage with these terrorist websites? Are the undergraduates merely being curious? Is it a passing phase? What are the numbers of undergraduates who after visiting and engaging these terrorist websites subsequently take the next step of joining terrorist organisations? Does the online behaviour of the undergraduates who visit and engage with such websites reflect and influence their offline behaviour or vice-versa? Can complete radicalisation occur solely through the online world? Is there still a need for an offline component before radicalisation is complete? Would it be possible to create an alternative website that could draw these undergraduates from these terrorist websites? Would such an alternative website work in reducing the number of undergraduates drawn to terrorist websites?

The majority of the undergraduates saw the importance of halting recruitment in countering terrorism. The majority were also of the opinion that the support of the people and winning the 'hearts and minds' was essential when dealing with terrorism.

The majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that terrorists started out by having radical ideas, and nearly half of them actually felt that it was possible for them to develop radical ideas and more importantly, move from having such ideas to actually carrying out acts of terrorism. More than half of them cited graphic images and witnessing the suffering of other people as reasons to be radicalised

and resort to terrorism. The undergraduates were very open to the possibility of graphic images triggering radical ideas that subsequently formed the basis of violent behaviour.

It is unfortunate to note that while more than half of the undergraduates surveyed felt that there could be successful alternatives to that of terrorism, most of the undergraduates were unaware of such initiatives. It was however encouraging to note that the undergraduates were of the opinion that if people were actually aware of specific alternatives to address injustice, there was a distinct possibility that fewer people would resort to violence. In this regard, non-violence was seen by nearly half of the undergraduates as a possible alternative to address injustice. This clearly shows the need to not only develop credible alternatives to terrorism but also, equally as important, to market, advertise and disseminate these non-violent approaches to reduce the possible perception among the undergraduates that terrorism was the only viable solution to address grievances.

It is significant to note that specific examples of individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Aung San Suu Kyi, and organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations (UN) seem to elicit a positive response among the undergraduates surveyed for viable non-violent alternatives to address grievances. Like the other countries surveyed, the undergraduates in the Philippines were very open and appreciative of real-life case studies of either individuals or organisations who had addressed grievances or resolved conflict without using indiscriminate violence. Hence, while it is important to expose the lies and myths of the terrorist rhetoric and propaganda, it is also equally important to develop, highlight and disseminate success stories of individuals and organisations who have made a 'difference' without resorting to indiscriminate violence.

<div align="center">Chapter Six</div>

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN SINGAPORE

Introduction

Singapore is a prized target for both Daesh and Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organisations.[119] On 1 June 2017, the Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) released its Terrorism Threat Assessment Report for 2017[120] which started by highlighting that the 'terrorism threat to Singapore remains the highest in recent years', citing that the city-state was 'specifically targeted', the regional threat was 'heightened' and that security agencies were on 'high vigilance'. The country was considered a 'key target' for groups such as Daesh which attempted to carry out an attack in Singapore in the first half of 2016 that was successfully dealt with by the authorities. In August 2016, a Batam-based group called Katibah Gonggong Rebus had intended to launch a rocket attack against the Marina Bay Sands (MBS) integrated resort. The group, which was foiled by the Indonesian authorities, had the aspiration of using a hill or an outer island of Batam as a launching point.

Internally, the Home Ministry also cited a 'significant rise in the number of radicalised Singaporeans detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA)'. While there were only 11 radicalised Singaporeans detained under the ISA from 2007 to 2014, there were already 14 Singaporeans detained under the ISA from 2015 to June 2017.

Daesh has also been able to successfully radicalise foreigners living in Singapore. In 2015, 40 Bangladeshi citizens in Singapore were detained for planning to carry out attacks against their government in Bangladesh.[121]

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[119] Rohan Gunaratna, *Singaporean fighter in IS Global Strategy: Shift from core to periphery,* RSIS Commentary, No 175, 26 September 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CO17175.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2018).
[120] *Terrorism Threat Assessment Report (2017)*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 1 June 2017. https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-releases/Pages/Singapore-Terrorism-Threat-Assessment-Report-2017.aspx (Accessed on 21 January 2018).
[121] Ibid.

This was the first case of a foreign religious terror cell in Singapore.[122] Since 2015, eight Indonesian domestic helpers were also deported from Singapore after they were found to be radicalised.

There has also been a number of Singaporeans who had travelled to Syria, mostly after being radicalised through social media. It was reported that a 47-year old Singaporean had left for Syria with her husband and three children. In 2015, a 19-year old youth was arrested for attempting to join and fight for Daesh. He was said to have been radicalised online. In April 2016, 26-year old Muhammad Fadil bin Abdul Hamid was detained a second time after he "became attracted to radical online material, like the teachings of radical ideologues such as Anwar al-Awlaki and the propaganda of Daesh" and had wanted to join Daesh.[123] On 23 September 2017, Daesh's official media outlet, Al-Hayat released a video titled 'Inside the Khalifah 4' which featured 39-year old Singaporean terrorist Megat Shahdan bin Abdul Samad, also known as Abu Uqayl. This was the first time a Singaporean had been used in a Daesh propaganda video. The Singaporean MHA confirmed his involvement in Daesh and was of the opinion that he was radicalised while working abroad.[124]

Hence, it is significant to note that while the Singapore Government does consider the possibility of an attack by an organised terrorist network, its greatest fear emanates from a radicalised individual living in their midst. Therefore, realising that the terrorism threat to Singapore was both 'multifaceted and serious', the SGSecure movement was launched in September 2016 to 'sensitise, train and mobilise the community in the fight against terror'.[125]

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[122] Stefanie Kam, *Singapore's Approach to Counter Terrorism and Extremism in Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asia Responses,* Panorama 02/2016, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_46739-1522-2-30.pdf?161028042843 (accessed on 22 January 2018).

[123] Ibid

[124] Rohan Gunaratna, *Singaporean fighter in IS Global Strategy: Shift from core to periphery*, RSIS Commentary, No 175, 26 September 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CO17175.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[125] *Terrorism Threat Assessment Report (2017)*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 1 June 2017. https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-releases/Pages/Singapore-Terrorism-Threat-Assessment-Report-2017.aspx (Accessed on 21 January 2018).

Given the religious dimension of the challenge, the Muslim community has been a very important component of Singapore's counter-terrorism efforts. In this regard, several Muslim-based organisations such as the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) and the Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS) have been 'spearheading Singapore's counter-ideological efforts.'[126]

Research Findings

A total of 171 surveys were distributed to undergraduates from the National University of Singapore (NUS) and the Nanyang Technological University (NTU).

General Information

In Singapore, 98.25% of the undergraduates surveyed had either heard or read about terrorism.

Chart 171 : Have you heard/read about terrorism?

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[126] Stefanie Kam, *Singapore's Approach to Counter Terrorism and Extremism in Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asia Responses*, Panorama 02/2016, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_46739-1522-2-30.pdf?161028042843 (accessed on 22 January 2018).

Out of this, the percentage of females who knew or had read about terrorism was slightly higher (98.44%) when compared to males (98.13%).

**Chart 172: Females and males who know about terrorism**

For the undergraduates, their sources of information on terrorism were distributed quite equally between foreign news (85.38%) and local news (84.21%).

Chart 173: Sources of information on terrorism news

In terms of the kinds of media that the undergraduates obtained information on terrorism from, the Internet was ranked highest (93.57%), followed closely by the television (90.64%), the newspapers (88.89%), seminars/courses/conferences (62.57%), radio (54.39%), magazines (52.63%) and lastly, books (52.05%).

Chart 174: Kinds of media to obtain information on terrorism

# Perception of undergraduates on the definition of terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates considered killing of civilians to be an act of terrorism (89.35%), followed by hijacking (81.55%), murder (67.46%), armed robbery (57.99%), rape (46.75%), riots/strikes (41.42%) and lastly, street demonstrations (23.67%).

Chart 175: Definitions of terrorism

Half (50.00%) of the undergraduates felt that there was a need for a commonly accepted definition for terrorism before it could be solved. However, only 38.75% felt that there was hope that all nations would eventually accept a common definition for terrorism.

Chart 176: The need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism before it can be solved & the hope that all nations would accept a common definition for terrorism

## General perception of undergraduates on terrorism

With regards to whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, 42.61% of the undergraduates either strongly agreed or agreed, while a similar percentage (41.42%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

**Chart 177: I believe that terrorism is a modern-day phenomenon**

Approximately, 69.64% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that homegrown terrorism in the West was a serious problem, while 10.72% felt otherwise.

Chart 178: I believe that homegrown terrorism in the West is a serious problem

An overwhelming majority (81.87%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was indeed a serious global problem, with 9.36% feeling otherwise.

**Chart 179: I believe that terrorism is a serious global problem**

It is significant to note that while 45.24% of the undergraduates did not agree that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective, there was nevertheless 30.95% who felt that it was. It was disconcerting to note that almost one-third of the undergraduates actually believed that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective.

Chart 180: I believe that terrorism is an effective strategy to achieve an objective

With regards to winning the war on terrorism, only 14.88% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was so, while more than half (55.96%) felt otherwise.

**Chart 181: I believe that the world is winning the war on terrorism**

With regards to solving the issue of terrorism, the undergraduates were more pessimistic than optimistic. 49.11% felt that it was not possible, while only 27.22% thought otherwise.

Chart 182: I believe that the issue of terrorism will be solved

On whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, the majority (50.60%) were of the opinion that this was not the case, while only 19.64% felt otherwise.

Chart 183: I believe that the US has the right strategy when dealing with terrorism

On the question of terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) being illegal and unethical at all times, an overwhelming majority of 79.54% agreed with only 10.52% disagreeing, while 7.60% remained neutral.

Chart 184: Terrorism (killing of civilian) is illegal & unethical at all times

On the premise that understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, only 15.57% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, while the majority (56.29%) disagreed.

Chart 185: Understanding terrorism means that we justify terrorism

On whether the 9/11 bombing in the US was an act of terrorism, the majority of the undergraduates (77.51%) felt that it was so, with only 7.69% feeling otherwise.

Chart 186: The 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism

Slightly more than half of the undergraduates (51.78%) were of the opinion that the Palestinian issue was a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, while 11.91% disagreed.

Chart 187: The Palestinian issue is a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West

Terrorism and Undergraduates

Slightly more than half (52.66%) of the undergraduates believed that they were targets for extremist/radical teachings, while 14.20% did not think that it was so.

Chart 188: Undergraduates are targets of extremist/radical teaching

69.65% of the undergraduates felt that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism, while 11.31% felt otherwise.

Chart 189: Universities can be used as breeding grounds for terrorism

76.65% of the undergraduates felt that universities could play a role in countering extremist/radical teachings, while only 8.38% disagreed.

Chart 190: Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/radical teaching

Approximately half (49.40%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives, while 21.08% felt otherwise.

Chart 191: Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

More than half of the undergraduates felt that they were targets for radical teachings, and that universities were possible breeding grounds for terrorism. They were also of the opinion that terrorism would affect their personal lives. Three-quarters of the undergraduates were optimistic that universities could play a role in countering terrorist teachings.

Perception of undergraduates on the Internet and terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates (79.64%) felt that they could not be separated from the Internet, while only a small minority (6.59%) thought otherwise.

Chart 192: The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

On whether they would visit a known militant/terrorist website, 38.92% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they would, while approximately 34.13% said that they would not.

Chart 193: Would you visit a known militant/terrorist website?

Whilst 47.91% of the undergraduates were not willing to chat in a chat-room with people who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective, there were still 24.55% who were willing to do so.

Chart 194: Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political objective?

A majority of the undergraduates (77.25%) felt that terrorists could use the Internet to recruit members, while only 7.18% thought otherwise.

Chart 195: Terrorists can use the Internet to recruit members

With regards to whether the foreign media's reporting on terrorism could be trusted, only 17.37% of the undergraduates felt that it could be trusted, whilst nearly double (34.13%) felt otherwise.

Chart 196: The foreign media's reports on terrorism can be trusted

Slightly more than half of the undergraduates (53.77%) felt that the foreign media conveniently linked terrorism with Islam, with only 14.88% feeling the other way.

Chart 197: The foreign media conveniently links terrorism with Islam

29.16% of the undergraduates felt that there was sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media, while 38.10% felt otherwise.

Chart 198: There is sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media

45.18% of the undergraduates felt that terrorism needed the media to grow, whilst 26.51% thought that was not the case.

Chart 199: Terrorism needs the media to grow

29.52% of the undergraduates felt that the local media was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, while 30.12% were of the opinion that this was not true.

Chart 200: The local media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

With regards to the foreign media, 23.17% of the undergraduates felt that it was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, with 39.03% thinking otherwise.

Chart 201: The foreign media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on countering terrorism

36.53% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that military action was the most effective way in dealing with terrorism, while a similar number of undergraduates (36.53%) disagreed with this premise.

Chart 202: Military is the most effective way in dealing with terrorism

On the subject of negotiating with terrorists, 36.15% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was acceptable to negotiate with terrorists, while approximately the same percentage (34.34%) thought otherwise.

Chart 203: It is acceptable to negotiate with terrorists

30.12% felt that negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism, while 41.57% thought otherwise.

Chart 204: Negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism to grow

An overwhelming majority (72.89%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that stopping the recruitment of terrorism was essential in countering terrorism, whilst 14.46% felt otherwise.

Chart 205: Stopping the recruitment of terrorists is essential in countering terrorism

The majority (65.87%) of the undergraduates felt that the support of the people was essential when dealing with terrorism, whilst 14.97% felt that it did not matter.

Chart 206: You cannot deal with terrorism if you do not have the support of your people

Most (48.51%) of the undergraduates felt that winning the 'hearts and minds' was the only way to effectively counter terrorism when compared to 22.75% who disagreed with this premise. Most of the undergraduates saw the halting of the recruitment of terrorism to be an essential component to counter terrorism, and felt that the support of the population was essential for that purpose.

Chart 207: Winning the hearts and minds is the only effective way to counter terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on mental radicalisation

The majority (55.35%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a terrorist usually started out by having violent radical ideas. Only 21.43% of the undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 208: A terrorist usually starts out by having violent radical ideas

67.26% of the undergraduates believed that it was possible to have radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whilst more than one-tenth (10.12%) thought otherwise.

Chart 209: It is possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism

In this regard, 41.07% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not wrong to have violent radical ideas as long as one did not engage in terrorism, while 28.57% thought otherwise.

Chart 210: It is not wrong to have violent radical ideas just as long as you do not engage in terrorism

Narrowing it down to themselves, the majority (71.43%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was possible for them to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism. Only 7.74% thought otherwise.

Chart 211: It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism

The majority (68.86%) of the undergraduates felt that it was very much possible for them to move from having such violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism. 7.19% disagreed with that premise.

Chart 212: It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

57.15% of the undergraduates felt that graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause an individual to be radicalised and consider acts such as terrorism. Only 11.91% felt otherwise.

Chart 213: Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism

More than three quarters (76.05%) of the undergraduates felt that the feelings of a group of people when witnessing others of the same race/religion/culture who were suffering unjustly in other parts of the world could subsequently lead them to violent acts in order to defend such victims. Only 5.99% of undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 214: The feeling that people of the same race/religion/culture are suffering unjustly in other parts of the world can lead to violent acts such as terrorism in order to defend them

The majority (77.38%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that friends could play an important role in the individual having radical violent ideas. Only 5.36% disagreed with this.

Chart 215: Friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

On a follow-up question, a similar percentage (73.81%) believed that friends could play an important role in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. 5.36% of the undergraduates did not share this opinion.

Chart 216: Friends could play an important role in an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

With regards to lecturers, 67.45% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. 5.32% however disagreed with this.

Chart 217: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

Similarly, the undergraduates (64.50%) were of the opinion that lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism. Approximately 7.70% felt otherwise.

Chart 218: Lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on alternatives to terrorism

More than half of the undergraduates (63.09%) were of the opinion that there were successful alternatives to terrorism, while only 9.52% thought otherwise.

Chart 219: There are successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances

More than half (61.67%) were unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence, while only 20.36% knew of such initiatives.

Chart 220: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence

The majority (64.49%) of the undergraduates agreed with the premise that should people be aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there would then be the possibility that fewer people would subsequently resort to violence. This was in contrast to 8.88% who felt otherwise.

Chart 221: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to violence

The majority (68.87%) of the undergraduates felt that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, with 7.79% feeling otherwise.

Chart 222: Non-violence is a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice

66.08% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works. Only a small minority (7.14%) felt otherwise.

Chart 223: Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works

The majority (69.27%) of the undergraduates felt that Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (3.01%) felt otherwise.

Chart 224: Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change

In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, more than half (58.03%) of the undergraduates felt that her efforts to fight for her belief without resorting to violence in Myanmar was an example of a non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (6.79%) felt otherwise.

Chart 225: Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 61.22% of the undergraduates felt that their efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas was an example of a non-violent strategy that has the potential to bring about positive change. Only 7.27% felt otherwise.

Chart 226: The International Committee of the Red Cross'(ICRC) efforts in bringing about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the United Nations (UN), more than half (54.87%) of the undergraduates felt that their efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions was an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change. This was in contrast to 12.20% who felt otherwise.

Chart 227: The United Nations'(UN) efforts in facilitating the peace talks between various warring factions is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

Significant findings on the perception of undergraduates in Singapore

The overwhelming majority of undergraduates in Singapore recognised and were familiar with the term terrorism. Their sources of information for terrorism were distributed rather equally between local and foreign news.

The Internet, television and newspapers provided most of the information on terrorism respectively, while seminars/courses/conferences, radio, magazines and books followed distantly behind. Knowing this, the authorities could exploit these mediums by developing and articulating both information and narratives that could either: (i) prevent young people from falling for the terrorist rhetoric or (ii) develop a love and sense of patriotism for the country. Singapore has done extremely well when it comes to the area of messaging on patriotism and unity, and perhaps could consider developing more specific and nuanced messaging in the field of counter-terrorism. At the macro level, countries that have yet to develop such positive messaging that Singapore has, could consider studying Singapore's model and then adapting the messaging to suit their own needs.

It was significant to note that approximately one-tenth of the undergraduates surveyed did not consider the killing of civilians to be both illegal and unethical, while nearly 8% had yet to take a position on this issue. The authorities need to consider that such youth have their own rationale and world-view, and having such thoughts could be deemed as being perfectly normal for them. There is, therefore, the need to engage such youth and perhaps share with them the harsh realities of terrorism.

These young people could prove to be vulnerable and susceptible to join terrorism and hence more attention should be focused on them. It must be stressed that these young individuals might not necessarily benefit from a more punitive approach from the autorities but rather that they should be engaged, allowed to express themselves, and once the channel of trust is build, they would then be open to hearing the counter/alternative messaging coming out from the authorities on the danger and fallacy of terrorism.

More than half of the undergraduates felt that they were targets for radical teachings, and that universities were possible breeding grounds for terrorism. Three-quarters of the undergraduates were optimistic that universities could play a role in countering terrorist teachings. It is obvious from the survey that universities play both the role in the possible radicalising of the undergraduate and as a venue to counter such radicalisation. Given this, university authorities must be vigilant at all times as campuses have the potential to be exploited by terrorists. Equally, given the positive response of the undergraduates on how universities have the potential in countering terrorism, the authorities should seriously consider how they could use the campus settings to further develop and improve their outreach programme among the undergraduates in this particular field.

The overwhelming majority of the undergraduates placed a great deal of importance on the Internet. Nearly 40% of the undergraduates were willing to visit known terrorist websites and approximately a quarter of them were open to chatting with known terrorists. They were willing to take that risk despite the majority of them believing that terrorists could indeed use the Internet to recruit potential members. At present, like in the other countries surveyed, we do not have the data on why undergraduates would visit terrorist websites and perhaps even engage with them. This lacuna in knowledge has to be corrected.

Is there a genuine interest on the part of the undergraduates to visit terrorist websites and chat with the terrorists? Is it merely curiosity? Is there traction and continuity after the undergraduates visit the terrorist websites and engage with the terrorist?

What we do know however is that the undergraduates are willing to both visit terrorist websites and chat with known terrorists, and the authorities' ability to prevent and limit such contact is both difficult to monitor and enforce.

It was also significant to note that the majority of the undergraduates felt that it was very possible for them to develop ideas associated with terrorism and even move from the idea phase to actually conduct acts of terrorism. More than half felt that graphic images and videos as well as witnessing others with similar characteristics (race/religion/culture) undergoing perceived injustice played a significant role in the radicalisation process and could trigger an individual to resort to terrorism.

The role of images and videos, particularly of people's perceived suffering and victimization, is made worse when there are commonalities between the ones suffering and the ones observing. This phenomenon was perceived by the undergraduates as a possible catalyst for the radicalisation process.

The undergraduates felt that friends played a significant role in an individual developing radical ideas as well as subsequently conducting acts of terrorism. On a lesser scale, the undergraduates felt that lecturers also played a significant role in an individual developing radical ideas as well as subsequently conducting acts of terrorism.

While the majority of the undergraduates felt that there could be successful alternatives to terrorism, they were also unaware of what those alternatives were. This was significant as the majority of those surveyed also felt that knowing specifically of such initiatives could play an important role in reducing the number of individuals resorting to terrorism. It was also encouraging to note that in this context, non-violence was still seen as a viable alternative to address injustice. In light of this, the authorities must not only provide credible alternatives to address grievances but also market, advertise and highlight such credible alternatives.

The majority of the undergraduates felt that the works and efforts of individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Aung San Suu Kyi, together with organisations such as the ICRC and the UN, were viable and credible non-violent approaches in addressing injustice and bringing about positive change.

This could indicate that the idealism of the undergraduates could be tapped, and that priority be placed, not only into developing individuals and organisations that could bring about positive change but also disseminating the narrative that there were credible and effective non-violent strategies to address political grievances.

<div align="center">Chapter Seven</div>

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AMONG UNDERGRADUATES IN THAILAND

Introduction

The threat landscape in Thailand is slightly different as the problem is two-fold. Firstly, the separatist issue which is confined more to the southern provinces of Thailand, and secondly, the threat of Daesh in the country.

With regards to the separatist issue in the southern provinces, Thailand has faced secessionist movements since 1902, which was mostly confined to the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and the five districts of Chana, Thepa, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi and Sadao in the province of Songkhla. It was reported that 'religious, racial and linguistic differences between the minority Malay Muslims and the Buddhist majority in Thailand,[127] coupled with the subsequent actions taken by both sides formed the basis of the conflict in the south.

The low-intensity conflict greatly increased in the early 2000s, with various 'deadly incidents' and 'intensified' in 2017,[128] possibly due to constitutional changes, the revival of dormant factions of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO)[129] and the renewal of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional's (BRN) leadership.[130]

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[127] Jayshree Bajoria and Carin Zissis, *The Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand*, Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2008, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/muslim-insurgency-southern-thailand (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[128] *Annual Threat Assessment,* Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[129] Vikram Rajakumar, *Insurgency in Southern Thailand: More Unrest Ahead*? RSIS Commentaries, July 4, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/CO16167.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[130] Amy Chew, *New Generation Of Insurgents Could See Renewed Violence In Thailand's South,* Channel News Asia, 19 May 2017. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/new-generation-of-insurgents-could-see-renewed-violence-in-8865058 (accessed on 23 January 2018).

In 2017, the separatist in the south increased their attacks, carrying out 38 coordinated strikes in April and detonating two bombs in Pattani in May 2017.[131] They carried out these attacks with the intent to 'pressurise Bangkok' to accede to their demands, which ranged from 'significant autonomy' to 'outright independence'.[132] The Government has tried to resolve this issue through negotiations with MARA (Majlis Syura) Patani, an umbrella panel representing the majority of the insurgent groups, but with little success.[133]

With regards to the issue of Daesh in Thailand, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that Daesh has been operating among the insurgent groups in the South for both entities do not share a common ideology or goal.[134] However, this could change.[135] There is always the possibility that Daesh fighters could persuade 'disaffected individuals or factions within existing southern insurgent groups' to rally and fight for a more far-reaching agenda. This might not be such a remote possibility as it was reported that several BRN members had 'personal ties to pan-Islamist groups'.[136] Added to that, in November 2016, social media accounts that had a connection with Thai insurgent groups had begun to showcase Daesh flags and symbols. There were also reports that the Thai police had received intelligence from their counterparts in Australia that there were Thais who were channeling funds to Daesh.[137]

[131] *Thailand: Insurgents bomb Southern Mall,* Human Rights Watch, 9 May 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/09/thailand-insurgents-bomb-southern-mall (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[132] Gabriel Dominguez, *A look at Southern Thailand's smoldering insurgency, Deutsche Welle,* 20 July 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/a-look-at-southern-thailands-smoldering-insurgency/a-18591878 (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[133] Don Pathan, *Southern Thailand's Peace Process Faces Many Challenges*, Channel News Asia, 18 June 2017, https://www.ucanews.com/news/deadly-bombings-dim-peace-prospects-in-thailands-deep-south/80438 (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[134] *Jihadism in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace*, International Crisis Group, 8 November 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/291-jihadism-southern-thailand-phantom-menace (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[135] *Annual Threat Assessment,* Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

[136] Jason Johns, *Faint ISIS Footprint In Thailand's Deep South*, Asia Times, 8 March 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/faint-footprint-thailands-deep-south/ (accessed on 23 January 2018).

[137] *Annual Threat Assessment*, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2018).

Undergraduate Radicalisation

Research Findings

A total of 1,555 surveys were carried out on undergraduates from Khon Kaen University, Ubon Ratchathani University, Chiang Mai University, Maejo University, Mae Fah Luang University, Prince of Songkla University, Kasetsart University, Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Mahidol University and Srinakharinwirot University.

General Information

In Thailand, 96.91% of the undergraduates had either heard or read about terrorism.

Chart 228 : Have you heard/read about terrorism?

Out of this, the percentage of females who knew or had read about terrorism was slightly higher (97.33%) when compared to the males (96.20%). The overwhelming majority of the undergraduates in Thailand, both male and female, are very familiar with the issue of terrorism.

Chart 229: Females and males who know about terrorism

For the undergraduates, their sources of information on terrorism was leaning more towards local news (82.57%) as compared to foreign news (60.77%).

Chart 230: Sources of information on terrorism news

In terms of the kinds of media that the undergraduates obtained information on terrorism; the television was ranked highest (89.14%), followed distantly by magazines (48.71%), followed by radio (39.97%), followed by the Internet (39.85%), followed by the newspapers (36.25%), followed by books (19.22%) and lastly, seminars/courses/conferences (8.10%).

Chart 231: Kinds of media to obtain information on terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on the definition of terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates considered killing of civilians (71.85%) to be an act of terrorism, followed by hijacking (63.24%), followed by armed robbery (50.77%), followed by murder (45.69%), followed by riots/strikes (43.96%),

Chart 232: Definitions of terrorism

66.36% of the undergraduates felt that there was a need for a commonly accepted definition for terrorism before it could be solved and the majority (71.97%) felt that there was indeed hope that all nations would eventually accept a common definition for terrorism.

Chart 233: The need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism before it can be solved & the hope that all nations would accept a common definition for terrorism

General perception of undergraduates on terrorism

With regards to whether terrorism was a modern-day phenomenon, an overwhelming majority (80.27%) of the undergraduates either strongly agreed or agreed, while only 5.09% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

Chart 234: I believe that terrorism is a modern-day phenomenon

An overwhelming majority (83.75%) of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was indeed a serious global problem with 4.19% feeling otherwise. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that terrorism was a global, modern-day phenomenon

Chart 235: I believe that terrorism is a serious global problem

Approximately 68.22% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that home-grown terrorism in the West was a serious problem, while only 6.06% felt otherwise. This could possibly be due to the constant media coverage on the terrorist attacks that have been taking place in the West.

Chart 236 : I believe that homegrown terrorism in the West is a serious problem

Only 31.81% of the undergraduates felt that terrorism was an effective strategy to achieve an objective, while 41.61% thought otherwise.

Chart 237: I believe that terrorism is an effective strategy to achieve an objective

With regards to winning the war on terrorism, only 13.51% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was so, while 37.17% felt otherwise.

Chart 238: I believe that the world is winning the war on terrorism

With regards to solving the issue of terrorism, the undergraduates were slightly more optimistic than pessimistic. 32.82% felt that it was possible, while only 26.63% thought otherwise.

Chart 239: I believe that the issue of terrorism will be solved

On whether the US had the right strategy when dealing with terrorism, 24.26% were of the opinion that this was not the case, while only 18.71% felt otherwise.

Chart 240: I believe that the US has the right strategy when dealing with terrorism

On the question of terrorism (which was pre-defined as the killing of civilians) being illegal and unethical at all times, an overwhelming majority of 74.69% agreed with only 7.68% disagreeing, while 12.59% remained neutral.

Chart 241: Terrorism (killing of civilians) is illegal & unethical at all times

It was mildly disconcerting to note that while only a small percentage (7.68%) did not consider the killing of civilians to be illegal and unethical, a bigger percentage (12.59%) was actually neutral on this issue. This could however indicate that there was still a chance for the relevant authorities in Thailand to actively seek to convince this group on the immorality, illegality and dangers of terrorism.

On the premise that understanding terrorism meant that we justified terrorism, 38.65% of the undergraduates felt that it was so, while 18.65% disagreed.

Chart 242: Understanding terrorism means that we justify terrorism

On whether the 9/11 bombing in the USA was an act of terrorism, the majority of the undergraduates (60.23%) felt that it was so, while a very small minority (2.64%) felt otherwise.

Chart 243: The 9/11 bombing in the US is an act of terrorism

Slightly less than half of the undergraduates (46.48%) were of the opinion that the Palestinian issue was a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West, while 5.63% disagreed.

Chart 244: The Palestinian issue is a tool used by terrorists to justify attacks against the West

Terrorism and Undergraduates

24.00% of the undergraduates believed that they were targets for extremist/radical teachings, while a similar number (23.61%) did not think that it was so.

Chart 245: Undergraduates are targets of extremist/radical teaching

28.28% of the undergraduates felt that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism, while 27.05% felt otherwise.

Chart 246: Universities can be used as breeding grounds for terrorism

44.07% of the undergraduates felt that terrorism had the potential to affect their lives, while 12.26% felt otherwise.

Chart 247: Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

40.60% of the undergraduates felt that universities could play a role in countering extremist/radical teachings, while 14.72% disagreed.

Chart 248: Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/radical teaching

Perception of undergraduates on the Internet and terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates (65.34%) felt that they could not be separated from the Internet, while a small minority (12.31%) thought otherwise.

Chart 249: The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

A majority of the undergraduates (59.94%) felt that terrorists could use the Internet to recruit members, while only 8.14% thought otherwise.

Chart 250: The terrorist can use the Internet to recruit members

On whether they would visit a known militant/terrorist website, only 12.82% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they would, while 47.82% said that they would not.

Chart 251: Would you visit a known militant/terrorist website?

Whilst the majority (63.26%) of the undergraduates were not willing to chat in a chat-room with people who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective, 9.57% were however willing to do so.

Chart 252: Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political objective?

With regards to whether the foreign media's reporting on terrorism could be trusted, 31.10% of the undergraduates felt that it could be trusted, whilst 12.20% felt otherwise.

Chart 253: The foreign media's reports on terrorism can be trusted

36.07% felt that the foreign media conveniently linked terrorism with Islam, with only 9.22% feeling the other way.

Chart 254: The foreign media conveniently links terrorism with Islam

20.77% of the undergraduates felt that there was sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media, while 24.78% felt otherwise.

Chart 255: There is sufficient fair coverage on terrorism in the media

62.45% of the undergraduates felt that terrorism needed the media to grow, whilst 6.58% thought that was not the case.

Chart 256: Terrorism needs the media to grow

27.16% of the undergraduates felt that the local media was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, while 20.26% were of the opinion that this was not true.

Chart 257: The local media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

With regards to the foreign media, 33.55% of the undergraduates felt that it was effective in playing its part to counter terrorism, with 11.55% thinking otherwise.

Chart 258: The foreign media is effectively playing its part to counter terrorism

Strongly agree / Agree
Strongly disagree / Disgree

33.55%

11.55%

Perception of undergraduates on countering terrorism

39.42% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that military action was the most effective way in dealing with terrorism, while 18.19% disagreed with this premise.

Chart 259: Military action is the most effective way in dealing with terrorism

Strongly agree / Agree
Strongly disagree / Disgree

39.42%

18.19%

The majority (64.41%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that stopping the recruitment of terrorism was essential in countering terrorism, whilst only 5.81% felt otherwise.

Chart 260: Stopping the recruitment of terrorists is essential in countering terrorism

The majority (60.22%) of the undergraduates felt that the support of the people was essential when dealing with terrorism, whilst 7.69% felt that it did not matter.

Chart 261: You cannot deal with terrorism if you do not have the support of your people

Most (55.14%) of the undergraduates felt that winning the 'hearts and minds' was the only way to effectively counter terrorism when compared to only 7.18% who disagreed with this premise.

Chart 262: Winning the hearts and minds is the only effective way to counter terrorism

On the subject of negotiating with terrorists, 42.47% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was acceptable to negotiate with terrorists, while approximately 14.87% thought otherwise.

Chart 263: It is acceptable to negotiate with terrorists

25.25% felt that negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism, while a similar number of undergraduates (24.47%) thought otherwise.

Chart 264: Negotiating with terrorists would only encourage terrorism to grow

Perception of undergraduates on mental radicalisation

The majority (67.95%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that a terrorist usually started out by having violent radical ideas. Only 7.28% of the undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 265: A terrorist usually starts out by having violent radical ideas

Slightly more than half (51.36%) of the undergraduates believed that it was possible to have radical ideas without resorting to terrorism, whilst more than one-tenth (11.93%) thought otherwise.

Chart 266: It is possible to have violent radical ideas without resorting to terrorism

In this regard, 35.07% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was not wrong to have violent radical ideas as long as one did not engage in terrorism, while 24.43% thought otherwise

Chart 267: It is not wrong to have violent radical ideas just as long as you do not engage in terrorism

Narrowing it down to themselves, 43.42% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that it was possible for them to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism. Only 12.05% thought otherwise.

Chart 268: It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism

42.22% of the undergraduates felt that it was very much possible for them to move from having such violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism. 13.04% disagreed with that premise.

Chart 269: It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

44.78% of the undergraduates felt that graphic pictures and videos of people suffering could cause an individual to be radicalised and consider acts such as terrorism. Only 15.29% felt otherwise.

Chart 270: Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism

The majority (57.16%) of the undergraduates felt that the feelings of a group of people when witnessing others of the same race/religion/culture who were suffering unjustly in other parts of the world could subsequently lead them to violent acts in order to defend such victims. Only 7.61% of undergraduates disagreed with this premise.

Chart 271: The feeling that people of the same race/religion/culture are suffering unjustly in other parts of the world can lead to violent acts such as terrorism in order to defend them

A slight majority (51.74%) of the undergraduates were of the opinion that friends could play an important role in the individual having radical violent ideas. Only 9.81% disagreed with this.

Chart 272: Friends could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

On a follow-up question, a similar percentage (50.23%) believed that friends could play an important role in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. 11.22% of the undergraduates did not share this opinion.

Chart 273: Friends could play an important role in an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

With regards to lecturers, 44.08% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that they could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas. 15.24% however disagreed with this.

Chart 274: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

Similarly, the undergraduates (40.43%) were of the opinion that lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism. Approximately, 15.35% felt otherwise.

Chart 275: Lecturers could play an important role in leading an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Perception of undergraduates on alternatives to terrorism

The majority of the undergraduates (72.11%) were of the opinion that there were successful alternatives to terrorism while only a small percentage (3.49%) thought otherwise.

Chart 276: There are successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances

More than half (57.75%) were unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence, while only 7.56% knew of such initiatives.

Chart 277: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to address violence

The majority (67.70%) of the undergraduates agreed with the premise that should people be aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there would then be the possibility that fewer people would subsequently resort to violence. This was in contrast to 5.63% who felt otherwise.

Chart 278: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to violence

The majority (63.83%) of the undergraduates felt that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, with 6.46% feeling otherwise.

Chart 279: Non-violence is a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice

57.46% of the undergraduates were of the opinion that Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works. Only a small minority (4.39%) felt otherwise.

Chart 280: Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to fight injustice in India without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that works

The majority (56.10%) of the undergraduates felt that Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence was an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (4.59%) felt otherwise.

Chart 281: Martin Luther King Jr.'s efforts to fight discrimination in US without resorting to violence is an example of a successful non-violent strategy that brought about positive change

In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, more than half (59.63%) of the undergraduates felt that her efforts to fight for her belief without resorting to violence in Myanmar was an example of a non-violent strategy that brought about positive change. Once again, only a small minority (4.72%) felt otherwise.

Chart 282: Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to fight for her beliefs without resorting to violence in Myanmar is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 58.49% of the undergraduates felt that their efforts to bring about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas was an example of a non-violent strategy that had the potential to bring about positive change. Only 4.00% felt otherwise.

Chart 283: The International Committee of the Red Cross'(ICRC) efforts in bringing about humanitarian aid to people suffering in conflict areas is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

With regards to the United Nations (UN), more than half (56.33%) of the undergraduates felt that their efforts in facilitating peace talks between various warring factions was an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change. This was in contrast to 5.36% who felt otherwise.

Chart 284: The United Nations'(UN) efforts in facilitating the peace talks between various warring factions is an example of a non-violent strategy that could bring about positive change

Significant findings on the perception of undergraduates in Thailand

There was a bias towards the local news as the source of information on issues related to terrorism when compared to the foreign news. The television remains the predominant media from which undergraduates receive their terrorism-related news, followed distantly by magazines, the radio, the Internet, newspapers, books and through seminars/courses/conferences. These numbers could mean that the television could be utilised in efforts to disseminate counter-narratives against terrorism. It is also noteworthy to mention that the Thai advertising field is well-known for its creativity,[138] humour and ability to tug at emotions, precisely the necessary ingredients to develop and disseminate successful counter-narratives. Given this skill-set, perhaps there is a possibility for the Thai advertising and marketing companies to get involved in this specific field.

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[138] Rezwana Manjur, *Yet another Thai ad kicks it out of the ballpark*, 16 February 2017, http://www.marketing-interactive.com/yet-another-thai-ad-kicks-ballpark-video/ (accessed on 3 March 2018).

It was disconcerting to note that approximately one-third of the undergraduates were of the opinion that terrorism worked. Nearly double the undergraduates felt that we were actually winning the war against terrorism.

Approximately a quarter of the undergraduates perceived themselves as targets for extremist/radical teachings and nearly one-third were of the opinion that universities were potential terrorism breeding grounds. On the upside, more than 40.00% of the undergraduates felt universities could also play a vital role in countering extremist and radical teachings. On the whole, according to the undergraduates, the university environment in Thailand played a significant role in both furthering as well as diminishing the cause of the terrorists. Given this, there is perhaps the need for both university authorities as well as counter-terrorism officials to monitor the possibility of terrorists disseminating their narratives in campuses.

In addition, given the receptivity of the undergraduates on universities playing a role in countering terrorism, perhaps there is a need to rethink the role of universities as being solely a centre to educate and to consider also the possibility of universities being used to critically examine the rhetoric and propaganda perpetuated by terrorist organisations.

The majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that the Internet played an important role in their lives. Specifically, they also believed that the Internet had the potential to be used as a recruitment tool for the terrorists. It was also significant to note that slightly more than one-tenth of the Thai undergraduates were willing to visit known militant/terrorist websites with roughly the same number of undergraduates willing to subsequently chat over the internet with those who advocated violence. While the number of undergraduates who were willing to visit terrorist websites and chat with terrorists remain relatively small, it is nevertheless a cause for concern. At this point, there is insufficient data to indicate what the drivers for such behaviour are and more work needs to be done to examine this phenomenon in greater detail.

Most of the undergraduates were of the opinion that slowing the recruitment process was a vital component in countering terrorism. They were also of the opinion that support from the people and winning the 'hearts and minds' were essential in countering terrorism.

The majority of the undergraduates believed that the pathway to terrorism usually started out with individuals having radical ideas. In this regards, more than 40.00% of them believed that it was well possible for they themselves to develop such ideas, and even progress from having such ideas to actually conducting acts of terrorism. There were some who were of the opinion that developing radical ideas was of little concern as long as such radical thinking does not lead to violent behaviour. While the experts continue to debate this issue, it is significant that a relatively large segment of the undergraduates were of the opinion that radical violent ideas could not be separated from subsequent violent actions. While it might prove to be difficult to stop radical ideas from being developed and disseminated, it is nevertheless within the power and scope of the authorities to expose hidden fallacies in the terrorist rhetoric and propaganda, and provide credible alternatives to that which are being pushed by the terrorists.

The undergraduates were of the opinion that graphic images of people suffering and the subsequent feelings that one had when witnessing such suffering or injustice occurring to a group of people had the potential of radicalising the observers and leading them to acts of violence in the name of defending the rights of the oppressed.

More than half of the undergraduates believed that friends played a vital role in shaping the views as well as leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. On the other hand, slightly half of the undergraduates surveyed believed that lecturers played a role in shaping the views as well as leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism.

While the majority of the undergraduates felt that there were successful alternatives to that of terrorism, most of them did now know what they were, and subsequently believed that if they knew, there would be a reduction in terrorism cases. In light of this, the authorities need to realise that they not only have the responsibility of providing credible alternatives to that of terrorism but they also have to market and 'advertise' these options to the target audience.

The majority of the undergraduates were of the opinion that non-violence was a possible alternative as a strategy to address injustice, and this was seen with their perception of the successes of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Aung San Suu Kyi, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations (UN) in utilising non-violence to bring about positive change.

Chapter Eight

SIGNIFICANT OVERALL FINDINGS

Radical violent and not-yet violent ideas: A clear and present danger

The majority of the undergraduates believed that terrorism usually started out by an individual having radical ideas. They were also of the opinion that there was a possibility for undergraduates to develop radical ideas such as terrorism and subsequently move from having such radical ideas to actually conducting acts of terrorism.

Chart 285: A terrorist usually starts out by having violent radical ideas

Chart 286: It is possible for an undergraduate to develop violent radical ideas such as terrorism

Chart 287: It is possible for an undergraduate to move from having violent radical ideas to actually conducting violent acts such as terrorism

The fundamental question that we need to seek clarity is the following: Is having violent radical ideas a prerequisite for terrorist behaviour among young people?

If not a prerequisite, could it be a possible trigger or push-factor?

Or should having not-yet violent/violent radical ideas merely be seen in the lenses of freedom of expressions and it being an avenue for young people to express themselves without actually doing anything violent?

Associate Professor Ramakrishna spoke on the contending views of how not-yet violent/non-violent extremism was seen by some as a 'safety valve' that allowed an individual to express ideas and thoughts, that while being radical, were nevertheless not-yet violent; while some saw it as a 'conveyor belt' for violent extremism.[139]

He reiterated that it was not just terror networks that posed a problem but also the so-called 'non-violent' but extremist groups like Hizbut Tahrir (HT) that specifically targeted university campuses with the express purpose of

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[139] Lecture by Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna titled '*Radicalisation over the Internet: Radicalism, Extremism and the Transition to Real-Life Violence*' for the '*Social Media in a Crisis – Effective Engagement in the Digital Age Workshop*' organised by the Centre for Excellence in National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore in October 2012.

indoctrinating undergraduates into their ideology that rejected the idea of a nation-state and democracy while advocating for a caliphate. Groups such as HT focused on infiltration rather than violence in the region, which according to Associate Professor Ramakrishna allowed them greater freedom and leeway and hence made them more insidious and deadly. [140]

While Associate Professor Ramakrishna focused on 'non-violent extremism', there are those who are of the opinion that even 'violent radical ideas' should not be viewed as a threat, for even though the followers have violent ideas, they remain mere ideas that have yet to be translated into actual action.

Hence, the calls to take up arms in Syria and Iraq were not criminalised in certain countries in the region as it was seen as just being mere words with no violent action actually taking place. It was also seen as being beyond the geographical jurisdiction of the country in question.

It is also significant to note that the distinction that differentiates 'violent radical ideas' and 'violent behaviour' is fully appreciated and exploited by terrorists. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, when asked about his role in guiding and motivating terrorists in Indonesia, clarified his position by saying, "I am only a craftsman selling knives – I am not responsible for how those knives are used."[141]

Ed Hussain, formerly with Hizbut Tahrir (and which operates in this region) highlighted how certain world-views 'even when held without advocating violence provides the mood music that encourages terrorist acts'.[142]

Authorities must realise that terrorists and extremists are developing and disseminating radical ideas that, while they might not necessarily be violent, set the stage for radical violent behaviour. While criminalising such radical ideas that lean towards extremism and intolerance might not necessarily be a step in the right direction, efforts must be undertaken to identify, debunk, expose and counter such ideas, simply because not doing so could facilitate the process to violent behaviour such as terrorism.

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[140] Email communication with Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore on 23 January 2018.
[141] Private communications with Professor Bilveer Singh, 4 March 2018 and Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the war on terror to islamist extremists*, Praeger Security International, 2007.
[142] Ed Husain cited in Tina Rosenberg, *Join the Club: How Peer Pressure Can Transform the World*, (London: Icon Books, 2011), 327–28.

Undergraduates are aware of terrorism and believe that it will affect their lives

There was a high degree of awareness and, to a certain extent, understanding on the meaning, complexities and nuances of terrorism among the undergraduates.

Chart 288: Have you heard/read about terrorism?

It is significant to note that the undergraduates themselves perceived the issue of 'terrorism' as playing a significant role in their lives.

Chart 289: Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

Given this development, it is rather unfortunate that the authorities in the region have yet to fully engage with undergraduates on this issue. Ironically, it is the terrorists who have spent more of their time, talent and expertise to attract the youth to sympathise, support and join their activities. It is unfortunate that the terrorists thus far seemed to be in a far better position to galvanize the youth and identify and exploit their talents.

In this regard, a paradigm shift is needed on the part of the authorities. Undergraduates should no longer be seen as 'passive spectators' and merely being at the receiving end of counter-terrorism programmes and activities, but be considered 'active participants' and 'joint-partners' with the authorities against terrorism.

While the idea of getting the youth to be 'co-workers' rather than merely 'end-users' might possibly sound alien, there have been case studies where certain specific tasks in countering terrorism was better handled when it was conducted jointly with the youth and at times even led by the youth.

A case in point was when the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia facilitated the Student Leaders Against Youth Extremism and Radicalisation (SLAYER) Workshop. SEARCCT conducted two workshops targeting 100 university undergraduate leaders from various universities in Malaysia. The speakers and resource experts were young Malaysians such as paralympians and celebrities who had the ability to connect and inspire youth; counter-terrorism experts who exposed the rhetoric and propaganda disseminated by the terrorists; and social media experts who trained the youth on specific skills such as creating online digital banners and posters. Subsequently, a hackathon was organised not only to create digital counter-narratives but also to disseminate these products.

The results were extremely encouraging. Qualitatively, SEARCCT was able to train 100 young leaders in producing and disseminating digital CVE products. These leaders then went on to become SEARCCT 'ambassadors' who then went back to their respective campuses and on their own, initiated workshops and sessions for their fellow peers. In terms of quantitative results, with the assistance of the undergraduate leaders, SEARCCT's ability to produce digital content doubled and then tripled. It was significant to note that in the five days that the Centre

conducted the two SLAYER workshops, the reach on social media increased[143] by an overwhelming 20,000 per cent[144].

This was a case study of how the youth evolved from merely being end-users to co-developers and facilitators in counter-terrorism programmes. The success of the above mentioned workshop supports the statistical data from the survey that suggests that the youth are: (i) highly aware of the issue of terrorism; (ii) concerned on how it will affect their lives; and (iii) receptive and willing to play a more active role in this particular field.

The power of a picture

The undergraduates were of the opinion that graphic images and videos, particularly of people suffering, had the potential to lead an individual to be radicalised and subsequently consider acts of violent terrorism.

Chart 290: Graphic pictures and videos of people suffering can cause an individual to be radicalised and consider violent acts such as terrorism

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
[143] Due to the sensitivity of the nature of our work, I will not be publishing our account names on social media but would welcome anyone who would like to know more to contact us directly.
[144] According to our Facebook analytics during that period of time.

In my previous writings,[145] I had highlighted that in the case of Daesh-type radicalisation, individuals were often times motivated by the desire to protect and avenge the atrocities that they perceived were committed by the Bashir regime on their fellow Sunni Muslims. Interestingly, they were 'moved by the graphic images and stories about how their fellow Sunnis were being cruelly mistreated.'

Alex Schmid explained this phenomenon by highlighting that in certain situations, terrorist groups often "adopt somebody else's grievances and become self-appointed champions of a cause other than their own". This occurrence, known as 'vicarious grievances', was based on "altruistic feelings", in which an individual felt the pain of another (secondary trauma) and subsequently "identified with the fate of an adopted constituency and acts on its behalf".

Khosrokhavar pointed out that young Muslims in the West often "cannot understand how it is possible to both watch the repression of the Muslim world on television, and live peacefully in a world of arrogant wealth and immoral complicity with the oppressors without raising their voice in protest or without taking action."[146] The key phrase in Khosrokhavar's observation was 'watch' in which emotions, particularly of anger, frustration, revenge, disgust and hatred were triggered, fermented and subsequently acted upon after watching and observing images and videos of the suffering of others.

Marhmudi Hariano alias Yusuf, a former terrorist who the author interviewed in Semarang, shared how watching videos at the age of 17 on the plight of Muslims played a key part in his radicalisation process.[147] In another example, a 22-year old British undergraduate who wanted to be the first female British suicide bomber was said to be radicalised when shown videos of Muslims allegedly 'suffering because of the West'. [148] In Guantanamo Bay, a study of young detainees highlighted that the recruiters extensively used visual displays and films of suffering women and children in refugee camps in Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan.[149]

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[145] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Deash in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, August 2016.
[146] Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*, Macey, D. trans., London: Pluto Press, 2005.
[147] Marhmudi Hariano alias Yusuf, Interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, 5 April 2011.
[148] Divya Talwar, *Muslim Women Targeted by Extremists' at UK universities*, BBC Asian Network, 5 August 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10855565 (accessed on 21 April 2018).
[149] Sharon Curcio, *The Dark Side of Jihad : How Young Men Detained At Guantanamo Assess Their Experience in A Future for the Young : Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization,* edited by Cheryl Benard, RAND National Security Research Division, September 2005.

In the author's interview with former terrorist Nasir Abas,[150] he highlighted how his instructors trained them – by showing videos of Muslims suffering in Afghanistan and Palestine. Similarly, Harry Setyo, a former Indonesian terrorist, recalled to the author[151] the manner in which his instructors used videos focusing on the suffering of the people in Palestine and Ambon to indoctrinate potential young recruits. In the author's interview with Noor Umug[152] from the Philippines, he recounted how teachers in certain religious schools in the Southern Philippines actively used videos of suffering Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries to both entice and radicalise potential recruits.

In my earlier writings,[153] I highlighted the following:

> *"Terrorists have focused and have been able to connect the individual to the perceived injustice of the aggrieved party. By cleverly manipulating the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution, in tandem with the globalisation phenomenon, terrorists have been very successful in ensuring that pain, anguish and misery happening in distant lands and even in different times, have been brought into the lives of the people, vividly and graphically, by the media in general and the Internet in particular. Through blogs, chat rooms and YouTube, perceived or real injustices happening all around the world have been condensed, edited, packaged and delivered to arouse a variety of feelings and emotions with the express purpose of eliciting sympathy, 'igniting the flame'[154] or even encouraging active participation in violent actions".*

Associate Professor of Psychiatry Dr. Speckhard highlighted that terrorists often times exploited images to both indoctrinate and recruit potential members. In the case of Daesh, Dr. Speckhard was of the opinion that images were used to convey that Islam, Muslims and Islamic lands were under attack and that this message conveyed through images were indeed very powerful. However, it was significant to note that Dr. Speckhard, who is very much involved in countering the narratives of the terrorists, was also of the opinion that images, if used creatively and sensitively, were also powerful tools in countering terrorist narratives.[155]

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[150] Nasir Abas, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 7 April 2011.

[151] Harry Setyo R., Interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, 5 April 2011.

[152] Noor Umug, Interview by Author, Manila, The Philippines, 30 March 2011.

[153] Thomas K. Samuel, *Don't-Lah Wei: A Peer-to-Peer Resource Guide on Ensuring that your Kawan Never Becomes a Terrorist'*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, February 2018.

[154] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2012.

[155] Email communication with Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) on 14 March 2018.

Therefore, the data from this study indicates that undergraduates realise the potential of graphic images to act as a trigger point for radicalisation. Numerous examples, from this region and beyond, further reinforce this point by highlighting the importance terrorists place on the usage of images in their indoctrination process.

The irony is that the ability to exploit images often times seems only to be realised and exploited by the terrorists. In most cases, there have been very little effort by the authorities in question to identify, generate and disseminate images and videos which could be used in countering violent extremism. This has to change. Two particular areas of focus in which images and videos could be generated and disseminated include victims of terrorism and rehabilitated former terrorists.

<u>Images and videos of victims of terrorism and former terrorists</u>

With regards to victims, in my earlier writings,[156] I highlighted that;

> *"Victims, by virtue over what has happened to them, provide a 'powerful emotional narrative' that has the potential to 'reinforce dissatisfaction' over the method and the approach taken by the terrorist.[157] Their story also has the potential to counter the often times evocative premise that the terrorists are representing and fighting for a victimised group of people. As highlighted by Schmid, "victim and survivor voices need not only be heard, but ought to be amplified."[158]*

Dr. Speckhard cited the case of the Beslan school siege in September 2004 in North Ossetia, where former supporters of Chechan warlord Shamil Basayev actually turned against him when the images of wounded and dead children from the siege went viral.[159]

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[156] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Deash in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, August 2016.

[157] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2012.

[158] Alex P. Schmid, *"Al-Qaeda's single narrative and attempts to develop counter-narratives: The state of knowledge,"* ICT Research Paper, January 2014, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Schmid-Al-Qaeda's-Single-Narrative-and-Attempts-to-Develop-Counter-Narratives-January-2014.pdf (Retrieved on 21 March 2016).

[159] Email communication with Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) on 14 March 2018.

However, according to Dr. Speckhard, there were also occasions, particularly with Daesh, when stories of victims of terrorism were less powerful simply because terrorist groups had taken the preemptive step of inoculating their target audience from having sympathy for victims of terrorism. The terrorists did this by justifying and arguing that the enemy was in fact causing far more collateral damage and that the supposed 'victims' that they had harmed were either infidels who deserved to die or 'good' Muslims who died as martyrs and would therefore go straight to 'paradise'.[160]

With regards to former terrorists, I had observed in my earlier writings[161] that;

> *"Former terrorists who have been rehabilitated and victims of terrorism offer a powerful story that could be harnessed in countering the terrorist narrative. In the case of former terrorists, they are said to have the credibility or the 'street credentials' and 'carry a certain weight in terms of the respect that potential recruits might have towards them.'* [162]

Dr Speckhard, who had worked with former rehabilitated terrorists, was of the opinion that their stories and images were extremely powerful. This was because the audience who were sympathetic to the story of the terrorists could identify with the former terrorists, who themselves were in that similar position in the past. That connection between the target audience and the former terrorists allows for trust and a connection to be build, making the testimony of the former terrorists far more credible and effective. Hence, stories of corruption, cruelty and deceit practised by the terrorists was better believed when it came from the mouths of the former terrorists, who are viewed as having first-hand knowledge and experience of the inner workings of a terrorist organisation. Dr. Speckhard however cautioned that on the downside, there was the possibility that former terrorists were at times not in good physical health and also had the potential to change their views and opinions over time. She proposed utilising videos of their testimonies instead of relying solely on their physical presence.[163]

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[160] Ibid.

[161] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Deash in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, August 2016.

[162] Sara Zeiger, *CVE Research Brief*, Hedayah Centre, December 2014, http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-research-brief-3.pdf (Retrieved on 21 March 2016).

[163] Email communication with Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) on 14 March 2018.

Hence, given the potential for images to act as a possible 'trigger' and 'driver' for radicalisation, there is also the possibility that images and videos, particularly focusing on victims of terrorism, survivors of terrorism and former rehabilitated terrorists, could be used to illicit emotion and provide a counter or alternative narrative to that of the images and videos developed and peddled by the terrorist.

In this regard, Think Twice Pakistan is a collection of videos produced by Black Box Sounds which is a communication company in Pakistan, doing work in countering the terrorist narratives. Among others, some of its videos powerfully capture images that showcase the misery and pain of the victims and the survivors of terrorism. The author has used many of their videos to reach out to undergraduates and people all over the world.

The International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)[164] has also carried out excellent work in this area in producing numerous videos that have graphically and critically used victims and survivors to create awareness on the dangers of terrorism as well as to counter their claims and propaganda. For example, the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, which utilises defectors and Daesh cadre prison stories is a powerful tool in countering terrorist narratives.[165]

These are but a few examples of counter narratives that have utilised images and videos. However, it is significant to note that there are experts in the field of countering terrorist narratives who are of the view that we are very much lagging behind in creatively exploiting the usage of 'emotionally-laden material' such as images and graphics to move people to action against terrorism or to create disgust with terrorism.[166] Dr Speckhard, for instance, is of the opinion that based on the premise that all good marketing is emotion-based, there is a need to move from solely fighting terrorism on a cognitive level, to now using emotions and graphics, as is being done by the terrorists.[167]

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[164] International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). http://www.icsve.org/ (accessed on 14 April 2018).
[165] *Fighting ISIS on Facebook—Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter-Narratives Project*, International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/fighting-isis-on-facebook-breaking-the-isis-brand-counter-narratives-project/ (accessed on 14 April 2018).
[166] Email communication with Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) on 14 March 2018.
[167] Ibid.

The need for credible alternatives to terrorism

There were many undergraduates who thought that there could be successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances.

Chart 291: There are successful alternatives to violence in order to address grievances

Nevertheless, they also admitted that many of them were quite clueless and unaware of the various alternatives that were available to address violence.

Chart 292: People are unaware of the numerous alternatives to violence in order to address grievances

It was significant to note that many of the undergraduates felt that should more people become aware of credible alternatives to terrorism in resolving conflict, there would be a greater receptivity for such options.

Chart 293: If people were aware of the alternatives to address injustice, there is a possibility that fewer people would resort to terrorism

However, the reality was that at times, the terrorists were seen to control the discourse and narrative with regards to addressing grievances. They subsequently present a landscape in which the only option that is both viable and available was to resort to indiscriminate violence manifested through terrorism. Terrorism was not just seen as the better choice, it was marketed as the only choice.

Terrorism is the only choice

In light of this, it is imperative that the authorities channel resources, expertise and effort to develop credible alternatives to terrorism and to dispel the notion that terrorism is the only choice. Given this, there is therefore a need to develop and articulate the concept of non-violence, particularly to young people.

Bob Irwin and Gordon Faison in their article 'Why Nonviolence? Introduction to Nonviolence Theory and Strategy'[168] define the concept of non-violence as 'taking action that goes beyond normal institutionalised political methods (voting, lobbying, letter writing, verbal expression) without injuring opponents.'

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[168] Bob Irwin and Gordon Faison, *Why Nonviolence? Introduction to Nonviolence Theory and Strategy*, New Societies Publishers, 1984.

The three main forms of non-violence were: (i) protest and persuasion; (ii) non-cooperation; and (iii) intervention. In my earlier writings,[169] I explained that;

> *"Protest and persuasion would include activities such as speechmaking, picketing, petitions, vigils, street theatre, marches, rallies, and teach-ins. Non-cooperation is displayed, whereby, when facing perceived injustice, people may refuse to act in ways which are considered to uphold the status-quo, for example, to work, buy, or obey. Examples in this category would include refusal to pay taxes, withholding rent or utility payments, civil disobedience, draft resistance, fasting, and different kinds of boycotts and strikes. The third category, intervention, can be defined as the active insertion and disruptive presence of people into the usual processes of social institutions. Examples of such activities include sit-ins, occupations, obstructions of 'business as usual' in offices, the streets, or elsewhere".*

Terrorism is the better choice

To address the ignorance of the youth on alternatives to address grievances, the theory of non-violence and its effectiveness must be taught, critically examined and articulated, particularly among the youth, to dispel the false notion that terrorism is the only choice available when addressing grievances.

Not only must it be taught, but based on the findings of the study that young people are often times unaware of alternatives to terrorism, there is also then the need to advertise, market, highlight and disseminate these alternatives to the public and especially to the young. In this regard, given the results from the study that indicated the positive response that the undergraduates had on case-studies on individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Aung San Suu Kyi, and organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), perhaps the way forward would be not to stress on the theory of non-violence but rather to showcase examples of individuals and organisations that have made a significant difference in the face of crisis and conflict without resorting to violence and terrorism.

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[169] Thomas Koruth Samuel, Reaching the Youth: *Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2012.

In my earlier writings,[170] I highlighted case studies such as the campaign against the slave trade by William Wilberforce; the movement for female suffrage by Susan B. Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt and numerous others; the Gandhian philosophy of 'satyagraha' (devotion to truth); Nelson Mandela's struggle to overcome apartheid in South Africa; Martin Luther King Jr.'s part in the American Civil Rights movement; and Aung San Suu Kyi's continued efforts in the 1990s in Myanmar as excellent examples which appealed to the youth. Such institutions and particularly such individuals, are seen by the youth as heroes and their stories resonate with the young people. Hence, the authorities need to go beyond just battling an ideology but instead highlight non-violent strategies as a heroic, sophisticated and viable mechanism. There is therefore the urgent need to articulate and disseminate these ideas, particularly to the young people, by advertising and highlighting the successes, viability and superiority of non-violent methods as the better choice in resolving conflict and addressing grievances.

In short, the authorities need to retake the discourse back from the hands of the terrorists, and based on the data and analysis of this study, the time is ripe as the undergraduates are positive on the possibility and potential of non-violence to be a credible and viable alternative to terrorism in addressing grievances.

The power of television and the Internet

Based on the survey results, the television and the Internet are extremely powerful tools when it comes to disseminating information with regards to terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Chart 294: Information on terrorism obtained from the television

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
[170] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2012.

Chart 295: Information on terrorism obtained from the Internet

The Television

The advent of the Internet has done little to diminish the influence and the reach of the television. However, while it is easy to see the pervasiveness and reach of the terrorists in other spheres of the media such as the Internet via social media platforms, e-articles and blogs; television, possible due to its high cost and the expertise involved in running it, does not seem to have a strong footprint with the terrorists.

Ironically, in many cases, the authorities who either control or, to a certain extent, regulate the television industry, also seem to have a very insignificant presence over this particular media when it comes to countering the terrorist narratives. Hence, while it is not uncommon to see public campaigns and Public Service Announcements (PSAs) on the dangers of smoking, the dangers of obesity, the need to achieve work-life balance, the dangers of drunk driving, or the need to be courteous; there is little content on the television that focuses or even touches on the dangers of terrorism and extremism, the pain and misery it brings upon the very people it claims to be fighting for, the deceptive lies of the terrorists and the scores of lives it has destroyed.

Given this, perhaps, it is time that the authorities in the region revisit their approach and consider investing in the necessary resources to utilise the television as a medium to spread awareness of the dangers of terrorism and extremism. Initially, the authorities could consider just converting the existing counter-narratives and alternative messages and content that are already present on the Internet for television viewing. The current content, readily available on the Internet and produced by civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and

think-tanks, often times funded by government authorities and international organisations, would be a good starting point. Hence, at the initial stage, the authorities need not focus too much of their resources on generating content but rather disseminating existing content that is readily available over the Internet onto the television platform. Not only would this allow tremendous savings in terms of content creation and marketing research[171] but allow the authorities the ability to start immediately.

Also, it would be worthwhile to explore Public-Private Partnership (PPP) when contemplating using television as a medium to reach out to the masses with counter and alternative narratives to that of terrorism. Given that 'air-time' over television is expensive, private companies could consider sponsoring such 'air-time' as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Television stations could consider providing such air-time at reduced or discounted rates. On the other hand, government-run radio and television stations could consider to start running such narratives as part of their PSAs.

With regards to the kinds of content to run, the authorities and private stations could, as mentioned, start with short PSAs that are 20 to 30 seconds long. Depending on the response and traction of the target audience, there could also be the potential of scaling these PSAs to become short animations, documentaries or even movies.

For example, Burka Avenger was a Pakistani animated television series that looked at the importance of education for girls, equality and non-discrimination in Pakistan and abroad.[172] These were all issues that the Taliban was very much against. It received very good response in Pakistan and was subsequently aired in Afghanistan and India. The series was also translated into Turkish, Arabic, Tamil, Pashto and Persian. This Emmy nominated show was also named by Time magazine as one of the most influential fictional characters of 2013[173] and serves as a good case study of how a television series with a message and a PSA that focuses on countering extremism and terrorism can still be an artistic and commercial success.

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[171] Some counter and alternative narratives developed by certain parties are only done after extensive market research to understand target audiences so as to develop an end-product that have the biggest impact.

[172] *Burka Avenger takes on Indonesia*, http://www.c21media.net/burka-avenger-takes-on-indonesia/ (accessed on 17 March 2018).

[173] Nita Bhalla, *Pakistan's cartoon 'Burka Avenger' swoops into India to empower girls*, Reuters, 14 April 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-women-entertainment/pakistans-cartoon-burka-avenger-swoops-into-india-to-empower-girls-idUSKBN0N50ZU20150414 (accessed on 17 March 2018).

The Internet

The study indicated the importance that the undergraduates placed upon the Internet.

Chart 296: The Internet and the undergraduate cannot be separated

The study also indicated that the undergraduates believed that terrorists recruited members using the Internet.

Chart 297: The terrorist can use the Internet to recruit members

The undergraduates' perception that terrorists were using the internet was very accurate. Daesh, for example, was extremely adept, 'tech savvy and understood social media'[174] and was extremely skillful at using Internet platforms such as Instagram, Facebook and Twitter.[175] Often times, the Internet and, in particular, the social media in this region, facilitated the process of radicalisation and recruitment.[176] In my earlier writings,[177] I had mentioned how terrorists were able to "conduct bigger scale efforts of radicalisation and recruitment via the Internet" and "when individuals showed deeper interest, they were then asked to move to other platforms which accorded more privacy". The Internet also had the potential in "piquing the interest and curiosity of the audience and led a segment of the audience to subsequently interact after the initial contact". This initial qualitative observation was later on substantiated in the survey when there was a significant number of undergraduates who showed interest in visiting known militant/terrorist websites and then went on to chat with individuals advocating violence in such internet chat rooms.

Chart 298: Would you visit a known-militant/terrorist website?

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
[174] Alfindra Primihalda, Interview with Author in Jakarta on 20 August 2015.

[175] Professsor Jamhari Makruf, Interview with Author in Jakarta on 20 August 2015.

[176] Maszlee Malik, Roundtable Discussion on Radicalisation in Malaysia organised by the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Kuala Lumpur on 23 September 2014.

[177] Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Deash in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, August 2016.

Chart 299: Would you chat in a chat room with people who advocate violence as a means to achieve a political objective?

The Internet also had the potential to shorten the time required to radicalise and recruit an individual. While in the JI case study, an individual took approximately three to six months before he or she was allowed into the group, groups like Daesh who used the Internet, were able to recruit much faster, often times in a matter of weeks.[178]

Collaborating in exploiting the Internet

While the Internet is a tool with incredible power, the authorities and the other parties involved in CVE need assistance in fully exploiting and maximising its value. Not fully exploring, developing and tapping into the expertise of these various partners would be disadvantageous at best, and disastrous at worst.

Social media companies and platforms such as Facebook, Google, You Tube, Instagram and Yahoo not only have to focus on their core business but they also have a responsibility to ensure that their platforms and tools are not misused. They have a vested interest to ensure that their products are not associated or manipulated, either directly or indirectly, by extremists and terrorists. Besides collaborating and cooperating with the authorities in this particular area, these companies are reservoirs of tremendous talent, skill and creativity in the field of Information and Communications Technology (ICT). From providing inputs on existing counter and alternative terrorist messaging, to training

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[178] Ahmad El-Muhammady, Roundtable Discussion on Radicalisation in Malaysia organised by the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Kuala Lumpur on 23 September 2014.

niche audience such as the youth on making videos to counter extremism, to providing 'free credits' over social media platforms for NGOs and civil society to 'air' their products which debunk the terrorist narrative, to connecting those pools of experts and activists involved in CVE, to assisting in the development of software or smartphone applications that either debunk terrorist narratives or create positive content; there are tremendous areas in which both parties could collaborate and cooperate.

Civil society and NGOs could also consider working together with the authorities in exploiting the Internet. The authorities could provide funding and technical resources to organisations that do work with victims or survivors of terrorism, religious clerics, women, youth and former rehabilitated terrorists. This assistance could be focused on utilising the Internet to tell their stories, connecting and supporting the work of those debunking the terrorist narratives, training in identifying those who might be susceptible to Internet radicalisation, and subsequently putting in place interventions that could build cognitive and mental resilience among those who are susceptible.

Digital advertisers and marketers are another group of skilled talent that the authorities could further develop areas of cooperation and collaboration with. Companies such as M & C Saatchi who do rebranding, advertising and marketing for commercial companies have already been utilised in the area of CVE. Using their specific skill set in understanding the likes, dislikes, fears and trends of a specified target audience, these companies then provide valuable insights into shaping, influencing and at times even changing the perception of the target audience. Hence, using their pre-existing skills in selling products, the authorities can tap their resources into selling ideas; chiefly that terrorism is strategically, tactically and morally wrong, and that there are other non-violent alternatives to bring about positive change.

In conclusion, the television and the Internet are two essential mediums utilised by the undergraduates and by extension, the youth. These two mediums have tremendous potential in which the authorities have yet to fully exploit, particularly in the area of countering violent extremism.

A minority of the undergraduates are actively seeking out terrorists via the Internet

As seen in the previous two graphs, the survey results indicated that there were a number of undergraduates from the respective countries represented in the study who have visited or are interested in visiting militant or terrorist websites. There were also undergraduates who would even consider chatting online with those who advocated violence as a means to achieve a political objective.

It is however important to note that 'visiting' online terrorist sites and 'chatting' with known terrorists might not necessarily indicate that the undergraduates themselves have already become radicalised or are even necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the terrorists. Also, those individuals wanting to visit known terrorist websites and engage with them were only confined to a minority. Nevertheless, this is a matter of concern and in terms of numbers, it is pertinent to note that a minority of a huge number is nevertheless a matter of significance. It is also possible to infer that a number of undergraduates who did visit those sites and engage with terrorists did so despite knowing that the Internet was a possible medium for radicalisation to occur.

At the worst case scenario, these undergraduates intend to visit/chat or have visited/chatted with known terrorists because they are sympathetic to the cause of the terrorists or they want to find out more about the group and the cause before they actually join. On the other hand, it could also be because the undergraduates who are mostly young, have heard something about the terrorist group and are curious to know more. While it is clear from the study that the undergraduates do actually know about terrorism, there is a possibility that they would like to know more from the point of view of the 'other side', and hence are drawn to visit and chat with the terrorists.

Regardless of whether the undergraduates are sympathetic to the cause of the terrorists or are genuinely curious about the motivations and goals that are being articulated, the end result is that there is a small minority of undergraduates who are actively seeking terrorists out. There is also the possibility that those who have actually visited the terrorist websites or who have engaged with them could then share their 'new-found discoveries' with others. The end result is that there is a possibility that the motivations, inspirations, desires, stories, goals and struggles of the terrorists have already been articulated to the undergraduates.

In this regard, besides education and awareness on the dangers of such websites, the reality is that the ability of the authorities to physically prevent or even fully monitor undergraduates from visiting such terrorist sites and subsequently communicating with terrorists was actually quite limited. While there are

punitive laws that make it a crime to download terrorists propaganda and while there might be a case to make that such punitive laws are perhaps necessary to prevent terrorists from being able to fully come into contact with the public, with the current technology, the actual ability to track, monitor and prevent undergraduates from coming into contact with such terrorist propaganda is relatively limited. Hence, the reality is that the ability of the authorities to prevent and limit contact between its citizens and undesirable elements such as terrorists are very limited with the advent of the Internet. Therefore, emphasis to focus on preventing such contact, while theoretically important, would be difficult to implement and enforce, and would have limited success.

What then could be done?

Let us review the situation again. Firstly, quantitative data from this study suggests that there are undergraduates, and by extension, young people, who could be actively seeking out terrorists' websites and engaging with terrorists over the Internet. Secondly, given the resources available in the region, the ability of the authorities to prevent this 'connection' between the young people and terrorists are rather limited, at best. Finally, such connections between the young people and the terrorists could, in some cases, be the basis for possible radicalisation and eventual recruitment.

In light of this, the author would like to suggest a possible paradigm shift in resolving this quandary. Firstly, the author would like to advocate the need for the authorities to move from the premise of 'preventing contact between the youth and terrorists/terrorist material' to 'inoculating the youth who come into contact with terrorists/terrorist material'.

Secondly, the author would like to propose moving from the premise of 'focusing CVE efforts on the youth susceptible to terrorism' to 'focusing CVE efforts on all youth' instead.

Moving from 'preventing-contact' to 'contact-preparedness'

In the past, the prevention component on the part of the authorities meant that the enforcement agencies did their best in preventing terrorists from coming into contact with their target audience. This meant ensuring that our borders are protected from terrorists recruiters attempting to infiltrate and physically slip through our boundaries to articulate their narratives, or even ensuring that their literature (books, magazines and articles) promoting their propaganda was carefully kept at bay.

However, all these means of protection and defence were rendered quite useless with the advent of the Internet. The Internet had allowed the terrorists to reach out and communicate directly with their target audience, sidestepping most of the conventional security hurdles that were placed by the enforcement agencies. Hence, a Daesh recruiter, through their online magazine Rumiyah and their media centres such as Al-Hayat can now bring their rhetoric, reasoning and justification through words, images, chat rooms, pod-casts, online games, videos and infographics right to the 'doorstep' of their potential target audience, all the while circumventing security hurdles and mechanisms that in the past have served us fairly well. Given this, the authorities' efforts to 'prevent contact' between terrorists and the citizens would prove to be extremely difficult to carry out.

In such a situation, perhaps the time is ripe to move from 'contact-prevention' to 'contact-preparedness'. Contact-preparedness is based on the understanding and assumption that given the difficulties involved in preventing the contact between the terrorists and their target audience due to the Internet, it would be prudent to prepare the target audience by building 'cognitive-firewalls' that firstly; seek to undermine the terrorists' rhetoric, justification and logic, and secondly; provide alternatives such as non-violent strategies to address possible grievances. Hence, in the event that an individual is 'exposed' to the narrative of the terrorists, he or she has, to a certain extent, been 'inoculated' with counter arguments, case-studies and alternative narratives that could turn the tide against the terrorists 'story'.

This concept follows the public health strategy of vaccinating an individual against certain diseases regardless of their risk in contracting the disease, given that prevention of such a disease to not only the individual but to the community in which that individual belongs far outweighs the costs and effort needed in the prevention exercise.

Given that there is little that can be done in identifying those who are at risk of being radicalised, and there is little that can be done in preventing terrorists to reach out and engage with their target audience, it then becomes incumbent upon the authorities to equip its citizens with the emotional and mental reasoning that would prepare them for the mental onslaught from the terrorists.

<u>Moving CVE efforts from 'youth susceptible to terrorism' to 'all youth'</u>

In the past, the security authorities would build and develop profiles of those they deemed to be susceptible to terrorists' rhetoric and propaganda, prioritising and focusing their resources on such vulnerable individuals and communities.

However, given the almost limitless nature of the Internet, terrorist groups no longer have to reach out to certain demographic profiles which they perceived had a better chance to be influenced and indoctrinated. Now, with the aid of the Internet, no one is beyond their reach and possible influence.

Hence, given the widening of the potential audience' base for the terrorists, it would follow that the authorities too should no longer limit their CVE efforts solely on those they deemed to be vulnerable and susceptible. Perhaps, a tiered approach would be better suited in which certain youth demographics are given priority and attention, while the remaining others are still given some attention, particularly by building their cognitive resilience through activities that focus on constructing their 'mental firewalls'.

The role of universities in radicalisation and deradicalisation

Based on the survey findings, the undergraduates perceived themselves to be targets for extremist and radical teachings, and that terrorism will affect their lives.
Many of them are also of the opinion that universities could be used as breeding grounds for terrorism.

Chart 300: Undergraduates are targets for extremist/radical teaching

Chart 301: Terrorism affects the lives of undergraduates

It is also significant to note that the undergraduates were of the opinion that lecturers had the potential to play a role in an individual having radical violent

Chart 302: Universities can be used as a breeding ground for terrorism

ideas as well as in leading an individual to actually conduct acts of terrorism. However, it is significant to note that they also believed that universities had the potential to be a venue to counter extremist and radical teachings. In this regard,

Chart 303: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual having radical violent ideas

Chart 304: Lecturers could play an important role in an individual to conduct acts of terrorism

Chart 305: Universities can be used as a place to counter extremist/radical teachings

the role of universities, both in creating an environment that cultivates and nurtures terrorism as well as a venue for equipping undergraduates to counter terrorism, remains ambiguous and relatively ill-researched. However, should we consider the perception of the undergraduates, there is little doubt in their minds that universities and lecturers have tremendous potential to be used as conduits and channels to either encourage terrorism or otherwise.

It is however unfortunate that the university authorities do not always share the view of the undergraduates and ironically, the terrorists seemed to have better understood the potential of university campuses, undergraduates and lecturers as agents of their agenda.

Hence, there is a need for the authorities in the ministries of education as well as in the universities to take heed of two important developments. Firstly; terrorists are actively trying to identify, indoctrinate, recruit and gain the sympathy of the undergraduates and secondly; there is an opening for university authorities, in the eyes of the undergraduates, to play a more important role in countering terrorism. In both these areas, the authorities need to take a proactive step in evaluating and reassessing their roles in the field of counter terrorism.

Chapter Nine

THE WAY FORWARD

The need for universities to be involved in countering terrorism

The authorities need to realise that terrorists are identifying and targeting the undergraduates in universities. No longer can the university authorities focus only on educating the undergraduates solely in their chosen academic field but rather they need to view education in a more holistic manner, encompassing the need to teach and create awareness on the dangers of extremism and violence propagated by the terrorists.

Besides debunking the assertions and assumptions of the terrorists, the university authorities also need to develop positive content in the field of counter-terrorism by focusing on peace studies, non-violent resolution, alternatives to terrorism in resolving conflict, and the importance and strength of unity and diversity.

The need to involve the undergraduates

Both the security and university authorities need to view the 'undergraduates' not exclusively as a 'client' but rather as a 'partner' in countering terrorism. While the undergraduates remain a viable target of the terrorists and efforts need to be undertaken to equip them in resisting the propaganda of the terrorists; it cannot be denied that these undergraduates also have the potential, energy and creativity to play a significant role in countering terrorism, particularly in the area of countering the terrorist narratives. Authorities have to realise that with the advent of the Internet, the 'playing field' has altered dramatically and they no longer have the ability to both 'command' and 'control' the situation and the players as they used to. This being the case, it is imperative that partnerships between the undergraduates and the university and security authorities are institutionalised from the very beginning when programmes are crafted and developed. Thus far, efforts in harnessing this potential from among the undergraduates in particular and the youth in general has been ambiguous at best and neglected at worst.

The need to exploit the media

The power of the media and in particular the Internet is very much in contrast when it comes to its usage by both the terrorists and the authorities. On one hand, the terrorists have realised the potential of the media and have exploited its various channels, particularly on the digital platforms; to push out their message, identify, gain sympathy, radicalise, indoctrinate and recruit the youth in general and the undergraduates in particular. The authorities, on the other hand, with a few

exceptions, have by and large remained uncoordinated and rather hesitant to fully exploit the media to reach out to the youth on the dangers of the ideas advocated by the terrorists. The tremendous skills and resources available to many of the authorities in terms of counter-terrorism specialists, media and communications practitioners, digital and social media specialists, advertisers and marketers, and religious experts have yet to be coordinated and utilised in exploiting the media. This has to change.

The need to target non-violent radicalisation to prevent violent radicalisation

While radicalisation leading to violence is the final goal for most terrorist organisations, it is nevertheless imperative to realise that such kinds of radicalisation actually grow from an environment where 'not-yet' violent radicalisation is allowed to grow and be nurtured. As mentioned earlier, developing and disseminating radical ideas that while might not necessarily be violent, set the stage for subsequent radical violent behaviour. Hence, 'not-yet' violent radicalisation has the tremendous potential to act as a 'conveyor belt' for subsequent violent extremism. Given this, the authorities in question must take and deal with 'not-yet' violent radicalisation before it evolves into violent radicalisation.

The need to tell the story of the victims and former terrorists

The terrorists are mostly gaining sympathy and recruits through an emotional appeal that is calculated to 'bypass the mind and go straight to the heart'. Their emotional plea is designed to elicit feelings of outrage and sadness, which they hope will be turned into the desire to either join the terrorist organisation or alternatively carry out acts of lone-wolf terrorism. In facing this compelling and evocative narrative, the authorities could turn the tables on the terrorists by getting victims of terrorism and former terrorists to share their stories and testimonies. The former has the moral grounds and the credibility to speak, while the latter possesses the 'credentials' to showcase and debunk the arguments and propaganda of the terrorists.

The need to publicise the alternatives to terrorism

Terrorists are often able to get away with their violent actions based on the premise that there is simply no other alternative to resolve a conflict or issue. Hence, there is an urgent need to revisit this premise and provide real-life case studies and examples of working, practical and sustainable models or alternatives to terrorism that are able to resolve conflict and address grievances. Not only

is there a need to develop these ideas, it is also imperative that such ideas and models are publicised, taught and disseminated at all levels of society simply because at present, the narrative of the terrorists that 'violence is the only way' is so prevalent that often times it is seen as the immediate default setting when faced with a conflict or grievance.

The need for digital story-tellers

The terrorist is, first and foremost, a 'story-teller' selling the target audience a well-crafted and developed story. Their ability to refine and perfect their 'story', particularly on the digital platforms, has allowed them into the 'hearts and minds' of the undergraduates. In this regard, it is imperative that the authorities design and develop programmes that will identify, train and deploy their own digital story-tellers on various social media platforms, who could at the very least, provide a differing view to that of the terrorists.

The need for real-life heroes and heroines

Part of the success of the terrorists, particularly in gaining the trust and the allegiance of the undergraduates, is due to their ability to sell themselves as real-life heroes and heroines of a cause. While many a times the reason for the 'struggle' or 'battle' of the terrorist remains fuzzy and vague, the 'heroic' element of their struggle is often times well emphasised and developed. This is simply because the terrorists understand well the needs of the young people to have someone to look up to. In this regard, it is unfortunate that the heroes that we have on our end all remain fictional characters in the comic universe. There is therefore the need to develop and disseminate the stories of real-life heroes, both present and of yesteryear. Case studies of well-known heroes such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Malala Yousafzai and Nelson Mandela as well as 'ordinary' heroes, well-known to the local community, who made a significant difference, must be actively developed, highlighted and disseminated at all levels of the society.

The need to re-channel curiosity

A significant number of undergraduates expressed their desires or had already visited terrorist-based websites and had even wanted to engage with known terrorists over the Internet. While their intentions might have been harmless, such encounters, without guidance, have the potential of creating mental or emotional openings for possible radicalisation. The authorities need to understand the reasons for the undergraduates wanting to visit such websites and engage with the terrorists. Sufficient information must be provided on who these terrorists are,

what they had done and the dangers of engaging with them. Given that there is a possibility that the undergraduates are merely visiting the websites and engaging with the individuals on the terrorist websites solely because they are curious, there is therefore the need to re-channel this curiosity.

The need for critical thinking

The terrorists' continuous use of emotions as a bait to gain both the attention and sympathy of the undergraduates is also one of their techniques to bypass the thought process of their potential recruits. Given this situation, it falls upon the university authorities to inculcate and teach the undergraduates the skills required in critical thinking. The university authorities need to equip the undergraduates with the ability to critically evaluate ideas and thoughts in general, and in particular those pushed by the terrorists. Such critical thinking and evaluation skills must be structured into the university syllabus and made mandatory for all undergraduates.

The need to move from 'selective CVE-inoculation' to 'comprehensive CVE-inoculation'

At present, awareness on the threat of terrorism particularly among undergraduates is done selectively on those who have shown tendencies of mental radicalisation or to those who could be susceptible to terrorist ideologies. However, with the advent of social media and the sheer number of youth from diverse backgrounds who have been radicalised, the previous model of 'selective CVE-inoculation' might no longer be suitable. Hence, the security and educational authorities need to develop programmes that would ensure that all youth, regardless of their background or circumstances, have the opportunity to critically evaluate the propaganda of the terrorists and discover non-violent methods to address conflict and address grievances.

CONCLUSION

This research project was able to yield significant insights with regards to the thinking, attitudes and possible behavioural conduct of undergraduates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. These insights were obtained by studying the literature on the subject, seeking the opinions and views of experts in the field, and conducting a quantitative survey on undergraduates from both public and private institutions of higher learning in the five countries in the region.

Among the key ideas that were obtained include firstly, the premise that both radically violent and 'not-yet violent' ideas were a clear and present danger. In this regard, it is significant to note that both radically violent and 'not-yet violent' ideas have the potential to set the stage for radical violent behaviour.

Secondly, the undergraduates surveyed in the five countries were very cognizant on the subject of terrorism and more importantly, had the deep-seated belief that it had the capacity to affect their lives. This awareness and belief should and could be utilised to get the undergraduates to play a more prominent role in countering terrorism in general and countering violent extremism in particular.

Thirdly, the premise that images were a powerful tool that had prominently been exploited by terrorists, and at the same time, held promising potential in countering terrorism. In particular, videos and images of victims of terrorism and former terrorists were powerful tools that had yet to be fully developed in countering the terrorist narratives.

Fourthly, the call to identify and develop credible alternatives to terrorism in the context of addressing grievances and addressing conflict. This was based on the terrorists' constant rhetoric that terrorism was not just the better choice but rather the only choice. In this light, the study indicated that there was not only the need to develop alternatives to terrorism, such as the non-violent approach of civil disobedience, but also to advertise, market, highlight and disseminate such alternatives to the undergraduates.

Fifthly, the premise that both the television and the Internet had the potential to be tremendous tools in countering terrorism, considering its popularity among the undergraduates. In this area, there is tremendous traction to be gained by exploring Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) between social media companies and platforms such as Facebook, Google, You Tube, Instagram and Yahoo as well as collaborations with digital advertisers and marketers to both create and disseminate CVE material over television and the Internet.

Sixthly, the premise that there was a small but significant minority of undergraduates who were actively seeking out and engaging with terrorists via the Internet. Given the limitations in preventing this contact, the authorities need to pre-emptively focus on building 'cognitive-firewalls' that would equip the undergraduates with counter arguments, case-studies and alternative narratives that have the ability to turn the tide against the terrorists 'story'.

Finally, the premise that there was a distinct and significant role that universities could play in both the areas of radicalisation and deradicalisation. Given that terrorists have been actively seeking to identify and indoctrinate undergraduates, there was an urgent need for the university authorities to take the initiative to relook at their responsibility towards their students in the field of countering terrorism.

From these findings, the policy recommendations on countering terrorism included the need for universities to play a more prominent role, the need to institutionalise undergraduates as vital stakeholders in countering terrorism, the importance of engaging and exploiting the media, the need to target not-yet violent radicalisation to prevent violent radicalisation, the need to develop and disseminate the story of the victims and former terrorists, the need to publicise the alternatives to terrorism, the importance of digital story-tellers, the significance of real-life heroes and heroines, the importance of re-channeling curiosity, the need to emphasise critical thinking, and the importance of moving from 'selective CVE-inoculation' to 'comprehensive CVE-inoculation'.

In conclusion, the research highlighted two trajectories. Firstly, the growing concern from the trends and patterns of undergraduate radicalisation in institutions of higher learning in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and secondly; the tremendous potential for universities and undergraduates to contribute positively and be significant stakeholders in countering violent extremism.

PROFILE OF THE AUTHOR

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UNDERGRADUATE RADICALISATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A Comparative Quantitative Analysis on the Perception of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism among Undergraduates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

THOMAS KORUTH SAMUEL